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For over a century, the Olympic Games have stood at the apex of what is now
a global sportsworld, marking the world sports calendar in a quadrennial
rhythm. They summon the largest single gatherings of humans on the planet to
a host city and host nation for several weeks of what the distinguished Olympics
scholar John MacAloon reminds us are sporting games, festivals, rituals, and
grand spectacle—all wrapped up in one intense, colorful, and often controver-
sial extravaganza. On the auspicious day of 8/8/2008, the Games of the XXIXth
Olympiad opened in Beijing, the fifth Asian venue in Olympic history, and these
Games in their East Asian context are the subject of this collaborative volume.
When our group of authors first met in March of 2008 in Hong Kong, look-
ing ahead to what might unfold later that year, I was sure that the 2008 Beijing
Olympics would be an apt instance of what Gary Whannel (1992) so strikingly
identified as “vortextuality.” By this clever neologism, he meant the power of
certain events to so dominate media coverage and public focus as to preempt
our attention to other developments. Whannel coined the term to signify not
only the intensity of coverage and the hyperbole of reporting and commentary.
He also identified a “feed-off” effect by which the media (and public commen-
tary and scholarship) are drawn into a self-referencing maelstrom of mutual at-
traction and competitive influence. In a frenzy of rivalry, media follow one
another in coverage, and the coverage itself becomes a topic of further coverage.
Major natural disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, public events like
the death of Princess Di, and global economic events like the 2008 financial
crisis can monopolize media and suck the air out of coverage and concern for
other events. Global sporting extravagances like the FIFA World Cup and the
Olympics can also become vortextual, and in 2008, as events moved towards
the Beijing Games themselves, Olympics-related issues again dominated many
national and international media-scapes by the journalistic and scholarly
scrutiny of the protests, the publicity, and the propaganda.
From the vantage point of 2010, did the Beijing Games generate such in-
tense vortextuality? The Olympics certainly consumed a lot of air time and com-
ercial resources and popular consumption. From the lighting of the Olympic
Torch to the street clashes in Lhasa to the fireworks over the Bird’s Nest Sta-
dium at the Opening Ceremony to the extinguishing of the Olympic Flame to
close the Games, the events of the Olympic year garnered continual, broad
media coverasge and public attention. We Americans heard more about Michael
Phelps, the poster child, and his physique and his mother and the most famous
photo finish in Olympic history than about much else that was going on in the




Media saturation (and, some argued, management) was even more complete
in China, but attention was remarkably widespread through the globe. The most
comprehensive analysis to date has been the 26 articles in the special issue ed-
ited by Luo (2010), reporting on an IOC-sponsored international research proj-
ect that coordinated 13 research teams around the world, analyzing media
coverage of the Torch Relay, the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, and the
Games themselves in 10 countries on four continents. This project also demon-
strates the academic scrutiny as well as media exposure garnered by the 2008
Games. The run-up and aftermath of the Games has produced an outpouring of
conferences, special journal issues, and books (see particularly Brownell 2008,
Caffrey 2009, Cha 2009, Close et al. 2007, Hong and Mangan 2010, Jarvie et
al. 2008, Mangan 2008, Martinez 2010, Price and Dayan 2008, Qing 2010, and
Xu 2008). These studies manifest multiple ways of analyzing the Beijing Games
and of assessing their consequences for China and for the Olympic Movement,
and they constitute an invaluable archive for the contemporary Olympic Move-
ment.
The particular contribution of our volume lies in assembling a group of East
Asian sports scholars to place the Beijing Olympics in an East Asian context.
The Olympics are indeed “Games,” but these Games are as much about eco-
nomics and politics as about play, and they are as much about patriotism and
profit as about sportsmanship.  The Beijing Olympics were a potent opportunity
for China to bring an Asian dimension to the Olympics and for the world com-
munity to cosmopolitanize China. They were a means by which Beijing could
claim its place as a global city, and they were a stage on which regional political
and economic rivalries could be played out or played up or played down in a
sporting idiom. Because they took place in multiple geopolitical and historical
contexts, any assessment of their effects must appreciate them as the fifth such
Games held in Asia, held after a century of Asian connections to the world-
wide Olympic Movement. That is what we seek to emphasize in bringing to-
gether scholarship on the Olympic experience in five East Asian settings.
This project began with a conversation that I had in early 2007 with my fel-
low anthropologist, Susan Brownell, who is well-known for her writings on
sport in China and on the Olympic Movement and who was then preparing for
a year as a Fulbright Senior Researcher at Beijing Sport University in the run-
up to the 2008 Games. Together, we sought out as diverse a group of scholars
as we could, both to represent the academic traditions of the East Asian coun-
tries, Europe, and the US, and to bring together multiple social science disci-
plinary perspectives. We were delighted with the response, and we are deeply
grateful to the scholars who agreed to participate.
We came together as a group together on two occasions. The first conference
was held in March of 2008, as popular disturbances were taking place in Tibet
and on the eve of the Olympic Torch Relay. We met at the University of Hong
Kong under the sponsorship of the Hong Kong Institute for Humanities and So-
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cial Sciences. We are deeply appreciative to the director of the Institute, Pro-
fessor Helen Siu, for the Institute’s generous funding and to Ms. Emily Ip and
the entire Institute staff for their impeccable arrangements. At these meetings,
we all benefitted greatly from the commentaries of two invited discussants, Ms.
Dong Qian, a reporter, commentator, and host on CCTV (and former World
Fellow at Yale) and Mr. Yu Bu, an executive editor for CCTV Sports, then work-
ing for the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee. We also thank several local
scholars, who offered astute and supportive feedback, especially Dean Kam
Louie and Professors Paul Abernethy, Frank Dikötter, and Ng Chun Hung of
the University of Hong Kong and Professor Leung Mee-Lee of Hong Kong
Baptist University.
The second workshop was held at Yale University in October of 2008, in
the aftermath of the Games. This was funded through the extraordinary gen-
erosity of the Council on East Asian Studies and its Sumitomo Fund. The Coun-
cil staff of Abbey Newman, Melissa Keeler, Anne Letterman, and Alan
Baubonis collaborated to provide a very hospitable venue for our public pre-
sentations and working group meetings.  Mr. Yu joined us again and our col-
league, Deborah Davis, in the Department of Sociology, offered support and
wise commentary. 
After the group’s papers from the second workshop were revised and edited,
the Council accepted the finished collection for publication in its Occasional
Monograph Series, and we are very grateful that its publication was made pos-
sible by a special subvention grant from the Sumitomo Endowment Fund. In
producing the volume, it has been a pleasure to work with Jason Driscoll of
New Haven’s Phoenix Press, a family company which is dedicated to being a
national leader in environmentally-sound business practices among commercial
printers in the United States. 
A note on orthography and proper name order. The contributors to this vol-
ume are from East Asia, Europe, and the United States, and we are referring to
authors and works in multiple languages. For consistency, we have adopted
American English spelling throughout, and we use the American Anthropolog-
ical Association citation conventions of in-text and endnote bibliographies. In
displaying and alphabetizing personal names, we follow the East Asian con-
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Beijing 2008 and the 
Limits of Exceptionalism
William W. Kelly
For over a half-century, the nations of East Asia have been as crucial to the
Olympic Movement as the Olympics have been significant to those East Asian
nations. This volume analyzes this mutual interaction at multiple levels—within
these nations, among these nations, and for the global Olympic movement itself.
The recent Beijing Olympics have been the starting point for our collective en-
deavor, but the volume seeks to place this Olympiad within the long East Asian
presence in the Olympic Movement.
Through the long endeavors of the Frenchman, Baron de Coubertin, an
Olympic Games festival was convened in Athens in 1896, marking the begin-
ning of the modern Olympic movement. By the late 20th century, the Games
(which from 1924 were divided into quadrennial Summer and Winter Games)
had become the largest regular sports gathering in the world. The massing of
athletes, spectators, media, and commercial interests makes the Olympics a true
“mega-event,” a vortex of individual effort, civic pride, national sentiment, and
global fellowship.
The first Olympic Games scheduled for Asia were those planned for Tokyo
in 1940 (with Winter Games to be held that year in Sapporo). The outbreak of
World War II forced the cancellation of what Sandra Collins (2007) has char-
acterized as the “missing Olympics,” and it was not until 1964 that the Olympics
came to the region, when the Summer Games were hosted in Tokyo. Since then,
the Winter Games have been held twice in Japan (in Sapporo in 1972 and in
Nagano in 1998), and the Summer Games were held in Seoul in 1988 and now
in Beijing in 2008. Worth noting too have been the many unsuccessful bids by
Asian cities in recent decades. Most recently, Tokyo mounted a strenuous bid
to bring the Games back to that city in 2016; it lost out to Rio de Janeiro, but
the Tokyo mayor vowed to continue his efforts. Pyeongchang, South Korea is
bidding for a third time to host the Winter Olympics, this time for the 2018
Games.
Each time the Games have returned to Asia, the region has loomed larger
on the world stage, and the Olympics themselves have vastly increased in mag-
nitude.  For the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, the degree of planning, the level of
investment, the scale of the events, and the extent of media coverage exceeded
even those of the previous Games in 2004 in Athens. In the buildup to the Bei-
jing Games, public and scholarly interest focused on two major questions. In
what ways and to what extent was Beijing 2008 changing the Olympic Move-




event, and, conversely, in what ways was the experience of hosting the
Olympics changing China? 
It is not surprising that these questions should have so engaged the world’s
attention. The critical significance of East Asia for the Olympics and the
Olympics for East Asia comes from two paradoxes that have been at the heart
of the modern Olympics for over a century. The first is the paradox of a move-
ment with very particularistic origins in late nineteenth-century Western Europe
whose philosophy nonetheless aspires to universal values. Is Olympism simply
a Western spiritual athleticism that claims a global salience, or have Asian ath-
letes and Asian host nations been able to expand Olympism to a truly global
vision? 
Secondly, the Olympic movement contains a fundamental tension between
the joy of participation and the drive for competition and between the athletes
as individuals and as representatives of nations. Cities and countries vie fiercely
for the right to host the Games and attempt to add their own special flavor and
themes to their venue. National sport federations and national media always
threaten to turn the Games into contests for national prestige. Are the Olympics
a joyous gathering of world athletes or a fierce tournament of national squads?
In what ways have the various Asian-site Olympic Games played roles in the
capital-city development, national politics, and regional relations of Japan,
South and North Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan?
All of the contributors to this volume address dimensions of these questions,
and in this opening chapter, I want to focus on one issue that underlay much of
the coverage of the Beijing Olympic year and is still with us as the post-Games
legacy-making continues. Were these 2008 Olympics special and unique, or did
they fit within the normal range in the history of other Olympics Games?
Overwhelmingly, media coverage and public commentary have emphasized
the uniqueness of the Beijing Olympics. Examples abound. For instance, Nico-
lai Ouroussoff, the noted architecture critic for the New York Times, arrived in
Beijing a month before the Games to assess the new Olympic buildings and
began a long and lavishly illustrated article that appeared on the front page of
the paper on Sunday, July 13, with rather breathless prose:
BEIJING — If Westerners feel dazed and confused upon exiting the
plane at the new international airport here, it’s understandable. It’s
not just the grandeur of the space. It’s the inescapable feeling that
you’re passing through a portal to another world, one whose fierce
embrace of change has left Western nations in the dust. [Ouroussoff
2008: A-1]
Such a sensationalist tone was not at all uncommon in the pages and air-
waves of the world media as “8/8/2008” approached, and it worked to create
an aura of unique significance and suspense. Indeed, it produced a strong the-
Beijing 2008 and the Limits of Exceptionalism
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matic of difference. These were unlike all previous Games, we were told and
shown, and the repetition of this thematic, from the Opening Ceremony to the
Closing Ceremony, from so many angles and with so much vertiginous spin,
came to provide its own self-referential support.  
The uniqueness of Beijing 2008 was, for some, a radical difference of cul-
ture—the radical alterity of Asian-ness, or the effect of “…passing through the
portal of another world…” as Ourousoff put it. But beyond such casual jour-
nalism, there is also serious scholarship that proposed that from Greece, the
font of Western civilization (Athens 2004), to China, the cradle of Asian civi-
lization in 2008, the Olympics were finally transiting from the parochialism of
its Eurocentric philosophy to a more truly global philosophical foundation. 
To others, the uniqueness of Beijing 2008 was a difference of politics, not
culture. Politics have permeated the Olympics from the very first Games in
1896, as Mandell (1976), Smith (2004), and other scholars have detailed. How-
ever, many commentators have argued that Beijing 2008 represented an alto-
gether new level of politicization and national social engineering. The
crackdown in Tibet and in Ürümchi, the arrests of domestic Olympic critics,
the rather heavy-handed marginalizing of protesters to obscure park zones, the
traffic and factory restrictions, the preemptory razing of old city blocks to make
way for Olympic construction, the widespread blocking of internet sites—these
and more were evidence to many that the efforts of the Chinese government to
manage the events, to dictate the reporting, and to control the internal and world
reception of the Olympics qualitatively exceeded any similar efforts in past
Olympic history. As the sharply contested peregrinations of the Olympic Torch
Relay showed, the greedy propaganda ambitions of the Chinese state met the
equally determined and strategically savvy oppositional protests from many
quarters of the world on an unprecedented scale.
However, in hindsight, I think it is valuable to revisit this question of ex-
ceptionalism and to reflect again on whether the XXIXth Olympiad really was
so divergent from the previous twenty-eight, culturally or politicaly. Did the
Beijing Olympics prove to be a radical departure from and thus a transformative
moment in the historical trajectory of the Olympic movement? Were the levels
of official abuses and popular protests through the year so far beyond previous
Olympic experiences? Were the possibilities of a new Asian sports vision that
drove the programming of the Chinese hosts sufficient to reframe the structure
and the meanings of the Olympics? What did the Olympics do to and for China,
and what have the Beijing Olympics done for the Olympic Movement? 
My own view is that the Games are not likely to prove such an exceptional
and transformational moment in Olympic history, and I believe that because I
see four factors that have operated to normalize and to routinize this Olympiad
and its Games. 
William W. KELLY
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• First are the ways that participation in the Olympic Movement and its con-
stituent elements have become regularized over a century of procedural 
refinement. 
• Second are the constraining effects of what I call Olympic temporality. 
• A third element is the rather long and under-appreciated history of East
Asian involvement in the Olympic movement, into which Beijing 2008
must be placed and which should make us skeptical about the current
claims of novelty and the prospects of transformation.
• And finally, there are the multiple, intersecting paradoxes upon which the
Olympic Movement is built and from which even the excesses of Beijing
2008 will not likely escape. 
In this chapter, I will expand upon these points in order to question the
claims of exceptionalism and to situate the Beijing Olympiad within the larger
institutional world of the Olympic Movement and the longer historical trajec-
tory of East Asian involvement in this Movement. I hasten to note at the outset,
however, that characterizing the Beijing Olympics as “normal” may seem odd,
even perverse, to some readers. In part, this is because the Olympic Games
themselves are far from normal sporting events and the Olympic Movement is
unlike any other sporting organization in the world. The Olympics may be at
the center of our global sports consciousness, but as a multi-sport extravaganza
of global scope mounted by a supra-national governance body, they are a most
unusual sports phenomenon to have such a hold on us. Unlike the FIFA World
Cup or the American football Super Bowl or Wimbledon or the World Figure
Skating Championships or the Cricket World Cup, the Olympics are the only
such “mega-event” that is a multi-sport gathering. And unlike these other world
sports championships, it is as much a festivity as a competition, and it is as
much about the assembly of participants as the crowning of winners. 
The power of the Olympics comes from the fact that it is so different from
the usual modern sports events that have such popular appeal and commercial
interest. And the complex articulation of a self-replicating International
Olympic Committee (its board and Commissions) with international sports fed-
erations, national Olympic committees, and local host organizing committees
is a unique pattern of global governance. In fact, I will argue, it is the very ab-
normality of the Olympics that makes it so difficult for anyone and anything
that comes within its orbit to escape its force field. In these terms, Beijing 2008
was not an exceptional Olympics; it had many distinctive—and disturbing—
elements but because of four features of modern Olympic history that I now
turn to, it was far less exceptional than many believe.
Beijing 2008 and the Limits of Exceptionalism
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“Olympic participation”: A normalizing trajectory
The Beijing Olympics demonstrate what we may appreciate, retrospectively,
as a common pathway by which countries (and world regions) now move from
the periphery of the Olympic Movement to its center. We may schematize the
gradient of commitment and standing as following a common sequence:
a. A country’s initial ambition is simply to participate in the Olympic
Games and in the IOC governance, symbolized by having a dele-
gation that can march in the Opening Ceremony and by organizing
a National Olympic Committee and gaining a vote in the IOC as-
sembly. Media coverage of the Ceremony will inevitably include
shots of one or several athletes marching behind the flag bearer and
name placard holder of a new or marginal IOC country that has
scraped together just enough resources to send a minimal represen-
tation. By 2008, there were 205 National Olympic Committees, ex-
ceeding in number the 192 United Nation member states.
b. Initial participation usually brings both the incentive and the pres-
sure to begin winning medals at the Games. Competitive success
becomes the benchmark of countries with increasingly robust par-
ticipation, and joining the rivalries for top medal totals is a measure
of becoming a leading Olympic power.
c. A further sign of rising status in the Olympic Movement is having a
national sport accepted as a demonstration sport and, even better,
as an official Olympic Games sport. For the 1964 Tokyo Games,
judo was given demonstration event status and in 1972 was granted
official status (women in 1992). For the 1988 Seoul Games, Taek-
wondo was given demonstration event status and in 2000 became
an official Olympic sport. Proposals to introduce wushu (a deriva-
tive of Chinese martial arts) as a recognized sport or even as a
demonstration sport at the 2008 Olympics were turned back by the
IOC, although the Beijing organizing committee was allowed to
present an unofficial tournament.
d. Of even greater prestige, of course, is hosting the Games, and the
host countries form a very select set of IOC member nations. The
30 Summer Games (through 2012 London Games) have been held
in only 18 countries, and 22 Winter Games (through 2014 Sochi
Games) have been hosted by a total of 10 countries, seven of whom
have also hosted the Summer Games. 
e. Finally, as several chapters in this volume discuss, the issues sur-
rounding the Beijing Games bring into focus what is perhaps the
highest form of IOC standing, which is the capacity to influence
Olympism philosophy itself. To casual spectators, the mottos and
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slogans generated by each Olympics and the Olympic Education
campaigns that host countries must organize seem like rhetorical
dressing for the athletic competitions on the field, but within the
IOC movement, they have come to be taken with utmost seriousness.
The strenuous efforts by China in promoting its mascots and its slo-
gans and its version of Olympic Education and in funding scholarly
conferences and other initiatives are part of an important campaign
to get the Olympic Movement to embrace a more “multicultural”
sports humanism.
This trajectory has been followed as successfully by the Asian nations of
Japan, Korea, and China as by the major Euroamerican nations at the center of
the Movement. That is, participation in the Games and OM governance, com-
petitive success, national sports promotion, Games hosting, and philosophical
influence is a trajectory of deepening involvement and acceptance that China,
like Japan, Korea, and many other Olympic core nations, has now largely com-
pleted. To put it differently, however, seeking status in the OM also has severe
standardizing effects on a nation’s sports development as it must conform to
the organizational, financial, and ideological demands of the IOC.
“Olympic time”: A normalizing temporal process
Time organizes the Olympic experience in other ways as well, and of equal
importance are the implications of its unique quadrennial unit that it calls the
Olympiad. The IOC formalized this in the 1930s and imposes it upon its orga-
nizational process, its sporting agenda, and its commercial promotions. It is
both a cyclical four-year interval between Summer Games and also a linear
chronology, which began with the 1896 Athens Games as the Ist Olympiad (al-
ways rendered in classical Roman numerals!). The 2008 Beijing Olympics were
the Summer Games of the XXIXth Olympiad, which, in accordance with the
Bye Law to Rule 6 of the Olympic Charter, began on January 1, 2008. 
However, the calendar of requirements and responsibilities for every Sum-
mer Games and Winter Games has created a far longer and more elaborate tem-
porality than the four-year Olympiad itself; in fact, the Beijing Games began
many years before that Games’ Olympiad and they continue long afterwards.
The effect is to engage countries that aim for Olympic hosting in an extended
process of standardizing requirements, which we may briefly characterize as
the following.
First, there is the bidding period. Winning the opportunity to host an
Olympic Games can take years of local mobilizing and IOC lobbying. Success-
ful bids often follow unsuccessful campaigns, and the initial failures provide
valuable learning experiences and image-building credentials. Japan began its
postwar effort in the early 1950s, a dozen years before its eventual Summer
Beijing 2008 and the Limits of Exceptionalism
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Games. China lobbied hard but unsuccessfully in the 1990s before winning the
2008 Games. Every Games now requires a long campaign to create a rationale,
construct a persuasive narrative about the virtues of one’s bid, and develop a
detailed economic and construction plan. The campaign must be waged domes-
tically, to gather local political, economic, and civic support, and internationally,
to persuade the IOC membership.
Once a bid is accepted and a host city designated, real preparations begin
as cities and a country are mobilized for massive and intensive infrastructure
development, broadcasting and other commercial rights and forms are negoti-
ated, and a Games aesthetics and merchandising plan are developed. The Games
are now awarded about seven years in advance, but a second time cycle is
marked formally as the four-year run-up from extinguishing the flame at the
Closing Ceremony of one Games to the Opening Ceremony of the next Games.
The Games themselves constitute a third Olympic temporal unit. In recent
decades, the Games have been held during a two-to-three week period; one of
Beijing’s slogans was “The world gives us 16 days; we give the world 5,000
years.” Formally, they extend from Opening Ceremony to Closing Ceremony—
even more precisely, from the declaration of opening by the host nation leader
to the extinguishing of the Olympic flame. However, the Movement’s embrace
of the Paralympics and the ever-closer scheduling of the Paralympics to follow
the Olympics are extending “Games time” to about six weeks. For instance, the
Beijing Olympics were held on August 8-24 and were soon followed by the
Paralympics, using the same facilities on September 6-17. It is now required of
bidding cities that they include commitments and plans for staging the Para-
lympics so there has in effect been a lengthening of Games temporality.
The contests and celebrations of the Games may conclude at the Closing
Ceremony, but extinguishing the flame only begins the open-ended time of writ-
ing the histories and building the legacies of those Games. There is the required
work of completing and publishing official and unofficial records of the
Olympiad (reports, documentaries, financial accounts, etc.), but there are also
the many subsequent efforts to fashion a retrospective theme and narrative, to
protect and burnish the public memories, to locate the Games within the larger
sweep of Olympic and national history, and so forth.
These four time cycles constitute a generic chronology, and of course the
rhythm, the intensity, and the content of each Games have varied significantly.
In part, such variations depend on the historical moment and in part there are
differences because each Olympiad is connected to and influenced by the tra-
jectory of its preceding Olympiads. Nonetheless, as we are well into the fourth
phase of the Beijing Games, the second phase of the 2012 London Games, and
the first stage of the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Games, it is clear that the Beijing
Games have followed a fairly predictable temporal format, normalized by the
constraints of the frame.
William W. KELLY
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Asia and the Olympics: 
A century of mutual involvement 
In the run-up to and aftermath of the Beijing Games, there were many claims
by the Chinese organizers themselves and in both the popular and scholarly lit-
erature about the novelty of this Asian Olympics. This was, many felt, the oc-
casion when the Olympic Movement had to acknowledge, finally and fully, the
East Asian world region and to embrace East Asian tenets within its Olympic
philosophy. It was a moment when the East Asia region itself could at last be-
come a regular participant in the Olympic Movement.
There is, however, a healthy dose of historical amnesia in such a perspective
because Asian nations and athletes have been involved in the Olympic Move-
ment for close to a century, well before much of the rest of the non-Euro-Amer-
ican world was drawn in. This is clear from many of the contributions to this
volume (and from a wider literature of East Asian Olympics), and even a brief
timeline of Asian involvement demonstrates the region’s longstanding famil-
iarity and engagement with Olympic organizations and Games. 
1908-1910: Early on, Baron de Coubertin and the IOC made contact
with Chinese and Japanese individuals about participation. The
Japanese educator and founder of judo, Kanō Jigorō, became the first
Asian member of the IOC in 1908, serving until 1938 and leading most
Japanese delegations to the Games during those decades. YMCA
sports educators and missionaries in East and Southeast Asia also en-
couraged Western sports and knowledge and enthusiasm for the
Olympic Games.
1913-1934: The Far Eastern Championship Games were originally
sponsored by the YMCA to foster sports competitions among Japan,
the Philippines and the Republic of China, three countries in which
the YMCA was active. The American E. S. Brown, who had the original
idea, christened them the Far Eastern Olympic Games, but the nascent
IOC objected and the name was changed to the Far Eastern Champi-
onship Games. The Games were held every two years (and later, every
four years), rotating among the three countries, until Japan’s 1937 in-
vasion of China brought them to an end, and they provided regular
experience in organizing multi-sport international competitions.
1936-1940: Japan was the first non-Western country to be awarded
the Games, when its bid for the 1940 Games was accepted in 1936.
Two years later, Japan cancelled its hosting following the outbreak of
war with China. Nevertheless, the nation had already made extensive
plans and held its own national games to celebrate what it considered
the country’s 2,600th anniversary. The “lost” Tokyo Olympics are in-
tegral to the 1930s history of the IOC (Collins 2007).
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1951 to present: The Asian Games are a regional, quadrennial multi-
sport gathering sanctioned and supervised by the IOC. The first Asian
Games were in New Delhi in 1951, and they have broad Asian mem-
bership, more sports-inclusive than the Olympic Games themselves
and used by countries and sports federations for a variety of national
purposes. It was from the 1950s, too, that the “two China” question
(the status of Taiwan and the mainland PRC) created several decades
of debate about the politics of representation to the IOC and its delib-
erative bodies. 
1964-2008: The Summer Games in Tokyo in September of 1964
marked the first actual Asian Olympics, the lobbying and planning for
which had begun in the previous decade. This was followed by a series
of Asian hosts—at least once in every decade since: the 1972 Winter
Olympics in Sapporo, the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, the 1998
Winter Olympics back in Japan in Nagano, and finally a decade later,
the 2008 Beijing Games.
2001-2009: Tokyo began a spirited bid to host the 2016 Summer
Games from 2001. In 2007, the IOC designated it as an Applicant City,
and in 2008, Tokyo was chosen as one of four Candidate Cities, vying
with Chicago, Rio de Janeiro, and Madrid. In 2009, Rio was selected
as the host, although Tokyo may reinstate its bid for the 2020 Summer
Games, along with several other Asian cities.
A number of the chapters that follow will elaborate on aspects of this history.
The point of this timeline for me is to make clear that the Beijing Olympics
were not the occasion when Asia burst onto the Olympic center stage. They
took place precisely one hundred years after Kanō Jigorō joined the IOC. Over
that century, the East Asian countries, separately and regionally, sometimes in
concert and sometimes contentiously, have made their way to the forefront of
the Olympic Movement—as member nations, as athletic powers, as Games
hosts, as instigators of political issues, and as a powerful audience of television
viewers and lucrative market for Olympic merchandise. What has been the
weight of this regional history and how did it bear upon the Beijing Olympics?
This is one of the principal themes running through many of the volume chap-
ters—the significance of this long but under-recognized East Asian involvement
in the Olympic Movement for the shaping of the Beijing Games as design, as
performance, and as legacy.
Olympic contests are not only about who wins
but about what is at stake 
A fourth way in which the Beijing Olympics fall within the “normal” tra-
jectory of the Olympic Movement takes us to the heart of the Olympic Move-
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ment, where there has always been far more at stake than determining athletic
champions. I do not underplay or condone the serious actions of the Chinese
government associated with the Olympic year, including human rights abuses,
press censorship, environmental pollution, repression in Tibet, support for op-
pressive regimes like Sudan, and so on. Nor do I deny the profoundly important
debate about whether and how such disturbing policies and practices should be
addressed by the Olympic Movement and by the participating (or, it seemed
earlier in 2008, boycotting) national teams and individual athletes. But it is im-
portant to appreciate these actions within more than a century of international
and national Olympic politics.
There are many who view this Olympic history as a long and ultimately los-
ing struggle in which de Coubertin’s visionary ideals of amateur effort and
global fellowship were gradually but inexorably tarnished by partisan nation-
alism and crass commercialism. This, I believe, is a serious misreading. While
the scale of controversies surrounding the Beijing Games may have exceeded
those of many earlier Olympics, political and economic controversies have been
part and parcel of the modern Olympics since arguments about Greek funding
of the 1896 Games and debates shortly after 1896 between moving Olympic
venues or remaining in Athens. The expulsions of Taiwan and of the apartheid
regime of South Africa, boycotts led by the US in 1980 and the USSR in 1984,
terrorist killings of Israeli Olympians in 1972, mass student demonstrations and
police killings at Mexico City, Hitler’s ostentatious politicization of the Berlin
Olympics, the corruption and kickbacks leading up to the Salt Lake City
Olympics—these and many more render moot any attempt to locate an earlier
period when the Olympic Movement existed beyond politics. Avery Brundage,
during his long term as IOC president, often loudly insisted that “The cardinal
rule of the Olympics is no politics,” prompting the incisive sportswriter David
Zirin to respond irreverently, “…which is like saying the cardinal rule of boxing
is no punching” (Zirin 2007)!
The Olympics never had a pristine past. We accord them center stage among
world sports not because the message of Olympism is so clear and so unam-
biguous but precisely it is unclear, so contestable to rival interpretations, so
convenient to multiple purposes and agendas. We value the Olympics not for
their purity but for their imperfections, not because they are above the fray but
because they constantly confront us with fundamental debates about politics,
economics, and culture that agitate individuals and nations. Are the Olympics
a field of play or a battleground of nations? Should the Olympics foreground
individual achievement or national prestige? Who is being exhorted to run
faster, to jump higher, and to be stronger? That is, do the Olympics showcase
the strongest individuals or the most powerful nations? Certainly the medal race
among national teams would suggest how often the scale has tipped to the side
of patriotic fervor and nationalist competition.
And have the powerful commercial interests—both inside the IOC (one of
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the most vigilant holders of lucrative intellectual property rights), among the
world’s biggest media and largest corporations, and from the local and national
host interests themselves—now completely overwhelmed the spirit of sports-
manship and captured the organization and the ethos of the Games? However,
there is as little that is new about commercial pressures as there ia about political
ambitions. The Olympics are not threatened by an ever-widening gap between
lofty ideals and crass realities. They have always been suspended between the
two, and striving for purity, pride, and profit has given a perpetual instability
to the rhetoric and actions of the Olympic Movement.
Politics and economics have been the core controversies in the Olympic
Movement, to be sure, but we must not forget that the Olympics have also been
the most important world platform for the most intractable and perpetually un-
resolved debates about the nature of modern sport itself. Of these, the most en-
during has been question of amateurism and the fraught boundary with
professionalism. Elite performance at the highest levels of competition always
tests whatever measures of amateurism are designed and enforced. This conun-
drum preceded the Olympics themselves—soccer, rugby, cricket, baseball, and
American football all were wracked with controversies about amateurism in
the nineteenth century. But throughout the twentieth century and up to the pres-
ent, it has been the Olympics that have brought together the most elite amateurs
in such a range of team and individual sports across the spectrum of spectator
interest and commercial potential. Thus it is the Games that have been the high-
est profile venue for defining what has been a constantly shifting line, often
drawn quite differently among the Olympic sports and their international fed-
erations. From athletes barely above recreational skills to NBA basketball pro-
fessionals, the 2008 Games juxtaposed the full spectrum of sports, from leisure
to livelihood.
Other questions, too, have put sports at the center of fundamental questions.
For a half century, determination of athletes’ sex type, specifically female sex,
roiled the Olympics. It will never end because the male-female dichotomy that
modern sport imposes upon what is really a cline of human physiology and en-
docrinology forces constant reconsideration of the meaning of sex identity.
Similarly, with the IOC embrace of the Paralympics, the Olympic Move-
ment more and more dramatizes the arbitrariness of our efforts to distinguish
the “able” and the “disabled.” In 2008, we saw several efforts of athletes to
qualify for both the Olympics and the Paralympics, and the most prominent
case, the South African runner Oscar Pistorius, raised for scientists, lawyers,
and sports administrators alike the fundamental divide between humans and
cyborgs. Running so fast with his “Cheetah” prosthetic legs, he posed dramat-
ically what many sports face on a routine basis: where does human end and ma-
chine begin? How do we distinguish between fair and unfair technology in skis,
blades, racquets, balls, and all the other accoutrements of sports?
Yet other conundrums are showcased across the range of Olympic sports.
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What is an appropriate minimum age for elite sports competition, a question
that has generated rancorous argument in sports like gymnastics, tennis, and
ice skating? And when does medical rehabilitation and pharmacological assis-
tance become unfair performance enhancement? Substance abuse and doping
have been tragedies and scandals from the earliest Games; what is new is not
the fact of looking for any competitive edge but the ever more intense struggle
between deceit and detection. In this too, the Beijing Games were only the latest
chapter.
What the Olympics bring to global attention is not just a politics of the sport-
ing body but also of the sporting spirit. Indeed, they present us with perhaps
the most fundamental paradox of all modern sports. Do we play to win or do
we play to participate? No other major sports gathering on the world stage jux-
taposes these fundamentally different human dispositions towards physical
games. FIFA, Wimbledon, the Super Bowl, whatever the event—it is all about
winning. Only the Olympics offer equal time and equal worth to the many who
come not for medals of victory but for memories of fellowship. Despite the elit-
ism of the Olympic motto (“Faster, Stronger, Higher”), the Games always draw
out our empathy for “the slower, the weaker, and the shorter.” Let us not forget
that almost half of the 222 nations which have competed at the Games since
1890 have never won a single medal. The sternly formal processional of nations
in the Opening Ceremony contrasts markedly with scenes of the athletes relax-
ing together in the Olympic Village and their friendly, chaotic mingling at the
Closing Ceremony. These are the two faces of the Olympics and they are the
two faces of modern sports, and no other sporting event in the world so vividly
dramatizes the pressures of competition and the pleasures of participation.
An equally fundamental philosophical tension—and that which has been
most on display in the three East Asian Summer Games—is the apparent con-
tradiction between the pronounced and proud Western classical inspirations for
the modern Olympics and their equally insistent claims to represent universal
aspirations and values. If the “Olympic spirit” is one of “friendship, solidarity,
and fair play,” is that just a Western parochial value, or is it a universal human-
ism? As we will see in a number of the chapters to follow, this perplexed Cou-
bertin himself, who envisioned participation from all the nations of the world,
and has motivated the East Asian nations, at least since Japan’s plans for the
1940 Games. 
In sum, sports as play or as politics, as festival or as competition, as indi-
vidual accomplishment or as national pride, as amateur or professional, human
achievement and the limits of enhancement, the shifting divide between the
able and the disabled, and the universalist claims of Olympic values—all of
these have been both divisive fault lines and constitutive elements of every re-
cent Olympics. 
The Olympics are so popular and powerful and profitable precisely they
have always been a stage where some of our most important tensions and strug-
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gles—about sports, about politics, about diplomacy, about business, about race
and gender, about what it is to be human—are displayed and dramatized—and
only precariously resolved—from Olympiad to Olympiad. They are a lightening
rod for controversy and a touchstone for our deepest anxieties as well as our
soaring hopes.
It is precisely the un-resolvability of these conundrums that perpetuates what
we might a “permanent instability” at the heart of the Olympic Movement and
that returns me to my central claim in this chapter. The year of the Beijing
Games certainly had breath-taking moments of grandeur (e.g., the Opening Cer-
emony) and troubling incidents of state repression and popular protest (e.g., the
actions in western China and the multi-continent demonstrations against the
Torch Relay); the Games themselves broke records for broadcast rights, media
attention, commercial revenues, construction costs, local volunteers staffing,
and other production elements. And of course, the sporting events themselves
produced athletic accomplishments that continued to push the limits of human
physical endurance and achievement. The extent and intensity of media and
scholarly coverage were surely justified by the dimensions of this mega-event.
Nonetheless, it was in fact an Olympic Games, the forty-seventh such Games
(counting Winter and Summer venues), and the persistent claims that 2008 was
a year of Olympic exceptionalism, that the Games would transform the Olympic
Movement, and that its excesses exceeded even Olympian proportions have
proved to be misleading. For all of the reasons that I have outlined here, it is
crucial to appreciate the distinctiveness of the Beijing Olympics within the mod-
ern Olympic Movement and as the latest testimony to the continuing importance
of East Asian nations in shaping our most global sporting experience. This is
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Producing Sports Mega-Events and
Imagining the Nation in East Asia:
The 2002 Football World Cup and
the East Asian Olympics
Wolfram Manzenreiter
In the summer of 2008, China attracted the undivided attention of the entire
sports world for the first time. In over 100 years of modern Olympic history,
this was only the third occasion that the Summer Games had been staged in
East Asia.  In recent decades, however, East Asian nations have become much
more involved in staging large-scale sports events of international significance,
such as the Olympic Winter Games (Sapporo 1972, Nagano 1998), the IAAF
World Championships (Tokyo 1991; Osaka 2007), the IAAF World Junior
Championships (Seoul 1992; Beijing 2006) in athletics, and the Women’s Foot-
ball World Cup (China 1991 and 2007). The region has also become firmly en-
trenched in the annual circuits of such major sports as the Formula 1 Grand
Prix, the Davis Cup and various international golf tours. 
Notwithstanding the far-reaching appeal and importance these sports events
have for athletes and spectators alike, they inevitably pale in significance when
compared with actual sports “mega-events.” In terms of global reach, follow-
ership, cultural significance and economic power, only the men’s Football
World Cup can draw even with the Olympic Summer Games to qualify as a
sports mega-event. In 2002 the FIFA World Cup was staged in Asia for the first
time—and also for the first time was co-hosted by two nations, Korea and
Japan. Watched by 2.7 million spectators, who followed the performances of
32 national teams within Japan’s and Korea’s twenty brand-new stadiums, and
nearly 30 billion TV viewers across the world, football proved its unrivalled
status as a truly global sport and entertainment. Addressing the Asian Football
Confederation at its fiftieth anniversary in 2004, FIFA president Sepp Blatter
flattered Asia’s regional representatives of football by saying “the future of foot-
ball is Asia.” However, he did not propose that Asia will be hosting the World
Cup more often in the future.
The Western-centered mentality in the sports world seems to be a main rea-
son for the unbalanced representation of host cities and host countries among
the continents. The Olympic Summer Games have been held 15 times in Eu-
rope, six times in North America and twice in Australia; the men’s Football
World Cup has been staged 10 times in Europe, four times in South America
and three times in North America.  Africa so far has never been granted any of




indicate the status differences that the principal rights owners of the events, the
IOC and the FIFA, have assigned to the respective regions throughout their 
history. 
Repercussions of the twentieth-century global political economy, which
saw China, Japan and Korea positioned at the fringes of a world order domi-
nated by the West, are not only responsible for East Asia’s underrepresentation
among the host nations, but also for the varying messages that East Asian sports
mega-events have conveyed to their local and global audiences. Even though
the relationships between East Asia and the West changed considerably over
the years, the dialectics between Western hegemony and East Asian subalternity
continued to mar the relations between the center and peripheries of world
sports. However, as I will demonstrate, factors beyond a presumed Western su-
periority – in economic as well as in political terms and in moral as well as in
cultural dimensions – have shaped the different and sometimes contradictory
self-representations of Asian nations at sports mega-events.
Questions of national identity, sport, and state imagination are often inter-
twined because modern sports provide a stage for the symbolic contest between
states and for the public display of collective virtues and national achievements.
Sports mega-events focus the world’s attention on a particular nation and its
success in hosting and/or performing well at the event. With such concentrated
media attention, it would be surprising if the host nation did not take advantage
of this opportunity to assert its identity. It was the prospect of displaying their
national accomplishments and cultural authority on an international stage that
prompted East Asia to bid for the Olympic Games and later the Football World
Cup. The various studies on East Asian experience with hosting the flagship
sport events provide ample evidence of the significance sports mega-events,
situated at the crossing of the universal and the particular, have acquired for
“official” versions of public culture in this region of the world (cf. Niehaus and
Seinsch 2007 on Japan’s Olympics; Tagsold 2002 on the Tokyo Olympics 1964,
Ahn 1990 on the Seoul Olympics 1988, Horne and Manzenreiter 2002 on that
year’s Football World Cup, Price and Dayan 2008 on the Beijing Games 2008).
However, because the very notion of a “nation” is ambiguous, the conventional
assertion that major media join with ruling elites to actively control the image
of the nation needs rethinking. Particularly since sports turned into an important
medium for globalizing media markets, sports mega-events have been co-opted
not only by political elites but also by global capital and multinational corpo-
rations. New forces such as transnational civic movements and partisan interest
groups that challenge political and economic elites have joined the circle of
parties competing for access to the network of “primary definers,” whose ma-
terial and ideological relevance to the sports mega-events has a direct bearing
on the shaping of narratives as well as the production of the events and their
regulation.
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In this chapter, I argue that the national representations presented during
these sports mega-events have become increasingly problematic to control due
to the mounting diversity of actors involved in the process of signifying. While
my analysis focuses on the 2002 Football World Cup in Japan and South Korea,
I will also touch upon similarities and differences in comparison to East Asian
encounters with the Olympic Games at various historical stages. It becomes ev-
ident that organizational particularities and the relational position of East Asia
within the world system of sports are responsible for similarities, whereas dif-
ferences are caused by the very essentials needed by these sport spectacles and
the changing political economy in which they are embedded. From an anthro-
pological point of view, the composite form of sports mega-events that John
MacAloon (1984) once described as “nested and ramified performance forms,”
contributes to the inherent difficulty of streamlining and controlling the message
they are about. Depending on the social roles of participants, which affect inti-
macy and distance, sports mega-events are experienced as bureaucratically man-
aged “public events” (Handelman 1990), as spectacles (MacAloon 1984; 2006),
as celebratory festivals (Manning 1983), and as contests. The principal agents
of these ramified categories and their respective contributions to national rep-
resentation at sports mega-events constitute the structure of the following sec-
tions. My conclusion will comment on the appropriateness of sports
mega-events for national representation in twenty-first-century society.
Managing the nation: 
The World Cup as a public event
Sports mega-events create official points of reference because states and
governments, usually in close cooperation with international non-governmental
organizations, are playing an active role in their planning and management.
Being directly involved in onstage and backstage operations, the state and its
actors are to some degree capable of manipulating the image of the nation de-
picted at the sports event. Given the scale of these events, government involve-
ment seems to be inevitable to insure the smooth running of the operation. For
good reasons, both the IOC and FIFA explicitly require the public commitment
of host governments before a bid is eventually accepted. Government officials
often join the steering committee of bidding campaigns – of which the huge
expenses are usually covered by public funds – and public employees are fre-
quently assigned to work with the organization staff, giving the state a much
tighter grip on the management of the event. South Korea’s bid was supported
by a very strong political streak running through its bidding campaign. A vice
prime minister, a party leader, foreign ministry officials, army generals and
leaders from the business world joined forces in the campaign which heavily
played on politically positioning the World Cup as a “catalyst for peace” (Sug-
den and Tomlinson 1998:118) on the Korean peninsula. By contrast, Japan’s
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bidding committee was mainly staffed by football executives and, in response
to the political heavyweights in Korea, by former Prime Minister Miyazawa
Kiichi as honorary chairman. Despite requesting government approval as early
as 1992, Japan received it just a week before the deadline in February 1995,
whereas Korea immediately obtained not only government approval upon re-
quest but also highly suggestive support by a president who met the executive
members of FIFA and went jogging with a “2002 World Cup” T-shirt. 
For the 2002 World Cup, however, both bidders had to come to terms with
the unexpected co-hosting decision, which was triggered by the internal power
struggles within FIFA as much as by an acrimonious bidding contest between
Japan and South Korea (Butler 2002). Japan, having led the region economi-
cally for a long time, consequently wanted to lead their continent in hosting the
first World Cup in Asia. For South Korea, on the pitch the stronger contender,
this was hardly acceptable, given that football had been “a means of resistance
to Japanese rule” (Lee 1997) during the Occupation. 
If anything, the co-hosting thus pushed a renegotiation of Japan’s relations
with her former colony Korea and, over the long term, it repositioned Japan’s
image among Asian nations. Both objectives ultimately provoked an alliance,
albeit fragile, between the two East Asian states and their people whose rela-
tionship is still determined by memories of the Japanese annexation of the Ko-
rean peninsula and the subsequent colonial oppression during the first half of
the twentieth century. Major efforts on national and local levels were needed
to cope with the technical difficulties of managing the several hundred-million
dollar enterprise in two countries simultaneously. In his first press conference
after being nominated general secretary of Japan World Cup Organizing Com-
mittee (JAWOC), Endō Yasuhiko stated that unless both nations succeeded, the
World Cup could not be declared a success. Only close cooperation would reach
this goal, and by way of working together, the interchange of the countries was
expected to deepen (JAWOC 2003:48). 
Since managing the tournament successfully is the minimum requirement
to express reliability, capability, efficiency and other benchmarks of a modern-
ized state towards the watching world, both Japan and South Korea were eager
to present themselves as capable, well-organized, in-charge and well-mannered.
The organizers could rely to some extent on the back-up sustained by a well-
developed infrastructure, a traditional strong relationship between sports ad-
ministration and the state bureaucracy, and a good working relationship of
governments with the business sector. To some extent these resources were
weakened by the aftermath of Japan’s bubble economy and the Asian currency
crisis which hit South Korea’s public sector in 1998. Given that the IMF bailout
for Korea has been dubbed the “Second National Shame Day” (Choi 2004:135),
it is no surprise that rumors of Japanese credits needed to guarantee the com-
pletion of Korean World Cup venues could never be substantiated. Currency
fluctuations against the dollar threatened to devaluate forecasted revenues. Stag-
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nant business performance caused by the recession bit into corporate sponsor-
ship and severely cut into government revenue streams. To make ends meet,
national consent was enforced by stressing the importance of the operation: the
Office for 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan in the Sports Bureau of the Min-
istry of Education put it as follows: “As with the Olympics, the understanding
and cooperation of the people of Japan is vital to assuring the success of the
tournament, an event of national importance.” In other words, the World Cup
desperately needed the Japanese taxpayers’ money, while the corporate business
sector fulfilled its national duties in Korea.
Governments also monitored the progress of tournament preparation
through meetings with the Vice Ministers World Cup Council and the relevant
liaison council established under it with JAWOC representatives. Ministries
provided additional support through conferring directly with relevant regional
bodies on administrative issues of immigration, travel, disaster prevention, se-
curity and similar issues that had become of increasing significance in a post
9/11 world. Meetings between the two national organizing committees were
held once every other month from January 1999 onwards. Similarly, on a work-
ing group level, the staff in charge of particular areas met frequently at the re-
spective secretariat offices in Tokyo and Seoul. Governors and mayors from
the host cities in Japan and Korea attended two conferences in 1999 and 2000.
On this occasion, they adopted a joint communiqué encouraging increased sol-
idarity, closer cooperation and intercultural exchange. 
Bilateral relations between the states improved after South Korean presi-
dent Kim Dae-Jung’s “sunshine policy” de-iced the frosty partnership. South
Korea opened its doors to some aspects of Japanese popular culture, and both
countries sported a modest rapprochement policy at the diplomatic level. An
increasing number of Japanese and Korean local governments started ex-
changes. By the end of March 2000, seven prefectures and 75 municipalities in
Japan had signed sister city agreements with South Korean regions. Tourist
flows between the countries intensified, reaching all-time highs in the years
prior to the World Cup. In 2000, the Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications started a three-year subsidy program
for exchange activities. Among others, it subsidized exhibitions of fine arts,
kendo and demonstrations of traditional Japanese culture in Korea and Korean
festivals in Otsu and other Japanese cities. In a joint statement issued at the eve
of the finals in Tokyo, the organizing committees of Japan and Korea and their
national football associations expressed their satisfaction with the results: 
Both Korea and Japan, more than merely representing the countries
of Asia in hosting the FIFA World Cup, have been able to fulfill their
responsibilities and produce results as the host countries. These results
are something that will remain in Asia as a whole and will, without
doubt, provide a significant incentive for other Asian countries to par-
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ticipate actively in future FIFA World Cup tournaments. We are proud
to be members of Asia.
For official Japan, seeing itself as being part of Asia was quite an accom-
plishment, given that “Out of Asia” has been a key term for Japan’s modern-
ization since the nineteenth century. Promoting an Asian identity could certainly
enhance, if not strengthen, Japan’s options for negotiating its position among
the Asian states. However, the circumstances of co-hosting with another East
Asian country may have limited Japan’s prospects for promoting its own dis-
tinctive image. The regional spread of football venues limits the suitability of
the World Cup for displaying a unified image of the host nation. This situation
turns into a dilemma if two nations are involved, unless they want to be drawn
into a competitive hosting conflict. However, seeing the benefits of using the
World Cup as moral leverage in diplomatic relations, both parties understood
that arguing was not an option. In Japan and Korea, where the states were strug-
gling with the repercussions of economic globalization and its neoliberal solu-
tions, the success of staging the World Cup was emphasized and presented as
an impressive model for effective collective action. By comparison, national
imaging strategies face a different problem in the case of the Olympic Games,
an event granted only to a host city. National stereotyping usually facilitates
the crafting of a coherent image of the nation, but this requires a suitable city
to be taken as a token for the nation in combination with the compliance of al-
ternative regional identities. In the case of FIFA, which awards the hosting
rights for the World Cup to a country, the local organizing committee is forced
to factor varying regional images and interests into the production of the host’s
national image. 
Sports mega-events are also public events because they are specifically
employed to induce larger transformations of the social order. Even before the
rise of neoliberalism intensified the competition for global city status and the
flow of international tourists  and investments from abroad, these mega-events
were seen as opportunities for urban development agendas. Similar to the Tokyo
Olympics, which showcased the made-in-Japan modern architecture and high
technology of the 1960s, the Seoul Olympics and the Beijing Olympics were
leveraged into larger urban planning initiatives in order to demonstrate moder-
nity and advanced development. The sports stadiums were only the pinnacle
protruding from the larger redevelopment sites. In a positive way, these highly
suggestive edifices featured the iconic architecture that powerfully signifies the
privileged position of dominant actors and their ideologies within the social
order. However, on the other hand, the construction of these massive buildings
forcefully evicted hundreds of thousands of people from their residential areas. 
In all of these incidents, homeless people were either expelled from the
area or taken into custody by city authorities since they would most likely be a
detriment to the positive responses the organizers were seeking. The ideological
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charging of place in accordance with the politics of place-marketing and in-
vestment has been accompanied by the redefinition of moral probity and the
state-controlled reinforcement of appropriate behavior in the public. Within the
medium-term range of mega-events, the ruling elites have therefore used the
event as an occasion to educate their people in standards of behavior that com-
ply with norms imported from abroad. Part of the moral campaigns leading up
to the Tokyo 1964 Games was the instruction of the public about refraining
from urinating at waysides or against trees, which itself was a small part of an
ongoing process of disciplining and managing the human body as clean and
proper in line with Japan’s modernization politics (Otomo 2007:117). The issue
of sanitization standards was also high on the agenda for the National Council’s
Better Korea Movement, which forged a comprehensive strategy to revitalize
a South Korean society still suffering from the aftermath of the Asian financial
crisis in the late 1990s (Choi 2004). Early in 2008 I came across a newspaper
report heralding the world city status of Beijing in terms of the number of public
restrooms; it had bypassed contenders like New York and Tokyo. Similarly, in
the context of changing body politics, spitting in public has increasingly become
an object of critical surveillance throughout East Asia. In the case of China there
were also attempts to ban the excessive use of swearwords from the social con-
text of sports events where, to some degree, verbal abuse is usually tolerated.
But there is a clear trend towards the strict control of behavior, even in those
spaces that corporatist forms of urban governance try to market as “sponta-
neous” and “carnivalesque” in a careful projection of “ordered disorder” (Feath-
erstone 1991:82). 
Staging the nation: The World Cup as a spectacle
The problem of simultaneously emphasizing and downplaying national
particularities is usually at the core of the staged productions that are the most-
highlighted elements of the sports mega-event. Its opening and closing cere-
monies are meticulously planned and professionally operated cultural
productions that typically combine timeless rituals of Olympic philosophy or
the international spirit of the occasion with a place-bound celebration of the
hosting nation. While the latter allows the host to shape its own representation
by means of various creative and imaginative technologies, the former usually
follows a strict protocol. The script-play for the Olympic ceremonial therefore
is more elaborated than the Olympic Charter; similarly, FIFA’s mandatory
guidelines for contracted World Cup hosts are much more voluminous than the
rulebook of the game. Apparently the ceremonies do not leave much space for
local color, though host countries actually employ a variety of strategies to “ab-
sorb the global in an arrogating process of remoulding” (Tomlinson 1996:590).
Speaking to audiences at home and abroad, these elaborately staged and com-
mercialized narratives of the host nation serve as an affirmation of national
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identity as well as an extended advertisement for the host nation (Hogan 2003).
Spectacles in general aspire for grandeur and acknowledgement as unique, ex-
clusive and extraordinary, and they use ritual symbolism, awe-inspiring per-
formances and breath-taking staging techniques in order to achieve these goals,
though they are often a means for the host’s own ends. As the whole spectacle
adapts itself around its own sensual, audiovisual potentials, it is the sensually
stimulating, dynamic and exciting facade that diverts mass attention away from
the cleavages and fissures that lie behind the surface of the spectacle. Particu-
larly in modern times, where the success or failure of grand spectacles is
counted in millions of TV spectators, the distributional channels of national and
international media networks play a leading role in the spectacularization of
sports mega-events. Even though the event was staged in their country, most
Japanese experienced the spectacle only in mediated form. 
The ceremonial aspect of the World Cup is less elaborated and of minor
significance in comparison with the Olympic Games but still large enough to
draw major attention from the media. Since the Opening Ceremony signifi-
cantly raises media awareness, both countries competed for the right to open
the sports mega-event with a spectacular show. Ultimately, it was Seoul where
the ceremony took place, while Yokohama staged the closing, which took place
prior to the actual highlight of the day, the final match between Brazil and Ger-
many. Both events were simply the culminating climax of a much longer series
of cultural events held in conjunction with the World Cup, but without the same
amount of media exposure as these spectacles. The Opening Ceremony at the
Seoul World Cup Stadium consisted of a four-part drama around the keywords
of welcome, communication, harmony and sharing. The 40 minute event,
framed by the ubiquitous speeches and fireworks, featured traditional Korean
dancers and musicians, children of different nationalities, drums from all over
the world, a multi-media installation from Korea’s most famous video artist
Paik Nam-jun, symbolic references to Asian philosophy, to Korea’s glorious
past and to the recent achievements of the country’s sophisticated high-end
communication and entertainment industries. Compared to the Opening Cere-
mony of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, which aimed at explaining a largely
unknown Korea to the watching world, the narrative of the 2002 ceremony had
a more international and integrative mood, showing the world “the Asian spirit
of coexistence and … the soul and grace of the East.” 
By contrast, the no less spectacular Closing Ceremony in Yokohama In-
ternational Stadium utilized the well-known rich cultural tradition of presenting
a “Baedeker” tourist guide image of Japan. The show, in front of an estimated
1.5 billion television viewers worldwide, featured Japanese taiko-drummers,
kimono-clad geisha performers, mikoshi-shrines decorated with the national
flag of the 32 participating countries, and a giant replica of Mount Fuji. The
dramatic climax following Brazil’s victory in the final against Germany featured
2.7 million “dream origami cranes” pouring down into the arena from the roof
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of the Yokohama stadium. According to the local organizing committee, the
“Wings of a Dream project” was selected because it enabled many Japanese
“to participate in an event unique to Japan that would remain in the memories
of people throughout the world. At the same time, it embodied a message of
hope for humankind and an image of Japan as a peaceful nation” (JAWOC
2003). Thousands of children from fifty elementary and junior high schools,
together with boys and girls scouting organizations, the youth hostel association
and the general public, under the guidance of the Ministry of Education, par-
ticipated in folding the paper cranes, which are understood as a universal sign
of goodwill and nowadays also as a symbol of peace. It is likely that the ministry
was also aware that the Shinto Association of Japan, which counts many school
principals among its members, was going to provide all the seats in the stadiums
staging Japan’s matches with patriotic hinomaru flags, hand-drawn by the
pupils. 
The peace motif was one instance in which international politics explicitly
appeared on the agenda. But in the background, quite opposed to the sports
event’s public message, the state that was soon going to join the US invasion
of Iraq used the World Cup to communicate its image as a strong and capable
partner in security issues. Emphasizing stadium and venue security concerns
allowed the Japanese police to openly introduce strict security acts under the
pretext of “hooligan control” at airports, public venues and amusement quarters
in metropolitan Tokyo. Authorities not only extended the Immigration Control
and Refugee Recognition Act (Shutsunyūkoku kanri oyobi nanmin nintei ho) to
enable the deportation of “hooligans” (Asahi Shinbun, 13 September 2001), but
also considered exercising control over “violent foreign NGOs” (Asahi Shinbun,
14 September 2001) in the name of anti-terrorism. In Korea, where Prime Min-
ister Lee Han-dong promised this to be the World Cup of Safety, some 420,000
police were on guard, anti-aircraft missiles were deployed near the stadiums
and fighter jets ready to scour the skies.
As these examples indicate, spectacular ceremonies not only bridge the
tension between the universal and the particular, but also serve to present their
very own interpretation of social life. Hence spectacles are a tool of repression,
as they show spectators only what they want to see. 
This disposition is obtained by the overpowering element of make-believe
which mediates between front-stage presentations (e.g. hospitable/peaceful
Japan) and backstage programs (fortified/forceful Japan; cf. Manzenreiter
2006). In comparing the signifying practices of the East Asian hosts of past
Olympics, Sandra Collins (2008:185) points out that the East-West dichotomy
is a common trope of their ceremonial scripts. While Western host cities tend
to present themselves as world class cities, Asian hosts play on modern hybrid-
ity, juxtaposing cutting edge technology with rich cultural heritage and exotic
civilization. This familiar narrative, which seems to be rooted in the lingering
anxieties of participating in the Western hegemony of the Olympics, can alter-
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natively be read as a careful suggestion that modernization is not synonymous
with Westernization, or as a more assertive claim for the moral right of hosting
the Games in order to prove the global spread and universalism of the Olympic
Games (Collins 2008:186). At the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games references to
traditional elements of Japanese culture were understated, since the producers
of the spectacle were more concerned with demonstrating a new and largely
westernized variant of the nation. Japan fully embraced the opportunity to put
on stage its return to the international community of nation-states and to cele-
brate its rebirth as a peace-loving nation and democratic state. This message
was highlighted by the final scene of the torch run that had seen the Olympic
fire carried through all of the regions of Japan. At last it was brought to light
the cauldron towering above the National Stadium by the hands of Sakai Yoshi-
nori, an 18 year-old athlete from Hiroshima who had seen the light of the world
on the day the atomic bomb devastated his home city. The public presentation
of the Emperor as a symbol of the state, who fulfilled the honorary role of open-
ing the Games coupled with the mass display of the controversial symbols kimi-
gayo and hinomaru, the national anthem and flag, simultaneously pleased
conservative nationalists while providing a sense of unity for the Japanese spec-
tators (cf. Tagsold 2000). In a similar fashion, the ceremony opening the Seoul
Olympics in 1988 offered the South Koreans an opportunity to come to terms
with a tragic past of colonial oppression under Japanese imperial rule, a bloody
civil war and years of military dictatorship in a divided country. The Olympic
fire was lighted by a young female athlete who had received the torch from the
Gold medal winner of the 1936 Olympic marathon, Sohn Kee-chung, who had
participated in the 1936 Olympics as a subject of the Japanese Empire and thus
been forced to endure the moment of his greatest triumph under a flag that was
not his own and a national anthem of an oppressive empire. These dramatic
moments of the opening ceremony powerfully condensed a series of contrasting
pairs: East vs. West; past/present and present/future, senior/junior, male/female,
colonialized/liberated, and suffering/rejoicing. 
Since the attention the host receives is highly concentrated within a brief
time-span, crafting the ceremonial protocol, as well as the designation of event
spaces and the rules for appropriate on-site behavior, demands careful planning
and preparation. One of the principal problems that the organizers of these
sports mega-event spectacles have to manage is the limited repository of signs
and signifiers they can employ for the representation of the self vis-à-vis the
Western gaze. The quest for authenticity is hampered by a play-script, stage
technologies and an apparatus of signifiers that corresponds to the reading abil-
ities of the Western audience. How can a fair and balanced presentation be
achieved when even the act of presentation is a cultural import? Even though
the bilateral relations between the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese may have
had a much larger significance on the construction of collective identities in the
past and present, the reoccurrence of the binary codes of old and new, tradition
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and modernity, rural and urban, spiritual and technological at the ceremonies
clearly hints at the geopolitical location of the main audiences their producers
had in mind. 
The narrative of the Opening Ceremony at the Beijing Olympic Games,
however, seemed to have turned this cultural hierarchy upside down. Rather
than trying to explain itself to a largely uninformed world, like the organizers
of Tokyo’s 1940 Games, or the meta-physique of South Korea’s coming-out
party in 1988, the most spectacular Olympic drama ever showed the world how
much Western modernization was actually indebted to Chinese civilization. A
key message was that although ancient China had commanded the technologi-
cal, material, and military resources to explore the far reaches of the world, it
decided against external expansion, preferring aesthetic, intellectual and cultural
refinement. Twentieth-century history was suspiciously absent from the elabo-
rate show of a Disney-China. A century ago such a spectacle demonstration
may have sufficed to explain the ruling elites’ claim for power. At the present,
however, it hardly convinces those who do not want to believe. 
Celebrating the nation: 
The World Cup as a festival
Grasping sports mega-events purely as state-governed, bureaucratically
planned and economically exploitative tools of repression does injustice to their
more complex reality. As the 2002 Football World Cup has shown, both host
countries experienced an unexpected ardor about football during the World Cup.
Every time the Korean team appeared in a match, millions of “Korligans” took
to the streets, all dressed in the color of the Red Devils, the official fan club of
the national team. As a journalist of the Asia Times (June 25, 2002) noted, Mao
Zedong himself may never have seen anything like the Sea of Red that engulfed
South Korea, even during the Cultural Revolution. In Japan, the massive display
of the hinomaru, Japan’s long time de facto and since 1999 de jure national
flag, was a similarly unprecedented incident. In the stadia, the image of a “blue
heaven,” consisting of Japan supporters dressed in some kind of replica uniform
of the national team’s blue jersey, dominated the grand stands which seemed to
tremble every time the chants of “Nip-pon! Nip-pon!” roared through the arena.
The colorful revelation of a collective identity rooted in a seemingly new na-
tionalism attracted the attention of the mass media and academic writers alike
(e.g. Mōri 2003; Ueno 2003; Ushiki and Kuroda 2003; Whang 2004).
However, the new football nationalism certainly has not been sparked by
a sudden awakening of patriotic sentiments for one’s country. I propose, rather,
to view the act of mass identification with symbols of the state as a response to
the desire for communal experience. In that sense, sports-mega events can be a
modern temporal-spatial correlative to the social framework of spontaneous ex-
periences within the community and of encounters with the charismatic. Their
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popularity and seemingly universal appeal are partially caused by the pre-
dictable appearance (and, ironically, also the bureaucratic control) of charisma
and aura in a modern world that is often experienced as excessively rationalized
and as lacking any dimensions beyond the mundane (Roche 2000:7). In a sec-
ularized world, traditional festivals and popular celebrations have lost much of
their authoritative meaning and communal importance, leaving a gap of unful-
filled desire for belonging. The dramatic decrease of charismatic moments in
religious life is opposed by a concomitant growth in demand for “magical mo-
ments” – the truly special and spectacular – within the mundane world of life.
What was once a special occurrence out of the ordinary, normal course of life,
with strong religious and mythical undertones, has thereby turned into a nor-
mative principle of consumer culture and late-modern lifestyle patterns. Sport
contests provide a rare opportunity to observe history in progress. There is al-
ways the promise of witnessing truly heroic moments and the aura emanating
from sports heroes. Taking the interplay of desire and lack into consideration,
events therefore are carefully designed and planned to suspend particularized
realities for an exactly defined, aesthetically and emotionally condensed time-
space (Gebhardt 2000:20). Since the Olympics appropriated the basic law of
the economy of attention, Tomlinson argued that the Olympic experience can
be compared to the theme park or Disneyland experience (Tomlinson 2005:62).
Like these “experiential commodities,” events can offer to their participants
highly esteemed resources for the reflective work of constructing subjectivity,
personhood and identity.
The desire for experiencing community bonds fuelled both the demand for
official volunteers as well as the foundation of numerous grassroots organiza-
tions of football lovers. “Salon 2002” was founded in 1997 as an information
exchange network in Tokyo. “Spirit of Niigata” was established in the same
year as a volunteer group to support the local football team Albirex. This group
initiated the foundation of “Alliance 2002” which unified five other groups of
supporters. In their own words, “Alliance 2002 was a movement that was or-
ganized to raise enthusiasm for the World Cup among people in Niigata through
grass roots activities.” Other member groups included “Ultra Niigata,” whose
primary concern is giving support to the National team; Niigata Shūyūkai (“Ni-
igata Soccer Friend Club”), which plays in the Amateur Football League; and
“Mokuhachi” (“Thursday 8 o’clock”), an open group of ever-changing people
that meets every Thursday at 8 p.m. for a game of indoor football (futsal). Said
one of the masterminds behind Alliance 2002 who works for a national financial
company: “I don’t want to be a mere ‘behind the goal’ fan, but a supporter who
plays and enjoys soccer as sporting culture. We actively participate in it. And I
wish for such concepts and practices to establish roots in Niigata after the World
Cup, even if my company moves me to another prefecture.” Supporters’ Support
Sendai was established by a group of students particularly for the purpose of
giving foreigners a memorable time while in town. Activities of these organi-
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zations included lecture series, discussion groups and networking with other
groups. During the World Cup they initiated mini-football matches, a face-paint-
ing service, amateur stage presentations, and intercultural exchange events like
Karaoke or Niigata’s legendary Samurai Night, which attracted large crowds
for a late-night post-match techno dance club. While JAWOC made excessive
use of its own 16,500 official volunteers, it balked at the idea of close cooper-
ation with the fan networks. Ogura Junji, deputy general secretary of JAWOC,
once said that “network members can support some small areas that JAWOC
volunteers can’t cover, such as interpreting at convenience stores. I expect the
official volunteers and the network volunteers to cooperate with each other.”
But the strict organizational structure of JAWOC’s official volunteers forestalled
the integration of the network members’ know-how. 
Games of contest: The World Cup as sports
Reflecting upon previous research on the larger backgrounds of the first
football World Cup hosted on Asian soil (Horne and Manzenreiter 2004;
Manzenreiter 2004; Manzenreiter 2008; Manzenreiter and Horne 2004), we ar-
gued that the burgeoning popularity of the People’s Game in East Asia indicated
both the successful integration of the “football periphery” into global commod-
ity markets as well as changing relations of consumption in areas that were pre-
viously not governed by market relations (Manzenreiter and Horne 2007). This
is another common feature of the world’s game (football) and the (Olympic)
world games beyond the structural features of the sports mega-event, while
there may be many more that have not been discussed yet. 
In general, a comparison of the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games
yields more differences than similarities. The World Cup is mono-thematic; the
Olympic Games are a multi-sports event. Football invites much faster stereo-
typing and simplified associations of national characteristics with playing styles
(Ogasawara 2004). The game also attracts much larger audiences throughout
the year than all of its international flagship events. Football for many support-
ers is a way of life; in the Olympic system this is hardly the case for anyone
beyond the national and international sports organizations themselves. Football
often resonates with assertions of male supremacy, cultural patriarchy, parochial
identity and sometimes xenophobic jingoism, while the Olympic ideas tend to
suppress such affections. Football has always retained a love-hate relationship
with its working class origins, whereas Olympic sports tend to ignore their plain
roots. Even though FIFA copies the IOC in highlighting aesthetic and educa-
tional aspects of football, football does not claim a transcendent ideology. FIFA-
ism is certainly not linked with the sport itself. By contrast, the Olympic sports
are more closely tied into a larger narrative of humanity that is problematic in
itself. The Olympic Games are celebrations of modernity, but their version of
modernity is parochial because it is based on Western rationalism, Western ideas
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of the nation-state, and the Western conceptualization of society and the indi-
vidual as an autonomous self. Such an idea of modernity hardly fits with ideal-
ized conceptions of the state, society and the individual in Asian 
societies.
Representations of East Asia at sports mega-events
In concluding, I return to the struggle of East Asian nations to control their
representation at global sports events. The susceptibility of these particular cul-
tural productions to meeting the social demand for spontaneous communities
and charismatic encounters only partly explains their popular appeal. As I have
shown, any non-critical celebration of sports as universal cultural property dis-
guises the political economy of sports in contemporary society and the baser
partisan interests behind their global spread. The transformation of sports mega-
events into global spectacles of mediated consumption has amplified their re-
liance on the financial and technological clout of multinational corporations.
Pursuing their own interests, these agents devised the “domesticating tech-
niques” of the media, which deliver tailor-made media productions of the global
event to national audiences and localized consumer markets. As a result, media
representations are extremely difficult to control. Another problem is the nec-
essarily abstracted representation employed by the event producers, which
leaves culturally uninitiated audiences wondering what the flurry of music,
dance, costumes and personalities might all be about, particularly if the sports
commentators are badly briefed or mildly disinterested in the flamboyant pack-
aging of the real sports contest. As an extensive body of media research demon-
strates, hosting in general produces scarce amounts of new knowledge about
the place in question. However, the mediated correlation of a place with a sig-
nificant event promotes lasting impressions and associations that audiences
make with cities and nations (Rivenburgh 2004:6).
The narratives of a mega-event are inexorably linked with the specific his-
toric constellations in which it is embedded, and I have tried to show how rep-
resentations of East Asia changed at distinctive historic constellations in
conjunction with both global political economy and the generic qualities of
sports events. Nevertheless, questions of representation and the representational
are ultimately bound to the geography of social relations that constitute the
world system of sports. In this regard, markers of “advanced,” “developing,”
and “under-developed” are significant for the relative positioning of nations.
Within this expanded spatial context, which has been stubbornly resistant to
change, East Asian notions of body culture and humanist thought are under-
represented and often misrepresented by the anachronistic design of the inter-
national non-governmental organizations in charge of sports. 
There are two main pillars of these organizations and both are increasingly
problematic. On the one hand, the power of representation, in the guise of mem-
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bership rights, is based on an axiomatic equation of place, state and culture with
a people that are exclusively associated with both the spatial representation of
culture and the cultural appropriation of the space. This reference to the ideal-
ized notion of the nation-state and state sovereignty is rooted in the political
landscape of the late nineteenth century, as well as the retro-futuristic design
of the sports spectacles. Since then, this basis of representation has accompanied
more than a century of world sports without any changes that would have as-
signed agency, voice and representation to ethnic or cultural minorities or state-
less nations. 
On the other hand, the appeal of internationalism and universal humanism
at the heart of the Olympic philosophy has contributed to much of the world-
wide spread of modern sports and their mega-events. In particular, the insistence
on a morality based on sports as “idealized make-believe versions of the real
world” (Cheska 1979:61) and the belief that sports transcend ordinary politics
continue to captivate the world’s imagination. Yet these claims of universalism
and moral superiority are challenged by the ease with which the Olympic Move-
ment has been co-opted by authoritarian regimes and paired with exploitative
capitalist corporations. As in the case of its membership regulations, the illusion
of separating itself from mundane power is another symbolic relic from the po-
litical context of nineteenth century Europe, while Olympic universalism is ac-
tually deeply entrenched within Eurocentric appropriations of fundamental
human rights. 
All these inherent contradictions, which have further been aggravated by
the hypocritical politics of some Western states, have undermined much of the
moral legitimacy of the Olympic Movement to speak on behalf of universal
human rights issues. The particular internationalism of the Olympic spirit is not
based on a broad dialogue among world body cultures and cultural traditions.
Rather it is a parochial Western signification process that interpolates the bodies,
athletes and nations at the periphery. In this way, the Olympic philosophy ac-
tually consolidates the privileges and prerogatives of those agents that have
taken a leading role in developing its agendas1. Within the social geography of
dominant ideologies and the politics of identity, mega-events continue to be
framed by discourses founded on established relationships of signification. Un-
less the international organizations of world sports escape from their own fal-
lacy, they will remain stuck within the Orientalist binary logic of Self and Other
as pairing identities conceding to the narcissism of the West and its desire for
docile objects of difference, without which the illusion of sameness cannot be




1 This formulation is basically a variation on Radhakrishnan’s critical stance on
globalization as extension of the regime of uneven development between de-
veloped and developing nations (Radhakrishnan 2001).
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Rebuilding the Japanese Nation at
the 1964 Tokyo Olympics: The Torch
Relay in Okinawa and Tokyo
Shimizu Satoshi
On August 13, 2004, the day of the Opening Ceremony of the Athens Olympics,
a large U.S. military transport helicopter crashed and burst into flames on the
campus of Okinawa International University in a densely populated area adja-
cent to Futenma Air Base, which was operated by the U.S. Marine Corps and
occupied a quarter of the total area of Ginowan City1. The local newspaper, The
Okinawa Times, ignored the national news and instead featured the accident
across its entire front page. It and other local papers kept the focus on the acci-
dent and its aftermath, even as the national press, day after day, reported the
Olympic events. Clearly, local concerns diverged sharply from national priori-
ties. Medoruma Shyun, an Okinawan novelist, later commented: 
The U.S. military bases, part of whose operational expenses Japan is
obliged to shoulder under the Japan-U.S. Security Pact, are talked
about as if they constitute a problem peculiar to Okinawa. Just like
Internet searching, people will select only what they want to see, and
will not select what they don’t want to see. Are the Japanese such peo-
ple? (Medoruma: 2005)
Mainland Japanese have strong images of Okinawa as a “refreshing para-
dise” of “blue sea and sky,” which further provoked Medoruma: 
Okinawa has been commercialized as a place to represent the diversity
and multiracial aspects of Japan, and accordingly, is taken lightly. Its
unique popular entertainment, music, and cuisine are much sought
after, but its complicated history and politics have been forgotten. Only
pleasant images are woven together. (Medoruma 2004)
What do the Japanese people and the Japan nation mean for Medoruma?
Was Japan conceived differently among the “Japanese” Olympic athletes and
among the Japanese Olympic viewers and spectators? What do mainland Japan-
ese feel in visiting Okinawa to enjoy its refreshing paradise? Moreover, how
did the 1964 Olympics help the Japanese to re-fashion a national identity, and
where does Okinawa fit into this national community? The 1964 Tokyo
Olympics was the first Olympics held in Asia, and themes of “peace and friend-




broadcasted to the world. However, this festive atmosphere was built upon a
foundation where political conflicts between nations and the memories of in-
vasion and colonization were conveniently forgotten. Furthermore, what sig-
nificance did the Tokyo Olympics and its torch relay have for Okinawa before
its return to Japan on May 15, 1972? These are the questions I will address in
this chapter after considering the broader issue of how the Olympics have been
mobilized to advance the project of the modern nation-state.
The modern Olympics and the 
modern nation-state
The modern Olympics have been held under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (IOC) for more than a century, but the Games them-
selves have changed continuously and the meaning of each Games has been
shaped by distinctive historical circumstances and networks of power relation-
ships. We tend to remember the Olympics as a history of discrepant experiences
by virtue of the “discrepant politics” of each Games, in terms of race, gender,
nationality and political economy (MacAloon 1984, Tomlinson and Whannel
1984, Allison 1986, Hoberman 1986, Guttmann 1994, Eichberg 1998, Riordan
and Krüger 1999, Senn 1999, Roche 2000, Shimizu 2004a, Jarvie 2006).
The Olympics have always thrived on international competition, and their
symbolic internationalism has been embodied in national flags, national an-
thems, and the tables of national medal totals (Allison 2002: 345-346). The
Olympic Games have been such an effective vehicle for expressing national
sentiment that they continually attract state authorities who wish to use them
to claim and assert a national power. They use the Games to inculcate a national
sentiment among a people.
What does the “nation” mean? It is derived from the Latin word natio, the
verb of which is nascor principally meaning to be born and by extension a group
united by common origin. This has precipitated many discussions of how to de-
fine such “origins”—whether their basis is geographical, biological, linguistic,
or cultural. Moreover, modern nations are always conceived in political terms,
supporting a distinctively modern hybrid, the nation-state. For instance, in a
speech in Berlin under the Napoleonic occupation (1807-1808), Johann G.
Fichte spoke of the nation as an organic body united by racial elements, a com-
mon language, a shared territory, and a distinct history (Fichte 1978). In con-
trast, the Frenchman J. Ernest Renan lectured at the Sorbonne in 1882 that the
essence of the nation is solidarité and a conscience morale, comprised of the
collective memories of a common heritage and sentiment of individual sacrifice
to communal goals (Renan 1882). In other words, Renan saw “nation” as an
intentional and selective body, not defined by any specific race or language.
Thus, the nation is a modern conception, constructed a posteriori from
narratives, myths, and “invented” and “selected” traditions. To Benedict An-
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derson, the nation is an imagined political community, and it was early modern
print capitalism that aroused the collective self-awareness and attachments that
initiated this imagined unit; the mass publication and distribution of newspapers
and novels spread collective memories through the Vulgate language of the
time. Furthermore, he argues that from the mid-19th century technologies such
as censuses, maps and museums became important in legitimizing state territo-
ries and colonial projects (Anderson 1983, 1991). His formulation has been
very important in analyzing the identities and cultural politics of the visualiza-
tion of space and the force of collective memories.
For Ernest Gellner (1982), too, nationalism is a theory of political legiti-
macy, originating in early industrialization, which brings ethnic and political
boundaries in alignment. Because modern industrial states require mobility and
often preach equality, state-directed education must be systematically developed
(see also Hobsbawm 1983 and A. Smith 1986 for other influential analyses of
nationalism that add further dimensions to the dynamics of collectivizing sen-
timent and mobilizing ethnicity). 
A number of sports scholars have recognized the critical and often com-
plicated role that sports have played in the formation of modern nationalisms.
Sports have proven capable of mobilizing and expressing powerful national pa-
triotisms, but they have been equally effective in widening divisions within na-
tion-states on the basis of race, gender, class, and other axes (e.g. Sugden and
Bairner 2000, Mangan 1996, Cronin and Mayall 1998). As John Hoberman
states, “sportive nationalism is not a single generic phenomenon; on the con-
trary, it is a complicated sociopolitical response to challenges and events, both
sportive and non-sportive, that must be understood in terms of the varying na-
tional context in which it appears” (Hoberman 1993:18). Thus, the nature of
sporting nationalism is a matter of empirical determination, requiring careful
archival and/or ethnographic research (Shimizu 2002, 2004b).
This is what brings me to the question of how the Olympics construct im-
ages of nation-states and the particular case of Japan and the 1964 Tokyo
Olympics. These were the first Olympics held in Asia, in which athletes from
around the world (except those from China and North Korea) participated,
where themes of “peace and friendship” and images of the capital city and of
Japanese economic growth were broadcasted to the world. But this festive at-
mosphere was built on a foundation where political conflicts between nations
and the memories of invasion and colonization were forgotten. What signifi-
cance did the Tokyo Olympics and its torch relay have for Okinawa before its
later return to Japan on May 15, 1972? My focus here, diagnostically, will be
on the handling of the national flag and anthem and on assessing what the
Olympics brought to people in Tokyo and Okinawa.
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The 1964 Tokyo Olympics and urbanization and
economic growth
Preparations for the 1964 Olympics included massive infrastructure re-
forms across the Tokyo metropolitan region, such as construction of the bullet
train and major improvements in roads, highways, water supply, drainage, and
waste disposal. Tokyo was seemingly transformed into a clean and hygienic
city (Ishiwata 2004). The changes in the Tokyo image during the 1960s were
visible indicators of the country’s “rapid economic growth.”
Nakade Kazuo, a resident of Shibuya Ward, recollected his youthful mem-
ories of the Tokyo Olympics as follows. 
Yoyogi Park, one of the sites of the Tokyo Olympics, was known as
“Washington Heights” because it was used for housing US armed
forces after the war, a place where Japanese were prohibited from en-
tering. In June 1964, a letter from the Shibuya Ward Office was deliv-
ered to my house near Washington Heights, informing us of that. The
letter informed me that “the Shibuya Ward Office is ready to make a
loan to me to change my privy to a flush toilet.” I guessed the reason
was that we Japanese should be ashamed of using a privy, especially
if a foreigner happened to visit. I now realize that there was no possi-
bility of any foreigner visiting my home. But at that time, my mother
immediately agreed and changed our house’s privy to a flush toilet.
My father worked for the railways. He learned English at his own ex-
pense to be prepared for foreigners visiting his station. People living
around our house also were always stressed, saying, “The foreigners
are coming anyway.” In the summer of 1964, we had less rain. When
I sprinkled water on the street in front of my house, a neighbor got
angry with me, saying, “Save water for the foreigners,” as if he re-
garded me as an unpatriotic man. (Nakade 2006)
His comments can be taken as a revealing example of a new type of na-
tionalism, by which people infused daily lives with a keen awareness that “for-
eigners are coming” (again).
The developments completed included areas such as Meiji Jingu Gaien,
Yoyogi and Komazawa, and improvements and maintenance to roads connect-
ing those areas signified the advent of a new age and a new metropolitan Tokyo.
More importantly, the completion of Aoyama-dōri made it possible not only to
connect those areas, but also connect them with central parts of Tokyo (e.g.,
Tokyo Station, Ginza, Diet Building, etc.). Concerning Aoyama-dōri, which
connected the center and outlying areas (Shinjuku, Shibuya and Yoyogi) of the
metropolis, Kurokawa Kishō, an architect working in the Tange Kenzō Re-
search Laboratory at that time, commented:
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Aoyama-dōri is one of the primary factors that changed Tokyo at the
time of the Tokyo Olympics. Its completion changed the structure of
Tokyo drastically. (Kurokawa 2004:60)
However, it is questionable if a vision of city planning was discussed
deeply when organizing the Tokyo Olympics, the cost of which was an enor-
mous one billion yen. This included costs for the Organizing Committee, the
construction and improvement of Olympic competition facilities and businesses
related to highways, parks, water supply and drainage, the Tokaido Shinkansen,
Tokyo International Airport (Haneda), hotels, ryokans (Japanese-style inns),
communication facilities like the NHK Broadcast Center, and the removal of
the Washington Heights barracks. Kurokawa continued to comment as follows:
At the time, master designer Tange studied the types of structures that
should be built in a given area of Yoyogi, and the other master de-
signer, Ashihara Yoshinobu, concentrated on what types of structures
to build in Komazawa. That is to say, the architects were not concerned
with city planning. This is a characteristic peculiar to Japan. The gov-
ernor at the time as well expressed no specific intentions and did not
provide any input. City planning was a job to be entrusted to govern-
ment officials and not studied by politicians. This is an issue for the
whole country, not only for Tokyo. (Kurokawa 2004: 61)
As Kurokawa commented, in those days, the Tokyo Metropolitan Govern-
ment did not hold deep discussions about overall city development or future
city planning. The city development planned and implemented at that time was
evaluated based on the comments of then-governor Azuma Ryūtarō:
We have succeeded in building a firm foundation to promote future re-
development business. (Azuma 1965: 4)
In sum, it can be said that the 1964 Tokyo Olympics was organized
and held utilizing sites and facilities belonging to the Imperial Family
and locations designated for military use, including those previously
occupied by the GHQ, and this is shown in the history of the Olympic
facilities. The Olympics was seized upon as an opportunity to trans-
form the city from an imperialistic city to a normal peacetime city,
leading towards an era of new post-war nationalism. Therefore, having
identified Tokyo as the capital, additional construction was further
promoted although processes were falling behind due to insufficient
financial resources. Even so, many facilities in the Yamanote area and
western suburbs of Tokyo that either belonged to the Imperial Family
or were designated for military use were diverted to the city infrastruc-
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ture (Author’s note: even hotels including the Prince Hotels). As city
development in the above-mentioned areas advanced, disparity be-
tween the downtown area and infrastructure in the eastern area in-
creased. (Machimura 2007: 13) 
By virtue of the Olympics, Tokyo came to be visualized as a city of con-
tinuous growth, rising from the depths of destruction like the rising sun. Various
aspects made this clearly notable. Nevertheless, understanding that many of the
sites and facilities were owned by the Imperial Family or were designated for
military use, it can be said that this wave of new nationalism led to helping for-
get memories of the past, especially amidst the development going on in met-
ropolitan Tokyo. 
Athletes from around the world (but not from China and North Korea) par-
ticipated in the Olympic competitions. These contestants witnessed the trans-
formation of Tokyo with their own eyes via impressive presentations such as
the Tokyo Olympic posters and the torch relay. But how did these people really
view those events? Azuma Ryūtarō, the Tokyo governor at the time and a mem-
ber of both the IOC and Tokyo Olympics Organization Committee, wrote in an
essay on “The Significance of Holding the Tokyo Olympics,”
One of the intangible legacies of the Tokyo Olympics is that it gave
Japanese people the opportunity to be united for the first time since
World War II. Additionally, the Tokyo Olympics succeeded in playing
a vital role in connecting the East and West in terms of worldwide
peace and sports. As a result, “the world began to show greater re-
spect for Japan and its people.” Another intangible legacy was that
sportsmanship, commonly only advocated in words or on the field,
truly grew through the virtue of the Tokyo Olympics. As IOC Chairman
Brundage commented: “When thinking of sportsmanship, what other
excellent amateur sport can bring human beings to this point? It is
clearly imprinted on the minds of everyone, and a contribution of the
Tokyo Olympics.”
In Tokyo, significant importance was placed on ensuring the success
of the Olympics. Tokyo made every possible effort to construct new
roads and facilities. Combined with the cooperation of the people,
Tokyo succeeded in achieving the anticipated results and establishing
a future redevelopment program. (Azuma 1965:4) 
“World peace and Japanese citizens’ decision to focus on the host” and “vi-
sualizing sportsmanship” during the Olympics were expressed in various media.
Kawamoto Nobumasa commented in an essay on “remembering the impressive
festival”: 
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As time goes by, I feel that I have gradually come to understand the
depth and real greatness of the Olympics. Those 15 days, from the bril-
liant opening ceremony through the impressive closing ceremony, fas-
cinated people throughout Japan; they were something I would
describe as “100 million people in ecstasy.” 
As I sat in the stadium, I sometimes hallucinated as if I were floating
somewhere in outer space, far away from Tokyo, Japan and Earth. It
was an amazing feeling to be in such a state! Something anyone can
seldom experience in his or her life. During the period of the Olympics,
there were few people on the streets as many stayed inside to watch
competitions on TV. It’s beyond imagination when such a situation will
occur again.
In thinking of previous Olympics, there was no other choice except to
go abroad to enjoy it. But the Tokyo Olympics brought the world to
Japan for the first time. Everybody could see the world in Japan, and
found Japan in the world. In an international atmosphere, the national
flag, national anthem and patriotism created a sense of harmony
among people. It was an exceptional experience that most Japanese
people had forgotten since the visit of foreign ships to Japan around
the end of the Edo period. (Kawamoto 1965: 30)
The hinomaru flag and modernization: 
The posters of Kamekura Yusaku
To most Japanese at the time, the Tokyo Olympics, bringing to Japan so
many athletes from around the world, had an ethereal presence. There was a
collective state of excitement, for it was held in Japan’s capital, Tokyo, show-
casing its remarkable progress and restored presence in the international com-
munity.2
In this context, it is significant that the “Hinomaru (Rising Sun)” was the
image of the first poster that was adopted symbol for the Tokyo Olympics in a
design competition held in June 1960 as a “very simple and powerful image
easily reminding people of ‘Japan’” (Maemura 2006a: 58). This was quite dif-
ferent from the symbolic logos of previous Olympic Games, and it garnered a
very positive response at home and abroad. However, Kamekura Yūsaku, the
designer of the symbol mark, claims he had a very different motivation.
I drew a large red circle on top of the Olympic logo. People may have
considered that this large red circle represented the hinomaru, but my
actual intention was to express the sun. I wanted to create a fresh and
vivid image through a balance between the large red circle and the
five-ring Olympic mark. I thought that it would make the hinomaru
look like a modern design. (Kamekura 1966)
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According to Kamekura, the logo was designed as a modern form repre-
sented by a simple and powerful red circle rather than as the hinomaru, with
the intention of expressing the power of Japan during its rapid growth and the
dynamism of sports. It was the dynamism of historical and cultural senses de-
rived from the conflicting two aesthetic senses in terms of tradition and mod-
ernism that made the poster a masterpiece. This was the primary characteristic
of Kamekura’s design (Maemura 2006b: 100). 
Beginning with this first poster in 1961, Kamekura designed one poster
each year until the Tokyo Olympics, totaling four posters in all. The layouts of
the second and third posters were entirely different, with lively images of track-
and-field athletes and swimmers. An important point is that Kamekura had taken
into consideration the display method of the posters during the production stage.
Immediately following the completion of the second poster, he envisioned that
displaying it on both the left and right sides of the first poster would have a
stronger appeal. He also discussed the plan of displaying the third poster on the
right side of the first poster, with the second poster on the left. Furthermore, he
commented that the amusement and appeal of displaying the posters in such a
manner would be attractive elements unique to them, making them different
from other artistic genres. This comment demonstrated his sincere self-confi-
dence as a graphics designer (Maemura 2006a: 58).
Kamekura’s opinion was that “visual design is a common language of all
human beings, and designers should keep this in mind when designing forms.”
On the other hand, he also advocated that designers should make the most of
tradition as something spiritual, not merely as a pattern or technique; this should
be done while accepting “what Japanese attempted to express” in standardizing
their work at the global level. For instance, he advocated that designers should
pursue the modern and geometrical beauty of traditional Japanese crests, con-
necting them with the “trademarks” of modern industries.
Tradition is one of the problems Japanese designers must work with.
For designers, it is a burden that must be born and there is no means
of refusing it. It is our duty to break down our tradition into pieces
once and then reassemble those pieces as new tradition. 
(Kamekura 1961: 31) 
After the Tokyo Olympics, Kamekura produced posters for mega-events
such as the 1970 Osaka Expo and the 1972 Sapporo Winter Olympics. The aim
of his visual designs was to present a globally common genre through a new
design that eliminated the confrontation between the traditional and the modern.
As mentioned above, it was also true that the “simple and powerful image that
reminded people of Japan at first glance,” and easily articulated images of the
Olympics and nationalism to all people. 
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The 1964 Olympics Torch Relay
In terms of reminding people of Japan at first glance, the Olympic torch
relay contributed to making people around the world aware of the actual geo-
graphical conditions of the Japanese Islands. The torch relay tradition had begun
with the 1936 Berlin Olympics, and for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the torch
was carried through 12 countries over a distance of 7,484 kilometers, taking 51
days to complete the journey. A total of 100,743 people participated in the torch
relay, including 870 official torch carriers, revealing that the number of people
who ran alongside of the official torch carriers was surprisingly large (Mainichi
Shimbun 1964a: front page 1).3
The Olympic Flame was lit at Olympia on August 21 and reached Naha
on September 7 after transiting Istanbul, Beirut, Teheran, Lahore, New Delhi,
Katmandu, Calcutta, Rangoon, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Hong Kong
and Taipei. A number of these countries had been invaded and occupied by
Japanese forces before and during the Pacific War. In reaching Okinawa, it by-
passed China and the Korean Peninsula. It was transported by air from Naha to
Kagoshima and then made its way to Tokyo via four different courses over a
month from September 9 to October 9, arriving the day before the opening cer-
emony.  The four separate flames were recombined as the Olympic Flame in
front of the Metropolitan Government Office and then placed in a torch holder
in the plaza in front of the Imperial Palace grounds. The road from the Palace
Plaza to Jingu Gaien via Aoyama was a new trunk road representing “new urban
Tokyo.” This torch relay route demonstrated the Japanese had forgotten the na-
tion’s aggressive wartime past and viewed “Tokyo, at the core of the Japanese
Islands, as the center of Japan’s economic development” (Mainichi Shimbun
1964: front page 2).
Furthermore, the anchor torch carrier was 19-year-old Sakai Yoshinori,
who was known as genbaku-ko, the “Atom Boy” because he had been born on
August 6, 1945 in Miyoshi, Hiroshima Prefecture, 70 kilometers from ground
zero, only one-and-a-half hours after the nuclear attack on Hiroshima. Having
been designated as a candidate runner for the 400-meter and 1,600-meter relays
in the Olympics, he lost his chance to represent Japan in the final qualifying
race. Even so, having been born on the day of the nuclear attack on Hiroshima,
he was designated as the anchor torch carrier. Afterwards he commented,
“Thinking back on the past, I ran toward the future, looking for a flash of hope.”
The Tokyo Olympics was a festival to demonstrate to the world the
brilliancy of Japan being at the gateway of rapid growth. We were
messengers to transmit the spiritual uplift of Japanese throughout the
country. (Nishi Nippon Shimbun 2005)
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The Olympic torch relay was a dramatic presentation by means of which
people could remember erased memories. The geo-politics in terms of the ge-
ography ranging from Olympia to Tokyo worked to show only events desired
for remembering, presenting the effects anticipated by the Japanese. Even if
those events were to have people focus their future hopes on metropolitan
Tokyo, they were based on the premise of allowing the Japanese to forget the
historical memories concerning the East Asian countries Japan had invaded and
colonized.
The Olympic Torch Relay and the 
Hinomaru flag in Okinawa
At the general meeting of the IOC held in Munich in May 1959, it was de-
cided that the 1964 Olympics would be hosted by Tokyo. Okinawa appealed
strongly to the Tokyo Olympics Organization Committee (established on Sep-
tember 30, 1959) and other related organizations to have the torch relay pass
through Okinawa as well. At that time, Okinawa was under the administration
of the United States and a territory over which Japan only had residual sover-
eignty. Nevertheless, mainly owing to the fact that the Okinawa Athletic Asso-
ciation had already been recognized as a branch of the Japan Athletic
Association, the Torch Relay Special Committee decided on July 4, 1962 that
the torch relay in Japan would be carried out in all prefectures, torch carriers
would be young people, and the first landing place of the Olympic Flame would
be Okinawa. 
It is not certain if the government intended, with this decision, to take ad-
vantage of the torch relay to arouse public opinion for the return of Okinawa
(Tomiyama 2007b: 28). The stance of Japan on the return of Okinawa at that
time is represented by the following comment that then-Foreign Minister
Kosaka made when he spoke with State Secretary Harter and Ambassador Reis-
chauer:
The Japanese government will not demand the return of Okinawa, and
yet, to keep down public opinion on the return, it is decisively impor-
tant to improve the living standard in Ryukyu…Japan has no intention
to infringe upon or nibble away the administration right of America.
(Miyazato 2000: 203)
Irrespective of the government’s policy on the right of administration, in
Japan there was public opinion demanding the return of Okinawa, as well as
that on the issue of the northern territories between Japan and the Soviet Union.
It may be said that securing and expanding Japan’s presence—that is to say the,
“Hinomaru”—in Okinawa was an important tactic for the Liberal Democratic
Party as the ruling party (Tomiyama 2007b: 29).
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Foreign Minister Kosaka had repeatedly demanded that the U.S. allow
schools to freely fly the hinomaru (i.e., U.S. armed forces prohibited this ac-
tivity in Okinawa). However, High Commissioner Booth rejected Kosaka’s de-
mand, stating as follows:
We are not ruling Ryukyu in terms of the partnership with and confi-
dence in Japan. … Any national flags can be absolute political sym-
bols, which let all people have strong national sentiments as to what
is justifiable. (External Affairs Office of the U.S. Local Government,
1960)
The torch relay was a valuable experience for Okinawa in taking part in
the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.4 The Okinawa Torch Relay Committee was estab-
lished in March 1964. The Subcommittee for Beautification appealed to people
to beautify the course of the torch relay, tying up with the New Life Movement
Promotion Council and municipalities along the course. Public health centers
prepared cleaning guidelines and all the people of the Ryūkyūs developed clean-
ing activities in concert. People considered that even though occupied by the
U.S. armed forces, Okinawa was recognized as a Japanese territory, and that
having been chosen as the first place for the Olympic Flame to land meant that
their nature as “good Japanese” was to be verified (Tomiyama 2007b: 29).
In a practice torch relay carried out on August 9, one month prior to the ar-
rival of the Olympic Flame, however, there were a considerable number of ab-
sentees and dropouts among accompanying runners. Some runners put on their
leather shoes and ran, but could not run the course within the scheduled time.
A local newspaper ran an article expressing apprehension, stating:
Unless studied and examined repeatedly, the torch relay will be thrown
into confusion, and not only Okinawa, but also Japan will lose face
with the world. (The Ryukyu Shimpo, August 10, 1964: “Practice Torch
Relay As Observed”) 
As a result, 3,473 young people including official runners, substitute run-
ners and accompanying runners came under great pressure.
The Olympic Torch, carried onboard a plane named “City of Tokyo,” which
was delayed one day due to a typhoon, arrived at Naha Airport from Taipei at
noon on September 7, 1964. Yosano Shigeru, the general secretary of the Tokyo
Olympics Organization Committee came to Okinawa to greet the Olympic
Torch and stated,
Being Japanese territory, Okinawa is the first place for the Olympic
Flame to land in Japan. In terms of administration, however, it is in-
appropriate to regard everything the same as on the mainland. So, Ok-
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inawa is the terminal point of the overseas course of the Olympic
Flame. (The Okinawa Times, September 4, 1964: “Delegation To Greet
Olympic Flame Coming Tomorrow”)
On the other hand, the media in Okinawa focused on reports that “Okinawa
is the starting point of the Olympic Torch in Japan.” All media covered the ar-
rival of the Olympic Flame as if the people of Okinawa were longing for a nar-
rative of the Olympic Flame landing in Japan’s Okinawa. In a festival of peace
and friendship, it would be delivered to the mainland by the people of Okinawa,
“the Japanese living under the occupation of the U.S. armed forces” (The Oki-
nawa Times, September 8, 1964, “Joyful as if to Celebrate ‘the Return’ to Japan,
Olympic Flame Has Arrived”, etc.). 
After the greeting ceremony held at Naha Airport, the torch carried by the
first runner left the premises at 12:40 and reached the Ounoyama Athletic Sta-
dium at 1:00 p. m. The stadium, which had a place to hold the torch, the main
site of the greeting ceremony, was filled with over 40,000 spectators, “whose
applause and shouts made it difficult to hear the fanfare being performed under
the torch holder” (Information Services Section 1964: 6). Following the lighting
of the Olympic Flame, a “hinomaru” flag was hoisted up the main pole while
the national anthem “kimigayo” was being played. Nagamine Akio, the speaker
of the legislative council, commented,
The domestic torch relay for the Olympic Games held for the first time
in Asia is to start from our native land, the place where the Second
World War ended. Therefore, the relay is the most significant event
leading to world peace, and I wish for its success from the bottom of
my heart. (Omission) I earnestly hope that under the Olympic Flame,
the greatest festival and its competition will be developed brilliantly,
leading to the achievement of the purpose of peace. (Information Serv-
ice Section 1964: 8)
For five days, the torch relay in Okinawa made its way southward from Naha,
then northward along the east coastline, then to the west coast via Shioya, before
finally returning to Naha again via Futenma, Urazoe, Nishihara, and Shuri. After
traveling a 247.1 kilometer circuit across the main island of Okinawa, the
Olympic Torch left Naha Airport at 3:50 p.m. on September 11, carried on a U.S.
armed forces aircraft bound for a receiving ceremony in Kyushu.
During this period, the course of the torch relay was fully lined with hino-
maru flags. All the runners wore the same uniforms, with a red circle and the five-
ring Olympic emblem (a simple design by Kamekura Yusaku) drawn and the
words “Tokyo 1964” printed on the chest of the uniform. The red circle was es-
pecially striking in the design, expressing to everyone the image of the hinomaru.
The Ryukyu Shimpo proposed developing a “movement to greet the
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Olympic Flame with hinomaru,” and shop owners and others agreed to the pro-
posal. It was decided that the national flag would be put up at relay points, and
in front of every school and home. Villages, schools, women’s associations and
young men’s associations participated in the movement. People had small hi-
nomaru flags in their hands and waved them continuously.
Right after landing in Okinawa in 1945, the U.S. armed forces prohibited
the flying of the national flag of Japan, and performing and singing of the Japan-
ese national anthem in groups. In 1949, they further prohibited the flying of all
other national flags in Okinawa, leaving it permissible to fly only that of the
United States. However, when the peace treaty with Japan came into effect in
1952, the U.S. armed forces came to permit the flying of the hinomaru at private
houses and private meetings for non-political purposes. And then, in light of
the talks between Prime Minister Ikeda and President Kennedy in 1961, it came
to be allowed that hinomaru could be flown at public buildings only on legal
holidays. (All of these regulations were abolished in 1969.)
Around 1964, the “Let’s Fly the hinomaru” movement began. Although
flying the hinomaru on days except for legal holidays was not permitted, the
U.S. armed forces tacitly permitted the hinomaru being displayed along the
relay course and at the ceremonial site. 
Following the hoisting of the hinomaru and the singing of the national an-
them in unison at the greeting ceremony, the torch relay reached another climax
when the Olympic Flame approached the south battlefield’s ruins. In front of
the Himeyuri Monument, members of the Himeyuri Senior Women’s Associa-
tion and bereaved wives holding the pictures of their husbands who had been
killed in action were watching the torch relay together with 500 children holding
small hinomaru flags in their hands. The torch carrier running on the Mabuni
Hill was a child of a person killed in action. The grand figure of the torch carrier
holding the torch was recognized by people as the best memorial service to the
dead who had fought for the sake of the hinomaru in the past (Tomiyama 2007b:
32).
The torch relay was not Okinawa’s only experience of participating in the
Tokyo Olympics. In addition to the arrival of the Olympic Flame at Okinawa,
a microwave line between Japan and Ryukyu, in which a huge amount of money
was invested, opened as one of the Japanese government’s projects to assist
Okinawa. There was only a single one-way TV line from the mainland to Oki-
nawa, and the microwave line made it possible to relay-broadcast the Tokyo
Olympics simultaneously (Tomiyama 2007a: 229). Thus, the people of Okinawa
were able to enjoy the athletic performances in Tokyo, and visually experience




Reconsidering the significance of the hinomaru
flag: The 1987 National Athletic Meet
In commemoration of the return of Okinawa to Japan on May 15, 1972,
the Okinawa Special National Athletic Meet, Wakanatsu Kokutai, was held from
May 3 to 6, 1973. The meet, unlike regular national athletic meets, was held
without preliminariy contests, selecting equal numbers of participants from each
prefecture.
After that, in 1987, the 42nd National Athletic Meet, Kaihō Kokutai, was
the final national athletic meet held successively in circuit around the country
every year and also in commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the return of
Okinawa.5 However, the hinomaru had come to have a completely different
significance to the people of Okinawa. In March 1987, at the village assembly
of Yomitan, where softball games were played, the then-village mayor spoke
publically against the compulsory guidelines on hinomaru and kimigayo.
The legislation concerning hinomaru and kimigayo reminds us of the
movement that prevailed in 1935 when Japan began its path of mili-
tarism and imperialism… The movement is a return to the idea of
“Loyalty to the Emperor and Devotion to the Country,” in other words,
a return to prewar days. This would be deeply regrettable, and I fear
that it will allow the government to control the most fundamental
human rights.
And the following was resolved at the village assembly.
Sports and education must be free from any despotism whatsoever. In
looking back on the histories of wars, we realize that politics always
controlled and subordinated sports and education. We must not forget
that is why humans went to war with one another.
In addition to the Yomitan movement, the “Kokutai Liberalization” move-
ment spread widely in Okinawa, led by labor unions, which strongly criticized
the hinomaru flag, the kimigayo anthem, the Emperor, and the Self-Defense
Forces. However, the Ministry of Education and the Japan Amateur Sports As-
sociation ignored those popular feelings in Okinawa, and they ordered official
national flag raising in the Standards for Holding National Athletic Festivals. 
For the Tokyo Olympics, the course and ceremonial sites for the torch relay
in Okinawa were lined with hinomaru, which was used to promote the “Re-
turn-to-the-Motherland Movement.” However, in 1987, 23 years after the return
of Okinawa in 1972, most residents had little interest in displaying the hino-
maru. In a celebrated incident, it was pulled down from the flagpole at Oki-
nawa’s National Sports Festival. 
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Conclusion: 
Nation building and the Olympics in East Asia
In the aftermath of World War II, the Japanese people and their leaders ea-
gerly and earnestly hoped for the opportunity to host an Olympic Games. The
Games were viewed as an expression of civilized accomplishment, based on
the spirit of sportsmanship and fair play originating from Europe. Hosting the
Olympics was considered to be a magnificent achievement, through which the
world would recognize the modernization of the host city, Tokyo, by virtue of
the country’s rapid postwar economic growth. Founded in European notions of
human dignity, the Olympics were to be relived in 1964 in modern Asia.
In this chapter, I have mainly discussed Japanese nation-building in terms
of its internal problems in the 1960s and against the backdrop of its historical
relationships with America and East Asia. Through the staging of the Olympic
Torch Relay, Japan attempted to cover up its history of invasion and coloniza-
tion in Asia, while staging a performance that highlighted the memories of the
final torch carrier, who was a victim of nuclear attack. 
Japan therefore planned the 1964 Olympic Torch relay to pass through Ok-
inawa, occupied by the U.S. armed forces since the end of the World War II. It
encouraged the reversion movement by displaying the hinomaru and promoted
a beautification movement as a means of modernization. As is clear from the
history of Okinawa as a geo-political region, the nation-building process is
never simple or easy. And as the national athletic meets show, the significance
of the hinomaru and kimigayo has also changed in diverse ways.
This chapter has highlighted how a collective social identity emerges in
the midst of cultural politics, especially sports, using the case of Tokyo and Ok-
inawa in the1960s. In these incidents, we can see the reformation of the nation
and its people. How is “nation” defined in Japan and East Asia? In the European
and American contexts, the emphasis is on the relationship between nation, na-
tionalism and sports. For East Asian countries, we must consider their regional
relationships of anti-western imperialism, Asian colonization, and moderniza-
tion. For Japan in this context, the status and symbolism of the emperor are cru-
cial. The Olympics as sporting mega-event must be understood as a political




1 Okinawa is an archipelago stretching from the Amami Islands to the Yaeyama
Islands. It is a geo-political keystone for East Asia and Southeast Asia. Much
of its history is a history of occupation by other powers. The name “Ryukyu”
was used from 1429 to 1879, having been bestowed by the Emperor of Ming
dynasty China. The country prospered as a transit point for trade between
Korea, China, Japan, Southeast Asia, and Spain. While its suzerain was Ming
(and later, Ch’ing) China, Ryukyu was invaded by the Satsuma clan in 1609,
and was then controlled by both Japan and China. From 1872 to 1879, it was
colonized by Japan and became to be known as Okinawa Prefecture. During
the Second World War, Okinawa was the only major Asian land mass invaded
by the American armed forces, and over 200,000 people died in offensive and
defensive battles.  After the war, the United States established the “Ryukyu
Government” and placed Okinawa under military administration. In 1953, the
Amami Islands were returned to Kagoshima Prefecture and became Okinawa
Prefecture on May 15, 1972. In 2008, Okinawa Prefecture had a population of
1,374,189. The five major American armed force bases in Okinawa represent
75% of the total American bases in Japan. The number of American military
and support personnel in Okinawa totaled 46,497, just under half of all U.S.
troops in Japan. On June 30, 1959, a U.S. Air Force jet fighter crashed and
burst into flames on the grounds of Miyamori Elementary School (present-day
Uruma City), killing 17 people, including 11 children, and injuring 156 people.
During the Vietnam War, B-52 strategic bombers were stationed at Kadena Air
Base on a regular basis from 1968, and emergency take-offs and landings at
night were common. In one instance, a B-52 crashed and burst into flames im-
mediately after take-off; the cause was determined to be poor maintenance.
Additionally, there have been a series of tragic cases of girls being raped by
U.S. soldiers and numerous accidents involving military vehicles. 
2 Olympism proclaims that world peace and the spirit of sportsmanship are re-
alized through the body of the athletes. But how can that be, for example, when
considering Japan’s 1964 Olympic volleyball team, the self-labeled “Oriental
Witches”? They were factory workers and subsidized players. They had no
choice but to train hard under their manager, Daimatsu, and their volleyball
bodies expressed that disciplined regime. They retired after the Olympics and
all married. This is an instructive case of how gender, sexuality, class and na-
tionalism are deeply inscribed in the body of athlete (Arata 2004). 
3 The 1936 Berlin Olympics torch relay – 7 countries, 12 days, 2,075km, 3,075
carriers; the 1948 London Olympics torch relay – 7 countries, 17 days,
3,160km; the 1952 Helsinki Olympics torch relay – 5 countries, 24 days,
3,300km, 3,042 carriers; the 1956 Melbourne Olympics torch relay – 5 coun-
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tries, 20 days, 3,520km, 3,180 carriers; the 1960 Rome Olympics torch relay
– 2 countries, 13 days, 2,250km, 1,883 carriers.
4 In the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, Azuma Fumiko participated in women’s archery,
and three persons were registered as judges.
5 For the Wakanatsu Kokutai, a torch relay was run through in the prefecture;
the flame was lit on Hateruma Island located at the southernmost end of the
archipelago. The Kaihō Kokutai in Hiroshima in 1987 also featured a torch
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The Tokyo Olympics: 
Politics and Aftermath
Christian Tagsold
Over the last half-century Japan has been an eager host for mega-events. Since
1964, the nation has hosted three Olympic Games, two World Expos and most
recently the FIFA World Cup. However, it has become more and more difficult
to justify such sponsorship to an increasingly skeptical Japanese public. This
can be seen in Tokyo’s campaign to bid for the 2016 Summer Games, after its
successful bids for the 1940 Olympics (ultimately canceled due to the outbreak
of World War II) and the very successful 1964 Summer Olympics. One of the
obstacles to broad public backing for the bid was the obvious connection be-
tween Tokyo’s efforts and the political fate of mayor Ishihara Shintarō. Critics
like Nagao Toshihiko (2008), who wrote an influential article about the “Ishi-
hara Olympics” in the popular intellectual journal Sekai, denounced the Games
as a simple vehicle for the mayor to fulfill his political ambitions. 
This widespread public discussion about the political dimensions of hosting
the Games is a new phenomenon in Tokyo, and it is surprising in light of Japan’s
earlier experiences with the 1940 and 1964 Games. It seems obvious that the
Olympics of 1940 would have served to legitimize the ultra-nationalist politics
of the times, just as the 1936 Berlin Olympics helped the National Socialists to
gain international acceptance. Placing the 1964 Olympics with the 1960 Rome
Games and the 1972 Munich Games also demonstrates that those Games were
intended as a political message of reintegrating Japan fully into the ranks of
peaceful nations following World War II. Still, neither the 1940 Games nor the
1964 Games were deemed political by contemporaries.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the 1964 Tokyo Olympics
were legitimized and how these Games acted as political events, despite not
being recognized as such by contemporaries. The Tokyo Olympics received
broad public support and symbolized for the Japanese people that the immediate
post-war era was over and that they could again be proud of their nation. Within
this context it was easy to use the Olympics as a stage for symbolic politics.
National symbols like the Japanese emperor – the tennō – or the hinomaru na-
tional flag could be given a fresh polish of legitimacy by integrating them into
the symbolism of the Olympic movement, which conveyed a compelling mes-
sage of peace. These symbolic politics were not recognized as such by the
Japanese public or even intellectuals. Instead, they were taken at face value be-
cause the overall narrative of the Olympics was so very compelling.
    Yet, the artificial distinction between the Olympics and politics in Japan




Olympics, an imaginative and persuasive anti-Olympics movement had
emerged that picked up the political character of the Olympic Games as a central
topic. Since then, the Japanese public has become increasingly skeptical toward
plans to stage mega-events. The legitimizing narratives for sports mega-events
such as the Olympic Games have collapsed in the last few decades, and the po-
litical dimensions and implications have been discussed openly, leading to a
much more balanced view.
The 1964 Olympic Games as rite of passage
In 1964, general opinion held the Tokyo Olympics to be a highly legitimate
and at the same time apolitical event. Though the public opinion polls that are
today ubiquitous were not performed prior to the Games, various other factors
made it clear that the Games were very much welcomed by the Japanese pop-
ulace. National media, commentary by well regarded intellectuals and polls
taken during the Games themselves show that the Tokyo Olympics had almost
universal support by the time they began.
Earlier in the process, however, criticism was much more widespread. Al-
though the general attitude of the media was very positive during the early
stages of the campaign to bring the Olympics to Tokyo, a more skeptical tone
emerged soon after the city’s bid was accepted over those of rivals such as De-
troit, Brussels and Vienna at the 1959 meeting of the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) in Munich. National newspapers began to question the ability
of the Japanese capital to host an event on such a massive scale. The nation’s
leading liberal newspaper, the Asahi Shinbun, printed a series of articles entitled
“The Olympics are coming, but,” in which the deficiencies of the city were enu-
merated. Especially emphasized was a lack of sufficient accommodations for
foreign guests (Asahi 5-1959:342); shortly after Tokyo won the bidding race,
hotel reservations from abroad were already pouring in (Nikkei 8-1959:477),
deepening the fear that Japan’s infrastructure, from the aforementioned hotels,
to transportation, to the sports stadiums themselves, would be unable to handle
the masses that would throng to the Games. The general ability of Japan to fi-
nance the necessary infrastructural improvements was called into question, and
some opponents in this early planning phase argued that the money could be
better invested elsewhere (NHK 1967:9f.). 
These critical viewpoints became less and less common the further plan-
ning and implementation went on. A year before the opening ceremonies, it was
no longer being called into question whether Japan would be able to success-
fully stage the Games or it was worthwhile to do so. The national media praised
the endeavor and critics of Tokyo’s infrastructure were silenced by the capital
city’s rapid transformation. When the Games finally opened in October 1964,
the Japanese citizens reacted euphorically. With the cheering nation at their
back, the Japanese Olympic team brought home 16 gold medals, including one
The Tokyo Olympics
63
for women’s volleyball, which followed a tense decisive match watched live
on television by about 90% of the population. The public also tuned in to the
ceremonies accompanying the Games in large numbers, with some 85% watch-
ing the opening ceremonies, of which 97% indicated their satisfaction with the
show (NHK 1967:238).
Finally, intellectuals added their voices to those of the national media and
the general public. Famed left-wing author and later Nobel laureate Ōe Kenz-
aburō (1964) attended the opening ceremony in the national stadium and would
even pardon the heavy presence of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the per-
formance - about 10,000 Japanese soldiers in total were involved in the Games.
The right-wing author Mishima Yukio (1964) praised the Opening Ceremony’s
healing effects on the wounds afflicted on Japanese souls by recent history. Al-
most all intellectuals pointed out that the Games changed international attitudes
toward Japan, lending credence to the officials who had given this very effect
as a major argument for staging the Olympics in the first place (Noma 1964).
Indeed, the world – and especially the West – was deeply impressed by the
Japanese ability to organize and stage an event of such scale and prestige.
Obviously, the narrative that was built up to legitimize and carry the 1964
Olympic Games was a very powerful one. Taking place 24 years after the failure
of the 1940 Olympics, the new Games served as a compelling symbol for the
end of the post-war era, a time in which Japan’s role in waging war and com-
mitting countless atrocities led to its prohibition from participating in interna-
tional matters – including the London Olympics of 1948, which especially
deprived Japan’s male swimmers of likely medals. Of course it was not the
Olympics themselves which were responsible for Japan’s return to the commu-
nity of nations; Japan was legally readmitted to the United Nations and various
international sports associations in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Economically
as well, the country had largely emerged from the ashes of its defeat within a
decade of the end of the Second World War, largely driven by the demand trig-
gered by the Korean War in the beginning of the 1950s. But the Olympics were
the rite of passage that returned Japan to a place of international acceptance and
economic wellbeing in the eyes of the Japanese public, as well as those of the
world.
Additionally, the Olympics eased the tensions created by the so-called
Anpō-Crisis, which began in the late 1950s and culminated in 1960. Millions
of Japanese citizens took to the streets to protest the revision of the 1951 secu-
rity treaty between Japan and the US, which would have put Japan in a much
more active position with regard to its defense. This crisis posed the biggest
risk for the stability of Japan in the post-war era, and led to the resignation of
Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke. The new Prime Minister, Ikeda Hayato, intro-
duced a whole new vocabulary into politics, refocusing political discussions in
Japan (Tsurumi 1991:15). He promised to double the incomes of citizens in the
near future in order to expand private consumption. The Tokyo Olympics were
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a symbol that marked this shift in economic politics. Instead of focusing on
reinvesting economic surpluses and strengthening business, private households
were now able to buy goods like color television sets to enjoy the Games.
The narrative told by and through the 1964 Olympic Games was highly
credible because it was clearly linked to Japan’s own sense of itself in that era.
Very few would have questioned the necessity and logic of performing rituals
to symbolize the rebirth of the nation, especially when those rituals were em-
bedded into such a well-established and accepted context as the Olympic
Games. This is clearly shown by the results of the NHK opinion polls cited ear-
lier in this chapter. Thus, those voices that were critical of the Games did not
principally criticize the rationale for staging the Games themselves, but rather
questioned whether Japan was up to the task of playing host to such an event.
The significant issue was Japan’s ability to upgrade its infrastructure to accom-
modate the great number of people who would come to Tokyo. Accomplishing
this task was required to legitimize the Games in the eyes of the Japanese pub-
lic.
The symbolic politics of the Games
The restoration of national pride that was staged in 1964 involved the de-
liberate rehabilitation of classical national symbols, especially the tennō himself
(the emperor), the hinomaru (or Rising Sun) flag, the kimigayo (“His Majesty‘s
Reign”) anthem, and the army. The method of their revival was to free them of
their wartime associations and present them instead as symbols of peace. This
was made possible by embedding them in the Olympic Games’ own narrative
and by introducing new national symbols. The latter were mostly associated
with the technical achievements of postwar Japan, such as the Shinkansen bullet
train, which ran for the first time just a few days prior to the opening of the
Games and was at the time the fastest train in the world. Also, the world-wide
broadcast of the Games in color and via satellite demonstrated the high tech-
nological standards of the Games, although Japan in fact relied heavily on as-
sistance from America to make this possible.
The most powerful example of the repossessing of classical national sym-
bols is the emperor (tennō) himself, who made the official proclamation to begin
the Games at the opening ceremony on October 10. The IOC requires that this
role be performed by the head of state, in which capacity the tennō was clearly
acting. Legally though, this was a very complicated situation. The first article
of the Japanese constitution of 1946 states clearly that “the Emperor shall be
the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people.” In Article 7, he is given
many duties that are normally the privilege of heads of state, but nowhere does
the constitution explicitly state that this is his role. Even now, it remains unclear
whether the emperor or the prime minister is the head of state (Yokota 1992:27).
Yet in the 1964 ceremony, the tennō was formally presented not as the head of
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state but rather as the patron of the Tokyo Olympics. This had been determined
in 1962 by the Organizing Committee and, behind it, the Ministry of Education
(and no doubt after discussions with the Imperial Household Agency), in order
to forestall any public debate about the emperor’s status as head of state (Orga-
nizing Committee for the XVIII Olympiad 1966:39). It is certain, though, that
this subtle difference was not clearly understood by the Japanese public and the
rest of the world. After the tennō had arrived at the Olympic stadium on October
10 for the opening ceremony, the national kimigayo anthem was played for the
first time. Nearly an hour later, the tennō delivered the opening speech declaring
the start of the Games. Before he left 20 minutes later, doves of peace were re-
leased, kimigayo played once again, and a squad of tactical jets painted the
Olympic rings in the sky above the Olympic stadium. The whole opening cer-
emony was broadcast live all over the globe for the first time in Olympic history.
Only 19 years after he had been narrowly spared from being tried as a war crim-
inal, the tennō appeared not only in the capacity as head of state but also as a
symbol of peace before the eyes of the audience in the Olympic stadium, and
on TV screens in Japan and worldwide. 
A very similar story can be told about the hinomaru flag, which was not
officially sanctioned as Japan’s national flag until 1999. Even though the flag
had been in public use throughout postwar Japan, serving as Japan’s official
flag in the Olympics, its status was disputed hotly in the public for its strong
connections to the country’s imperial past. Thus, as the 1964 Games ap-
proached, an attempt was made to recreate the flag as a symbol of shared beliefs.
A commission was set up to redesign the flag, whose colors and proportions
had not been defined since 1945, and a number of variations had appeared (Fuk-
iura 1995:96). The commission decided to use the Olympic standard for the
flag size, which is a vertical to horizontal ratio of 2:3. This ratio diverged from
the proclamation of 1870, which had set the ratio to 7:10. For the color of the
sun disk (the literal meaning of hinomaru), the commission distributed a public
questionnaire that asked respondents to choose the most apt shade from a scale
of reds. The resulting flag could be seen as a product of democracy and inter-
nationalism. It was presented to the public in March, 1964, half a year before
the start of the Games. The particular design process was obviously crucial in
altering the flag’s image and perception; however, its prominent display before
and during the Olympics was even more important. To see the hinomaru flying
along with other national flags and the Olympic banner of peace was an im-
pressive demonstration of its new status. Could there be anything nefarious with
using the hinomaru as a national symbol when it complied with international
standards in the most peaceful of world arenas? 
The ultimate demonstration of this flag’s image shift was in its appearance
on the uniform of Sakai Yoshinori, the final runner in the Olympic torch relay.
Sakai had been born in Hiroshima prefecture on August 6, 1945, the day the
first atomic bomb was dropped on the prefecture‘s capital. To be precise, it was
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not actually the hinomaru that shone bright on Sakai’s white t-shirt but rather
the logo of the 1964 Games. However, that logo was the red sun (albeit in a
slightly different shade), together with the five Olympic rings and the phrase
“Tokyo 1964” below it.
Keeping politics and sports apart
Even into the 1980s, the Olympics were widely seen in Japan as a realm
separate from politics, and there were very few questions raised against the con-
stant insistence by the IOC and the Japan Olympic Committee that the Olympic
Movement was apolitical. For instance, the 62nd session of the IOC, which was
held in Tokyo shortly before the Games themselves, addressed the need to resist
“political interference,” by which the IOC meant the threat of politics intruding
into the Olympic Movement. As hosts of the immanent Games, the Japanese
were of course eager to embrace this pretense. Such claims, of course, required
an enormous suspension of disbelief—or perhaps a Lewis Carol notion of pol-
itics, it being clear that the Games were awarded to Japan for the (apolitical?)
act of welcoming it back to normal nationhood! But if that was not political,
then how could anyone see the flag, the anthem, and the emperor in anything
but a benign light? This was due to the fact that the realm of ritual and symbol-
ism was not widely regarded as political in the mid-1960s. 
The political scientist Murray Edelman (1964) formulated his theory of
“the symbolic uses of politics” the very year that the Olympics took place, al-
though it took another decade before this idea of symbolic politics found its
way into Olympic studies. He argued that politics not only proceed as rational
discourses but also legitimize themselves with rituals and symbols. The first
and most obvious example of Edelman’s model was the 1936 Berlin Olympics,
but the first critical analysis of the symbols and rituals of these Games was
Mandell (1971). In 1964, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces still used the role
of the German army in 1936 as a model for their involvement in the Tokyo
Games. The Self-Defense Force’s report (Bōeichō 1965: Preface) admitted
qualms about the persecution of Jews in Germany and the political abuse of the
Games, but along the general lines of the IOC, only as political interference,
not as something inherent in the logic of the Games themselves. Who could
blame the Self-Defense Forces for this if even the influential German Olympic
theorist Hans Lenk (1964:162f.) denied any political interference by the Na-
tional-Socialists in the Berlin Olympics in his book Werte, Ziele, Wirklichkeit
der Modernen Olympischen Spiele [Values, Aims and Reality of the Modern
Olympic Games] the very same year?
If even the Olympic Games of 1936 were seen as non-political, it was cer-
tainly difficult for contemporaries to understand how important the role of sym-
bolic politics was during the Tokyo Olympics in 1964. No one complained, for
example, about Sakai performing the sacred torch runner as a political gesture
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towards Japan’s imagined wartime victimization. Rather, his final round through
the Olympic stadium and the lighting of the Olympic flame were understood
as a powerful statement by the peaceful youth of the world against nuclear dan-
gers. This fit well in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which had
brought the world to the brink of a devastating nuclear war, a terror still fresh
in the public mind. It also proved that the Olympics were beyond the daily quar-
rels of politics and promised a road to universal peace, reconciling, especially,
the antagonism of the Cold War.
In that sense, the fiction of the Olympic Games as non-political was highly
important in the second half of the twentieth century. Whenever there was rea-
son to believe that the Olympics served political reasons or was not completely
free of political undertones, as in the case of the Moscow Games of 1980, the
event did not function anymore as an arena where athletes from the West and
East could meet one another. In the same vein, any efforts to deliberately politi-
cize sports were condemned harshly as political interference by the sports
world. When Sukarno’s Indonesia tried to assemble the “new emerging forces”
with its GANEFO movement, the IOC reacted quickly and ejected the country
from the Tokyo Olympics (Kanin 1981:85; Lutan and Hong 2005). Setting sport
apart from politics was the premise for establishing it as a field on which to
meet each other, though this reading was ambiguous on both sides since the
sportive competitions were seen as a metaphor for the general competition of
political systems.
Against the tide of anti-government protests that rose again in the late
1960s, these re-nationalized symbols retained much of their legitimacy because
of their deployment during the Olympics. It would still take another three
decades for the flag and the hymn to be granted formal legal legitimacy, and
the status of the tennō as head of state remains ambiguous—or rather is delib-
erately left ambiguous by conservative politicians and the Imperial Household
Agency as the best strategy for preserving imperial prerogatives. Hence, the
emperor opened the 1972 Sapporo Winter Games and the 1998 Nagano Winter
Games again in the capacity of patron.
Revealing the political side of olympics
In the 1960s, there were almost no critical voices raised against the
Olympics and its uses by the Japanese state. But the Olympic truce in Japan
did not last forever. During Nagoya’s bid for the 1988 Summer Olympics,
broad-based citizens’ groups emerged in protest against their city’s bid, arguing
that the Games would be a wasteful expenditure of public money and would
cause ecological problems. They even called into question the ideals of the
Olympic Games themselves. This was probably the first popular anti-Olympic
movement in Asia. 
Prefectural mayor Nakaya Yoshiaki had initiated the bid in 1977 to gain
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nation- and worldwide recognition for Japan’s fourth largest city. After the
Olympics were held in the capital city, Japan’s other major urban center, Ōsaka,
had organized the World Expo in 1970, thereby restoring balance to the ever
competitive relationship between the eastern and western halves of Japan’s main
island of Honshū. The far north got its share with the 1972 Sapporo Winter
Olympics. Nagoya’s politicians were eager to burnish the image of their city,
situated between the Tokyo/Yokohama urban area to the east and the
Osaka/Kobe/Kyoto to the west, which had not yet had its own day in the sun. 
The anti-Olympic movement in Nagoya was not the main reason for the
failure of the bid. While Nagoya’s efforts were technically superior to those of
Seoul, the sole other competitor, the Korean side did a better job of lobbying
and playing the political power games within the Olympic movement (Ikei
1992:196ff.). Furthermore, allowing Korea to host the Games allowed the IOC
to avoid the perceptions of Japanese dominance that would have arisen if the
third Olympic Games hosted in Asia had again taken place in Japan. Given
Japan’s colonial history, this would have been quite problematic for the Olympic
Movement. Despite this, Nagoya was considered the clear favorite going into
the race, but in the end, Seoul received about two thirds of the votes, shocking
the Japanese supporters. Prefectural Mayor Nakaya did not run for a second
term after this perceived disaster, and about a month and a half after the closing
ceremony of the 1988 Seoul Games, committed suicide, most likely because
he could not do away with this black mark on his career.
Even though it did not play the decisive role in Nagoya’s loss, the anti-
Olympic movement formed in reaction to the city’s bid was the grounds for
some of the principles used in arguments against staging mega-events ever
since, whether Olympics, World Cups or World Expos. The most common ar-
gument, and the one also seen during the preparations for the Tokyo Olympics,
was the depiction of the costs of the event and the necessary infrastructure as
wasteful (Yamada 1981). But while the emphasis in the late 1950s was on the
question of whether Japan could afford to stage such an event, in the late 1970s
criticism questioned whether Nagoya should do so. Many citizens were no
longer prepared to sacrifice their own wellbeing for the lofty plans and inter-
national ambitions of politicians without at least engaging in a thorough debate
about the environmental and economical burdens of staging the Olympics. They
organized a campaign against the Games, including demonstrations, as well as
distributed informational material and held public discussions.
But the criticism went much further than simply questioning the direct ef-
fects of the Olympics on the city. The protesters questioned the very aims and
ideals of the Olympic Games. Kageyama Ken, Okasaki Masaru and Mizuta Hi-
roshi (1981), three leading intellectuals of the anti-Olympics movement, re-
leased an “Anti-Olympic Manifesto,” challenging the image of the Olympic
Games as a catalyst of peace and mutual understanding as well as attempting
to deconstruct  the internal logic of the Olympic movement itself. In their eyes,
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the modern Olympics served to strengthen nationalist sentiments, encouraged
the public to take a passive spectator role rather than participating in the sports
themselves, and cost a great deal of money, more to the benefit of large concerns
than to those of ordinary citizens. 
For those within the anti-Olympic movement, the Olympic idea was caught
up in aristocratic ideals from the very beginning, and thus was of no use to the
normal citizens living at the end of the twentieth century. As an alternative, the
anti-Olympic movement proposed the concept of “trops,” a neologism which
is the reverse spelling of “sport” and was intended to bring into public discus-
sion a substitute for the consumerist, sports-industry driven Olympics. The goal
of “trops” was to encourage ordinary citizens to playfully engage in cooperative
games (Kageyama/Okasaki 1984). The proposed games did not emphasize an-
tagonistic competition and produced no winners. Instead, they were designed
to keep the players constantly moving while working together to achieve com-
mon goals.
The anti-Olympic movement and “trops” were politically rooted in the up-
heavals of 1968 that shook Japan as much as the nations of the West; the Tokyo
University riots of 1968/69 were possibly the most ferocious worldwide. It took
inspiration from French Situationism, wanting to free sports from the grasp of
capitalism and return them to a playful and universally accessible realm in order
to again create authentic situations, instead of passive consumption. They also
adopted the extremely critical stance taken by the German Left against the 1972
Munich Olympics (Henschen and Wetter 1972; Prokop 1971), although the con-
cept of “trops” went further than this negativism as it proposed games for all.
Further foundations for the concept of “trops” can be found in the criticisms of
competition and antagonism in the peace movement and alternative pedagogies.
The anti-capitalist standpoint gained justification from the economic slowdown
of the 1970s and the drawbacks of industrial development that became more
and more obvious during that time, leading to a reevaluation of priorities by
ever increasing numbers of Japanese citizens. The “trops” movement was thus
closely related to the non-sports festivals and civil-society games that were
gaining momentum worldwide in the 1980s, as observed by Henning Eichberg
(2004:77). It distinguished itself, however, in that it did not simply abandon
Olympism but attempted to transcend it by flipping it upside down.
Under the critical barrage of the anti-Olympic movement, the legitimizing
narrative of the 1964 Olympics began to crumble. The emperor’s acting as head
of state in opening the Olympics – a role unjustified by the Japanese constitution
– was shown to be simple revisionist nationalism. The peaceful aura of the
Games was disputed; they were portrayed instead as antagonistic and therefore
rooted in the logic of international relations, which, in the ultimate logical ex-
tension, propagated war. Also, economic development and a blind faith in tech-
nological progress were shown to be anti-humanist instead of advancing the
common welfare. Admittedly not all citizens of Nagoya, most likely not even
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a majority, agreed with the arguments of the anti-Olympic movement. It is clear
enough, though, that a consensus as to the meaning of the Olympics in general
and their meaning for Japan in particular, could no longer be easily reached and
had to be discussed in the political arena. 
Interestingly, trops has spread to other countries in Asia, though it has not
sparked an anti-Olympic movement in itself. While the Beijing Olympics seem
to have served as a rite of passage for China as the Tokyo Olympics did for
Japan in the 1960s, the anti-Olympic voices in this case overwhelmingly came
from outside and did not lead the Chinese people to a more critical view of their
Games. Instead, opposition to the international critical narratives strengthened
the convictions of Chinese people for their cause. Given that even the most
heated discussions have not helped to form a visible anti-Olympic movement
in China, which, under the political circumstances, may be a risky undertaking,
the quite remarkable reception of trops in China is surprising. Wu and Gao
(2002), two of the advocates of trops in China, argue the term represents a good
way to bring sports to and increase the health of the Chinese masses, who face
lifestyle-related health problems, such as cardiovascular disease, similar to those
common in the United States. Wu and Gao’s discussion does not completely
disregard the critical potential of trops, but it is certainly pushed to the back-
ground. Instead, they argue that trops would promote a better knowledge of
sports to the population, which has been misled by Falun Gong and its contro-
versial teachings that embody exercise and healing experiments (Wu and Gao
2002:10). 
Regaining political grounds
In this chapter I have tried to show how the 1964 Tokyo Olympics served
as a rite of passage from the immediate post-war era into a period of economic
affluence and renewed national pride. Symbolic politics were intensively used
during the Games to instill a new sense of national belonging and also prove to
the world that Japan had rejoined the ranks of peaceful nations. The symbolic
complex surrounding the tennō was especially central to this. But the highly
political character of the Games was more or less ignored in contemporary dis-
cussions. There are three reasons for this. First of all, the narrative of the Tokyo
Olympics as a rite of passage was highly credible. Because of this, political dis-
cussions about the Olympics were limited to the question of whether the city
could host the Games, not whether it should do so. Additionally, the Olympic
framework, with its message of peace, lent credibility to the assumption of non-
political games. It was easy to present national symbols, which had been tar-
nished by their use during WW II, as natural devices denoting Japan. Finally,
due to the Cold War it was necessary for the IOC, but also for the powers of
each side, to keep up the fiction of non-political games in order to secure a com-
mon ground for sportive competitions. Only two decades later, the trops move-
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ment against Nagoya’s bid to host Olympics in 1988 unveiled the inherent po-
litical character of the Olympic movement and questioned the legitimacy of the
1964 Games. 
Since that time, Olympic matters have come to be seen as political issues
in Japan when new bids have been undertaken. This is also true for Tokyo’s bid
for the 2016 Olympics, which sparked heated debates with its proponent mayor
Ishihara Shintarō, a renowned populist leaning strongly to the right. These de-
bates had a very international dimension, since Ishihara on more than one oc-
casion had voiced opinions playing down the wounds inflicted by Japan on
Asian nations in WWII.  Tokyo’s ultimately unsuccessful bid to host the 2016
Olympic Games was openly political (Kelly 2010) and stood in direct opposi-
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Spreading Olympism and the
Olympic Movement in Japan:
Inerpreting “Universal” Values
Andreas NIEHAUS
The act of translation thus hypothesizes an exchange of equivalent
signs and makes up that equivalence where there is none perceived as
such. (Liu 1999: 21)
“One World, One Dream,” the slogan of the Beijing Olympics of 2008, reflects
the established narrative that the Olympic Games are held in the spirit of global
unity and peace. Nevertheless, contrary to this internationalism, the modern
Olympics have bolstered patriotism and nationalism since the very first Games
of 1896. This inherent contradiction is exemplified by the root concept of
“Olympism,” which is defined as “a philosophy of life, exalting and combining
in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with
culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy
found in effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal
fundamental ethical principles.”1 This definition allows the extraction of certain
core values like internationalism, universalism, continuity, rhythm, independ-
ence, and neutrality (Höfer 1994:56.). However, the German philosopher Hans
Lenk (1972) in his influential work on the modern Olympic Games has already
shown that there is no standardized, distinctly defined fundamental term that
characterizes the “Olympic idea, “which ultimately remains vague.”2 The ob-
served vagueness that results in a manifold and ambiguous interpretability as
well as an all-embracing compatibility is a crucial element in the Olympic
Movement’s attraction for cultures and peoples around the world, as the seman-
tic gaps can be filled with what ever is constructed to be one’s own. 
Early on, Coubertin stated that “Olympism is not a system; it is a state of
mind. It can accommodate the most widely divergent approaches, and no race
or time can hold an exclusive monopoly” (Müller 2000:548). And John
MacAloon (1987) acknowledges, with reference to Émile Durkheim, that “the
more plural the social groups attempting to make common cause, the more ab-
stract must become the collective representations by which they identify”
(MacAloon 1987:25, 36). As a set of values, Olympism communicates meaning,
even though meaning is historically as well as culturally constructed. Olymp-
ism’s values are stated explicitly, but the meanings that different individuals,
different countries, and different eras give to those values frequently vary. Using
the example of Japan, I will ask whether its encounter with the Olympic Move-




versity and difference that Japan represents absorbed in the Olympic Move-
ment? Is Liu correct that “[u]niversalism thrives on difference. It does not reject
difference but translates and absorbs it into its own orbit of antithesis and di-
alect” (1999:1)? 
This chapter will discuss Japan’s encounter with the Olympic Movement
from four different perspectives. First I will analyze what the inclusion of judo
into the Olympic program in 1964 meant for the interpretation of this “tradi-
tional Japanese martial art” and for the Western hegemonic outlook on sports
in the Olympic Movement. Next I show how Olympic internationalism and uni-
versalism served to strengthen national identity as well as the feeling of unique-
ness in Japan. Following this I look at the translation of Olympic values and
the challenge of Olympic universalism on an ideological level within Japan.
And to conclude I will focus on the question of how knowledge about Olymp-
ism is communicated through Olympic education in Japan. There it will be ar-
gued that official Olympic education in Japan follows the cycles of Olympic
time and focuses on presenting national or local communities rather than ad-
vocating internationalism. 
Did judo challenge Olympic Eurocentrism?
Judo was integrated into the Olympic program for the first time in 1964
and since then it has generally been accepted that this occasion marked the first
time a “traditional” Eastern sport was included as an Olympic event. However,
the question that has to be asked is whether judo could be considered a “tradi-
tional” Japanese sport in 1964? 
When the prospect of recognizing judo as an Olympic sport was discussed
by the IOC it was clear that many sports officials did not see Japanese judo as
a sport. During the 1950s, at least two international judo bodies had emerged,
the International Judo Federation (IJF) and the International World Judo Fed-
eration (IWJF), and there was rift between them (see especially Manzenreiter
and Frühstück 2001:69-93). When the IJF under the guidance of the Kōdōkan
Headquarters applied for recognition as an Olympic sport, the IWJF argued that
the “Japanese” judo trained in the IJF must be viewed as a form of religious
imperialism: “Judo for the Japanese [sic] and their followers is not alone a sport,
but a ‘bodily way’ for working with Zen-Buddhism (Buddhism of Samurai etc.)
and the codex of Bushidō” (IOC Archives, Lausanne, letter from Knud Janson
to Otto Mayer, August 5, 1955). On the other hand, judo as it was practiced in
the West was seen as a pure sport in the Western YMCA sporting tradition that
needed to be protected: “We in IWJF like Judo as a fine sport, therefore we are
trying to save it from the grip of mysticism and aggressive Budhism [sic] mis-
sionary work” (IOC Archives, Lausanne, letter from Knud Janson to Otto
Mayer, January 21, 1956). This identification of judo with Zen-Buddhism must
be a result of the diffusion of judo into the West. When judo spread into Western
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countries in the early 20th century, it encountered a society which, as Uta Schaf-
fers (2006) has shown, considered Japan to be a space of spirituality and mys-
tery—a paradise long lost to the “technicized” and rationalized West. The notion
of a Far Eastern paradise implies eternal stereotypes of geisha, architecture,
samurai, and also martial arts, not in the least initiated by Japan’s military vic-
tory over Russia in 1905, which became the eternal icons of this Eastern para-
dise. The Western interpretation of judo as eternal thus became a serious
obstacle in the attempt to include it in the Olympic program. The observation
is quite surprising since the Japanese form of judo was in fact a rationalized
sporting system in its approach to the body, as well as its philosophical and ide-
ological framework.
Kanō Jigorō developed judo in the second half of the nineteenth century
as a “sportified” martial art for physical education in order to gain acceptance
in the Japanese educational system. He based its fighting techniques on tradi-
tional Japanese styles of jūjutsu and Western physical education philosophy,
without referring to or basing the martial art on any religious values. From its
very beginning, Judo was educational in its essence, aiming to strengthen the
Japanese nation physically as well as morally. Nonetheless, despite being cre-
ated as a modern sport, for the West judo retained a sense of spirituality that
hindered its successful induction into the Olympic program. Thus, when Charles
Palmer became president of the International Judo Federation (IJF) in 1965, the
sportification of judo gained momentum through his introduction of additional
weight classes, additional scoring points (yuko and koka in 1974) and the em-
phasis on negative judo penalties to encourage fighting techniques. The “regu-
lating” connection between IJF and the Olympic Movement became clear in
article 1.4 of the IJF-statutes, where it is stated: “All provisions of the IJF
Statutes, Bye-Laws, Rules and other Regulations must be in conformity with
the Olympic Charter” (quoted here are the rules of 2004 at http://www.ijf.org).
Today, by IJF rules, judo is explicitly considered to be a sport and not a martial
art. The Minutes of the IJF Moscow Congress (1980) state under the category
proposals: “Judo is an Olympic Programme sport and is not, nor should it be
referred to as a Martial Art.” This distinct definition by the IJF can be interpreted
as the completion of a process of globalization and sportification that trans-
formed judo into a “pure” sport, leaving behind philosophical teachings by
Kanō Jigorō. 
Using Allen Guttmann’s modernization theory as reference, Kevin Grey
Carr presented the sportification of judo in terms of secularism (philosophical
teachings disappear), equality (open to all classes, gender), specialization (lim-
itation of techniques applied), rationalization (scientific training methods), bu-
reaucratization (IJF, national bodies), quantification (point divisions), as well
as a quest for records, concluding that judo “is becoming more and more a sim-
ple variant of wrestling” (Carr 1993:184-185). Although the names of tech-
niques, commands, points, and penalties are still given in Japanese, and the
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j ūdōgi equally adds to a superficial Occidental atmosphere in the audience, the
(sporting) values of Olympism are neither altered nor challenged. Judo as an
Olympic sport has ultimately followed a process of homogenization along the
lines of Western/Olympic sporting traditions, losing its own specific cultural
markers. However, the Japanese audience still regards judo as an expression of
its national character and the media still covers judo athletes and events with
special interest. Todd Holden and Itō Rie (2007), by analyzing studio interviews
of Olympic athletes, showed that the Athens Olympics served to “simulate na-
tional community, with normative, emotionally binding effects” (191). Inter-
views with judo athletes like Inoue Kōsei, Tsukada Maki, and Tani Ryōko
certainly played a crucial role in personalizing the emotional bonds of judo with
the Japanese public. From this standpoint, it can be argued that judo does not
support the spread of Olympism in Japan but rather serves as a tool to present
the Japanese nation to itself and the world. The case of judo shows that it served
as a space for national identity, despite its absorption into the framework of
Olympic sports. This particularistic interpretation of the Olympics, from a na-
tional perspective, characterizes Japan’s early encounter with the Olympic
Movement.
The particularistic interpretation 
of Olympism in Japan
The year 1909, when Kanō Jigorō became the first Japanese (and Asian)
IOC member, is generally seen as the beginning of Japan’s Olympic history.
However, the first chapters in Japan’s contact with the Olympic Movement were
written years earlier. In 1896 the Japanese government sent firearms for an ex-
hibition at the Athens Games; in 1900 Japanese physical educators participated
in the Congress of Physical Education in Paris; in 1904 Ainu participated in the
St. Louis Anthropological Games; and the first invitation for Japanese athletes
to participate in the Olympics was sent for the Games of 1906. 
Consequently, knowledge about the existence of the Olympic Games as
well as the modern Olympic Movement can be found in Japan before the year
1909. In the early years the terms Olympia or Olympic were written in the syl-
labic alphabet katakana as “Orimpiya,” “Orimupia,” “Orinpia,” or even in rō-
maji as “Jeux Olympiques,” all of which actually imply and format the
foreignness of the Games.3 The national newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun (Novem-
ber 15, 1887) features an athletic school meeting award-giving ceremony that
imitated the ancient Olympic Games’ ceremony. The first mention of the ancient
Olympic Games’ revival (Orinpikku undōkai) can, according to Wada Kōichi,
be traced back to the magazine Bunbu Sōshi (Literary and Martial Arts Maga-
zine) of March 1896 (Wada 2007:21). These and other early writings focus on
characterizing the modern Olympics as a revival of the ancient Olympic Games.
This notion is important in so far as the Hellenistic or classicist revival in the
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19th century served in the West as a powerful tool to ideologically unify Western
nations and also construct and legitimize Western cultural and political su-
premacy from an ancient past. In Japan’s ambition to join the imperialistic world
powers, participation in Western sporting traditions and symbolism was a pow-
erful ideological tool.
Japan’s encounter with the Olympic Movement falls within a period of in-
tensive contact with Western nations, beginning with the Meiji Restoration of
1868 after a period of approximately 250 years of partial seclusion. Only one
year before the first modern Games were celebrated in Athens (1896), Japan
had gained a major victory in the Sino-Japanese War 1894-5, claiming for the
first time its place among the colonial powers of the West. Just as Japan was
able to utilize international expositions as a stage to neutralize some of the ex-
clusionary politics of the West, Japan’s interest and involvement in the Olympic
Movement helped the nation negotiate its place among the Western powers as
an equal (Roche 2000:73). This aspiration of becoming a world power was also
mirrored in the fact that the wish to host the Games in Tokyo could already be
found in the magazine, Sekai no Nihon (Japan in the World) in 1897 (vol. 12:46-
49).
Though the term “Olympism” cannot be found in the early Japanese texts
on the Olympics, this should not be interpreted as a lack in the understanding
of Coubertin’s Olympic philosophy on the Japanese side. It can instead be ex-
plained by the fact that Coubertin only began working on his concept of
“Olympism” after 1911, when the organization of the Games had become less
important to him (see Müller 2000:44). And it was only in 1935 that the term
Orinpizumu was used in an article entitled Orinpizumu no yonjū nen 1894-1934
(Forty years of Olympism 1894-1934) in the periodical Orinpikku (13:3, 1935,
pp. 2-6).4 Orinpizumu, however, is even nowadays not widely used but trans-
lated as Orinpikku no gainen (Olympic idea), Orinpikku no shisō (Olympic
idea), or Orinpikku no seishin (Olympic spirit). Although the translation Orin-
pizumu acknowledges that the suffix -ism refers to an abstract idea, it doesn’t
actually distinguish between “Olympism” and the “Olympic idea.”5
What was recognized immediately, however, by early writers on the
Olympic Games like Tōyabe Shuntei (1865-1908), Ōmori Hyōzo (1876-1913),
and later Kanō Jigorō was the significance of the Games for the education of
the youth, especially their potential to strengthen the Japanese physically as
well as morally. Moral education as a primary objective of the “education for
the nation” (kokka no tame no kyōiku) in the school curriculum had been im-
planted in Japanese schools since Mori Arinori (1847-1889) became education
minister in 1885. Physical educators tried hard after that to demonstrate that
physical education and sports foster moral education. The example of the
Olympic Movement, which was in its core intended to strengthen the French




Looking at the early texts, we may conclude that writers up until 1909
placed the national aspect of the Olympic Movement above the international
dimension. Here, yet another aspect comes into focus: since the Japanese en-
counter with the West and the Black Ships of Commodore Perry, the “weak-
ness” of the Japanese body, first as part of a hetero-stereotypical exotification
and then as a auto-stereotype, became a topic of national concern. Bodies are
embedded in a specific cultural and historical context and reflect the political
discourses of modernity (Foucault 1977:187; see also Sarasin 2003:102-3).
Moreover, the discursive language about the body cannot be separated from
politics. The extent to which political metaphors refer to the body is striking
both in Western languages and in Japanese; for instance, dantai (organization)
and kokutai (body of the nation) were both crucial terms of political discourse
in the early 20th century. The Olympic Movement with its quasi-religious ado-
ration for the strong male body could thus be utilized to (re)construct a modern
and strong Japanese body, individually as well as nationally. 
The observed tendencies of particularism and nationalism can also be found
in the interpretation of the Olympic value of internationalism. The encounters
of pre-war “multiethnic” Japan and post-war “monoethnic” Japan, with the
Olympic Movement as a “multiethnic event,” show how Japan dealt with in-
ternationalism. Before World War II, politicians and ideologists propagated the
theory of the multiethnic origin of the Japanese nation, which “lent itself to the
claim that the Japanese nation embodied the unification of Asia and that the
peoples of neighbouring regions could be assimilated into the Japanese nation
and their lands annexed by the Great Japanese Empire” (Oguma 2002:xxii).
The fact that the medals of Sohn Kee-chung (Son Kitei in Japan) and Nam
Sung-yong (Nan Shōryū in Japan), who won gold and bronze in the 1936 Berlin
Games marathon, are claimed today on both the homepages of the Japanese
Olympic Committee (as they were at that time subjects of the Japanese empire)
as well as of the Korean Olympic Committee (since the champions were of Ko-
rean origin) can be seen as a lasting legacy of these policies.6 After the war,
Japanese thinkers claimed their nation was in fact a harmonious and homoge-
neous society without minorities. This redefinition of the Japanese nation was
already part of a national reconstruction that ultimately relied on the unification
of its populace. Members of such ethnic minorities, who did not fit the pro-
scribed stereotype, came to be either ignored or characterized as “foreigners,”
implying that any kind of contribution to Japanese society and culture by these
minorities should be ignored. 
Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu states that “[t]he monoethnic myth is a pa-
triotic hymn dissonant with the often heard romantic rhapsodies of internation-
alization and globalism, the realization of which demand both a tolerance for
differences and an understanding of shared humanity” (1993:78). It is a condi-
tion that Matsumoto Sannosuke (1971) says is a result of the Western nations’
common Christian background. According to him, they have always shared an
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ideal of universalism and internationalism, which Japan was never able to en-
compass, even though the Western nations forced them to construct a nation-
state that both adhered and contrast to them (49-56). The result was a
nation-state that existed only for self-perpetuation: “The Japanese nation-state
never possessed a universal ideal that transcended itself. The ultimate end-value
of this national state was nothing other than the preservation of its own national
polity (kokutai)…  In a nutshell, Japan’s national mission was the self-perpet-
uation and self-expansion of the nation-state itself” (Matsumoto 1971:53). The
Japanese solution to problems of multi-ethnicity and internationalism was thus
to erase it: “Japan is all for internationalism, as long as it means the convergence
of international opinion on the Japanese point of view” (Niehaus and Seinsch
2007:12). For the Japanese, learning about the Olympic Movement and thus
about other countries, paradoxically meant not only strengthening the notion
of a mono-ethnic nation, but also Japan’s feeling of “uniqueness.”7
Translating Olympic values
Following his election as an IOC member in 1909, Kano’s commitment to
the Olympic Movement compelled him to develop two key values that were to
become the very essence of his sport—as well as his life-philosophy. These two
principles, “most effective use of energy” (seiryoku zenyō) and “mutual welfare
and benefit” (jita kyōei), clearly show analogies to the Olympic mottos, citius,
altius, fortius, and respect mutuel. However, the differences in cultures made
direct translation of theses value difficult for the Japanese. Whereas the Olympic
ideals often lean towards pragmatism and seem to be, in essence, utilitarian,
Kanō’s principles favour a strong ethical approach based on Confucian ethics
and on an altruism that relies on the Confucian jin (humanity or humanness). 
Kanō translated seiryoku zenyō with several different phrasings: for in-
stance, the “principle of the maximum-efficient use of mind and body” (at his
speech given in 1932 at Southern California University), and “highest or the
maximum efficient use of mental and physical energy” (at his lecture given in
1934 at the Parnassus Society in Athens). What all of his translations share in
common is that they exclude the moral connotations associated with the term
“Zen.” In this light, the Japanese character for zen should actually be translated
as “good.” Therefore, zenyō is in fact not “maximum-efficiency” but “good ef-
ficiency” or “good use.” Kanō’s notion of goodness was clearly not based on
religion but on Confucian ethics: “Zen is everything that supports the permanent
development of society, while everything that obstructs this development is
considered bad, or the opposite of Zen. Since ancient times, social life has been
stimulated by loyalty towards the emperor, love towards our parents, and sin-
cerity” (Kanō 1936:71). And so, in the Japanese tradition, moral “goodness”
lies within the realm of society and state serving as an ideal that in modern lan-
guage defines the realm of the nation-state. 
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The term jita, which means “oneself and others,” establishes a corporeal
dichotomy that is dissolved by adding kyōei (mutual prosperity), in which self
and other merge in the form of interpersonal dependence. The character for
“prosperity” (ei) implies material prosperity (eiga), as well as idealistic pros-
perity as in glory or honour (eiyo, eii, kōei). Kanō himself used ei to express an
ideal state of mental as well as corporeal contentment that can only be reached
by the individual’s active participation in the betterment of a national as well
as international society. Individuals are thus seen as social beings that can only
exist and develop within the context of society; the Japanese term ningen
(human being) literally means “being in-between humans” (see Niehaus
2003:165-185). 
Jita kyōei (as well as seiryoku zenyō), in Kanō’s thinking gains the status
of a universalistic value: “Is it not because this principle of mutual welfare and
benefit has been recognized that we came to form the League of Nations and
the Great Powers of the world came to meet for the decrease of naval and mil-
itary armaments? These movements are also automatic acknowledgements of
the crying need for efficiency and mutual welfare and benefit” (pamphlet from
a speech given by Kanō Jigorō at the University of Southern California in 1932,
8). In this quote from 1932, Kanō touches upon the very sensitive topic of
Japanese foreign politics. Japan had joined the League of Nations in 1926 and
had signed the London Naval Treaty in 1930. But Japan left the League of Na-
tions in 1933 – symbolically stepping out of a period of internationalism during
the 1930s. 
Kanō, however, preserved a strong international attitude during the 1930s,
a time of increasing militarization in Japan. Yet, as for Coubertin, promoting
patriotism and internationalism at the same time was no paradox for Kanō: “I
think that they [the Olympics] benefit from the promotion of physical education,
the cultivation of a sporting spirit (undō seishin no kanyō) and mutual friendship
(sōgo shinzen)” (Kanō 1937:355). Whereas the promotion of physical education
and sporting spirit were directed towards the nation, mutual friendship was cer-
tainly aimed at international exchange. 
The forming of Kanō’s sport philosophy certainly has to be seen as reflec-
tive of a growing Japanese need for discursive participation in the Olympic
Movement. For Japanese functionaries and representatives, “passive” partici-
pation on the sport fields did not match the nation’s relevance in the Olympic
Movement and consequently they aimed to “actively” (co-) define its ideolog-
ical framework. From the perspective of the Japanese representatives, there
were at least three reasons why the Olympic Movement in those years could
not be called international. First, Olympism or the Olympic idea was still a con-
cept of exclusively Western symbols and Western interpretation of values.
Moreover, the Olympics had never been held outside Europe or the United
States; thus there was no geographical universalism. And finally only Western
sports were included into the program, symbolizing the performative coloniza-
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tion of Asia. Over time, all three aspects would be challenged. 
In an article entitled Waga Orinpikku hiroku (My Secret Olympic Notes),
published in the year 1938, Kanō underlined that Japan can actively contribute
to the Olympic Movement: “Participation [in the Olympics] certainly stirs up
the whole Japanese nation’s enthusiasm for physical education (taiiku). On the
other hand we should not just imitate Western nations. I also want to blow
Japanese spirit (Nihon seishin) into the Western Olympics and make them
Olympics of the world (sekai no Orinpikku)” (Kanō 1938:370). The term
“Japanese spirit” is not further explained and remains “vague” not only in the
above quoted text but all throughout Kanō’s writings. But Kanō explicitly
placed Nihon no seishin in a certain semantic field by asking: “Therefore, could
we not think about […], flavouring (kami) the Olympics that developed in the
West with the spirit of the warrior (bushidō no seishin)?” (Kanō 1938:369).8
His hope of harmoniously (konzen) unifying the Olympic spirit (Orinpikku
seishin) and the spirit of the martial arts (budō seishin) raises the question of
Kanō’s perception of budō (martial arts). 
In the 1930s budō was placed in an antagonistic position towards Western
sports, which were interpreted as a threat to a “pure” Japanese spirit since they
were considered to encourage individualism and selfishness: “Budō, originally
a modern hybrid typical of late Meiji culture, was redefined as ‘timeless’ and
utilized to infuse Western-type sports with ‘pure’ Japanese spirit” (Inoue
1998:172). In 1936, Tokyo was chosen, despite international protest, to be the
host city for the 1940 Games. Japanese military leaders intended to employ the
Games to advertise and strengthen Japan’s position in the arena of world poli-
tics, but “[t]here was also the perceived threat of polluting Japanese culture as
well: the national and spiritual culture of Japan had to be clearly demarcated
from that which it was not, so as to retain its pureness and solemnity for the
Japanese polity” (Kanō 1938:370). However, Kanō’s definition of budō, a term
that was claimed by different ideological discourses, differed from contempo-
rary propaganda in which it was semantically seen as an opposite force to West-
ern sports, but Kanō saw them both as complementary. Budō and bushidō were
not put into a nationalistic and imperialistic framework that reduced bushidō
to the population’s willingness for self-sacrifice for the national body (kokutai);
on the contrary, both remained in essence modern and international. For Kanō,
the two martial arts that proto-typically represent the spirit of budō were kendō
and judo and he consequently hoped to see both as Olympic sports.
“Peripheral” Olympic nations increasingly claim their right to discursive
participation. Their contributions to the debate are not characterized by conti-
nuity, but follow “Olympic time and space” as they basically are limited to the
occasions when the Games are given to Asian nations. Kanō wanted to see a
Japanese presence in the Olympic Movement in 1938. When Tokyo was still
slated to hold the 1940 Olympics, the first conference focusing on the problem
of Asian, Arabic, and African marginalization in the Olympic Movement was
Andreas NIEHAUS
84
titled the First International Congress on the Olympics and Cultural Exchange
in the World System held in Korea in 1987.9 This was the beginning of a trend
continuing with the Seoul Olympics and the successful bid of Beijing that in-
tensified Asians’ contributions to and their interpretations of Olympism. The
Korean Shin-pyo Kang, for example, proposed the establishment of a second
International Olympic Academy in Qufu (Shandong). The suggested location
is the hometown of Confucius and in its vicinity lies Mount Tai, one of the five
sacred mountains of Taoism. The establishment of an academy in Qufu would
not only parallel but challenge the ideological and religious symbolism of the
International Olympic Academy in Ancient Olympia that is situated on the
flanks of Mount Kronos. At the Beijing conference on “Multiculturalism in the
Olympic Movement” (August 2007), Sanada Hisashi (member of the board of
directors of the Japan Olympic Academy) presented a paper entitled “‘Wa’ as a
concept of multiculturalism in the Olympic Movement.” Here Sanada aimed
to preserve multiculturalism in the Olympic Movement by including the “tra-
ditional” Japanese concept of wa (harmony, peace) as a value in Olympism:
“The ‘wa’ of East and West, the ‘wa’ of Olympic sports and ethnic sports, and
‘wa’ in the sense of seeking harmony with foreign culture, without making any
essential changes to your own culture, must certainly be seen as one beneficial
approach that will assure the persistence of multiculturalism in the Olympic
Movement in the future.”10 However, these contributions do not seem to be ex-
tensions of the Olympic framework, but translations of existing Olympic values
based on a specific cultural and philosophical background. In this sense, these
contributions merely seem to substitute “Occidental Olympic vagueness” with
“Oriental Olympic vagueness.”
Spreading Olympism in Japan
Olympism is in its emergence, its goals, its practice, and effect, is peda-
gogical.11 Based on an initiative by Coubertin, a plan to establish an Olympic
Study Center in Greece to educate young people in Olympism had been worked
out by Carl Diem and Ioannis Ketseas as early as 1938. This initial proposal
led to the foundation of the International Olympic Academy (IOA) in 1961.
The aim, and in fact its “mission,” is “to create an international cultural centre
in Olympia, to preserve and spread the Olympic Spirit, study and implement
the educational and social principles of Olympism and consolidate the scientific
basis of the Olympic ideal, in conformity with the principles laid down by the
ancient Greeks and the revivers of the contemporary Olympic Movement,
through Baron de Coubertin’s initiative” (see http://www.ioa.org.gr/the_mis-
sion.htm). In order to spread the Olympic idea on national levels, National
Olympic Academies (NOA) had been established since the late 1960s while the
IOA functions as an ideological training facility for their members. Far Eastern
countries were among the first to establish academies: South Korea and Chinese
Spreading Olympism and the Olympic Movement in Japan
85
Taipei in 1977 and Japan in 1978. However, interest in Olympic education re-
mained minimal outside as well as within the IOC, despite the pedagogic legacy
of Pierre de Coubertin and the establishment of the IOA. A strengthening of
Olympic education within the Olympic Movement can only be witnessed in the
1990s, most likely as a reaction to the growing criticism against the Olympic
Movement’s commercialism and expansionism. The first official definition of
Olympism was given in the Olympic Carter of 1991 and the Olympic Congress
of 1994 stressed in its final declaration the educational value of Olympism. Be-
tween the years 1990 and 2000 a total number of 65 NOA’s have been estab-
lished. 
Japan, still under the influence of the positive economic and political effects
of the 1964 Games, was one of the first countries to establish an Olympic Acad-
emy in 1978, even though Olympic education had already started in the 1960s
as part of the preparation for the Tokyo Games (Matsumoto 2007:35). Christian
Tagsold (2002) has shown that the Japanese government took control not only
over the organization of the Tokyo Games but also over the Games’ symbolism,
succeeding in connecting the positive image of the Olympic Movement with
the Japanese nation-state and presenting to the world a nation that had learned
from its nationalistic and militaristic past, a nation that was ready to join the
international community again. During the early 1960s Olympic education be-
came a “national project” and the Ministry of Education supervised an Olympic
Exhibition Tour (1962-1964), the Citizen’s Olympic Games Movement (Orin-
pikku kokumin undō) and the publication of textbooks for Olympic education.
The general contents of those textbooks is exemplified by the textbook Orin-
pikku to Gakkō: Orinpikku Gakushū no tebiki (The Olympics and School:
Guidebook for Olympic Learning), which features four objectives: international
understanding, national self-awareness, knowledge about the Olympic Move-
ment, and raising participation in sports. The publication of textbooks was part
of a national education program that “aimed at cultivating a social attitude and
creating a social environment that would present the Japanese hosts in a positive
light to the world” (Matsumoto 2007:36; Sanada 2004:68-72).
However, presenting a nation requires an audience and as soon as the au-
dience returned to their home countries, the Olympic education program was
terminated. Olympic education during the following Games in Sapporo (1972)
and Nagano (1998) revolved around the same objectives. However, the focus
of attention shifted from the national to the local. The importance of the local
representing the national12 was, for example, mirrored in the “One Haiku for
the Olympics” Program initiated for the Games. One of the haiku written by
the citizens of Nagano prefecture reads:
Nagano Olympics 
Resound all over the world, 
The murmur of the snow!
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Isshiki Miho, Mure Village
Through displaying haiku as a “unique” Japanese form of poetry, the pre-
fecture of Nagano was able to present itself to the (nation/world?) as a repre-
sentation of the traditional and “truly” Japanese identity. 
The most recent example showing the international receiving attention (or
even relevance) only in front of a national background was Tokyo’s bid for the
2016 Summer Olympics, announced in September 2005. On the website of the
Bid Committee (http://www.tokyo2016.or.jp/jp/.), the 1964 Olympics were used
as a frame of reference to evoke a nostalgia of hope that connected the past
Tokyo Olympics with the present and the future, e.g., by a link titled “Legacy
1964” that featured interviews with former Olympic participants like Kasai
Masae, Miyake Yoshinobu, Endō Yukio and others. The Olympic legacy was
even more evident on the official bid website:
When we look back, on October tenth in 1964 the sky above the grove
of the Meiji-shrine in Tokyo was of a transparent blue. […] In these
days, 40 years later, what is ruining not only Tokyo, but the whole
country, is unfortunately a clouded sky, which is the feeling of a block-
ade (heiso kukan). It is said that the economy recovers more or less,
but Japan has not yet wiped out the spiritlessness (fugainasa), with
which it is aimlessly drifting around. (http://www.tokyo-2016.com/
way.html)
This diffuse feeling of spiritlessness, which is a common allegation by
Japan’s political rightists, refers to the absence of “Japanese spirit” (yamato
damashi). It became a strong argument in Tokyo’s effort to create a semantic
field in which the host city Tokyo would once again become the unifying force
and symbol of a strong nation. With China becoming the dominant political and
economic power in East Asia, Fukuda Tomiaki’s (chairman of the Sports Com-
mittee of the JOC) remark in an interview with Konō Ichirō (chairman of the
Tokyo 2016 Olympic Bid Committee) that “Tokyo is also the center of Asia”
seemed to express the hope to restore Tokyo’s glory that has slipped away with
the times. In this context, the Games’ international arena is reduced to a stage
for a purely national play. 
The crucial shortcomings in terms of sustainability of the Olympic educa-
tion for the 1964 Olympics still characterize the present situation. Even the es-
tablishment of a Japanese Olympic Academy in 1978 had no positive effect on
the sustainability of Olympic education in Japan, which remains an isolated
event around specific time clusters. A survey conducted at the Tokyo Metro-
politan University showed that not even students who participated in a physical
education theory class knew of the concept Olympism and only 7.2% were
aware of the Olympic motto (Masumoto 2007:43). Another survey conducted
by Saga Hitoshi, with students from a general course in Olympic studies,
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showed that the students’ two most important points of interest were “episodes
and dramas of great Olympians of the past (92.1%) and victories and results of
Japanese athletes (90.8%)” (Saga 2004:82-84.).
The JOA’s official aim is “to embody and implement the ideals of the
Olympism in Japan, which are described as Fundamental Principles in the
Olympic Charter,” without propagating a Japanese or Asian form of Olympism.
As a “branch” of the IOA, the Japanese Academy, as well as other national
academies, is “ideologically supervised” and only functions “as transmitters
and amplifiers of the [International] Academy’s ideas by means of the National
Programs of Olympic Education” (http://www.ioa.org.gr/national_olympic_aca-
demies.htm, consulted August 2008). The International Academy, however, de-
votes itself to multiculturalism—not in the sense of multicultural diversity but
as the concept of different cultures participating in a movement that remains
Western-centric. 
Conclusion
It has been stated that “Olympism” is characterized by the vagueness of its
values, but this observed vagueness also raises the question of the meaning of
values in global encounters. Coubertin spoke French, which was still the West-
ern lingua franca in the 19th century. However, not only did French lose its pre-
dominant position in the following century, but globalization also called for
translations into many different languages. Marx in the Grundrisse had already
stated that “[i]deas do not exist separately from language. Ideas which have
first to be translated out of their mother tongue into a foreign language in order
to circulate, in order to become exchangeable, offer a somewhat better analogy;
but the analogy then lies not in the language; but in the foreignness of language”
(Elster [1903] 1986:53-54). What will be translated and how will it be trans-
lated? And in how far have functional and pragmatic factors been taken into
consideration? It has been shown that these problems are as closely connected
to the question of historicity and cultural space as they are to the subject and
the translator, who himself is part of a certain time-space frame, with his indi-
vidual background, education and socialization. I have argued that in the Japan-
ese discourse, Olympic universalism and internationalism are answered by a
particularistic standpoint stressing local and national identities. Using the ex-
amples of the ideological and educational framework of the Olympic Games
and Movement in Japan, it has been shown that historical and cultural dynamics
highly influenced the modes of the discourse. Yet, this discourse was never
unanimous or static, but characterized by multi-vocal, fluid and different de-
grees of compliance, as well as resistance, to Western hegemony.
The need to overcome Olympic Euro-centrism or Western-centrism, which
has also been described as an “undesirable form of neo-colonialism” (Liponski
and Mickiewicz 1987:513), has been increasing thanks to the growing interna-
Andreas NIEHAUS
88
tional influence of Japan as well as the strengthening of its national identity
throughout its history with the Olympic Movement. However, the inclusion of
Asian sports like judo into the Olympic program merely meant their assimila-
tion into the existing Western sporting traditions. So far, attempts to overcome
the West’s interpretative hegemony over the concept of Olympism by adding
an “Asian flavor” have more or less been ignored.13
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Endnotes
1 The latest definition can be found on the IOC website:
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf (consulted August
2008). The given definition is based on the extensive writings of Pierre de
Coubertin. For Coubertin’s writings on Olympism, see Müller (ed.) 2000.
2 See also Lenk 2006: 372 and on Lenk and Olympism especially Schantz
1996:75-92.
3 Only one term uses Chinese characters to refer the Olympic Games: Gorin
(“Five Rings”). The terminology used in the early Japanese sources shows the
lack of a regulating authority in the discourse, which would only appear with
the creation of the Dai Nippon Taiiku Kyōkai in 1911.
4 In the same year also the Yomiuri Shimbun features the term Orinpizumu on
3.9.1935, p. 4. 
5 Orinpikku, 13:3, 1935:2-6. This article is a translation of a lecture Coubertin
gave in Lausanne. Quarante années d’Olympisme 1894-1934. (Allocution pro-
noncée lors de la célébration du 40e anniversaire du rétablissement des Jeux
Olympiques par le baron de Coubertin, le samedi 23 juin 1934 à l’Aula de
l’université de Lausanne) in: Le Sport Suisse, no.1394 (4 juillet 1934). I thank
Wada Kōichi for providing this information and the sources.
6 See the official homepages of the JOC and the KOC. Both athletes were forced
to compete under their Japanese names, and Son is said to have wept out of
chagrin when the Japanese flag was raised in his honor. In the official records
of the IOC, Son’s nationality is still given as Japanese, while on the Olympic
Marathon Memorial in California and in other Olympic records, his nationality
is given as Korean. On the memorial in the Berlin Olympic Stadium, his na-
tionality was once changed from Japanese to Korean but is today back to
Japanese.
7 The non-celebrated Tokyo Games of 1940 showed that the antagonistic forces
of Olympic universalism and Japanese particularism could only result in con-
flict. This became clear already in 1936, when the Japan Advertiser (November
17, 1936) announces that according to the Education Ministry the Organizing
Committee should be so powerful that it could overrule decisions by the IOC
“should it be found not fitting to the national characteristics of Japan” and fur-
ther that “the sport activities are only of secondary importance to Japan, the
primary object being to show the world the cultural development of Japan.”
These statements invited strong criticism from the IOC. See the file Japon
Correspondance 1936-1939 of the IOC Archives in Lausanne.
8 The article appeared posthumous in the magazine Kaizō (vol. 20, no. 7) and
shows that Kanō at the end of his life did not have any illusions about his




9 For the contributions of the conference: http://www.olympic.inje.ac.
kr/con_htm/con_1_int.htm. For the Asian perspective on Olympism, see Kang
1991:49-63; Yuen 1994, 111-115 and also Japanese Olympic Academy (ed.)
2004.
10 Unpublished manuscript of Sanada Hisashi, “’Wa’ as a concept of multicul-
turalism in the Olympic Movement’ presented at the conference on “From
Athens to Beijing = Multiculturalism in the Olympic Movement,” in Beijing,
August, 2007, page 5. 
11 See Grupe 1996:24. For further reading on the educational dimension of
Olympism, see Müller (ed.) 2000:527-584; especially Coubertin’s Olympic
Letters, ibd.:547-448.  
12 The headline of the official webpage reads: Culture of Nagano “One Haiku
for the Olympics” Program/ Greeting the people of the world through Japan-
ese culture, see: http://www.threeweb.ad.jp/logos/saijiki/haiku100e.html
(consulted August 2008).
13 I would like to thank Wolfram Manzenreiter for his careful reading of my
manuscript and for his constructive comments.
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Beyond All Barriers: The Significance
of the 1988 Seoul Olympics
OK Gwang and HA Nam-Gil
China successfully hosted the Beijing Olympic Games, demonstrating to the
world its remarkable achievement in both national status and sport. It was the
third Summer Games held in Asia, and for many Koreans it was a vivid re-
minder of the 1988 Summer Games in Seoul twenty years before. The 1988
Games made contributions to both modern Korean society and the world. The
participation of almost all IOC member countries, including the USSR and the
USA, resulted in the 1988 Seoul Olympics being remembered as the Games
that demolished ideological conflicts. Its slogan, Beyond the Wall, represented
harmony beyond Eastern and Western ideological barriers. The Games also
helped Korea pave the way toward democracy and economic development.
South Korea was propelled onto the global stage by means of sports perform-
ance and facilities, urban reformation, economic advancement, and environ-
mental improvements. There are many hopes that this will also be true for China
in the aftermath of its 2008 Games. 
Modern sport was introduced to Korea over one hundred years ago by west-
ern Christian missionary groups. This western cultural convention was adopted
to promote the modernization of Korean society, gradually becoming a “vehi-
cle” of resistance in the struggle against Eastern imperial power in the first half
of the 20th century (Jarvie 1985:64–67). Western sport offered Korean patriot-
ism a Christian shield against Japanese imperialism and the result was a unique
combination of sport, religion, and nationalism (Ha and Mangan 1994:351).
After Korea obtained its independence in 1945, modern sport advanced the na-
tion’s post-colonial modernization and nationalism. In conjunction with military
political ambitions and considerable economic progress from the late 1960s to
the 1980s, modern sport became an asset to the transformation of society.  
The evolution of modern sport in Korea is closely linked to its national his-
tory. Sport has been linked to the transformation of education, culture, econom-
ics, and politics. Modern sport can also be regarded as the central mechanism
in the evolution of modern Korean society. The important ideological issues re-
lated to the evolution of modern Korean sport are imperialism, nationalism, and
modernization. These ideologies are the significant ingredients that have min-
gled to create both the history of Korean sport and Korean society.
u6
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Figure 1. The Origins and Evolution of Modern Sport in Korea (Ok 2007:343)
The story of the Olympic Movement in Korea began with two marathoners,
Un-bae Kim and Tae-ha Kwon, who took part in the 1932 Olympic Games in
Los Angeles. Kwon finished 9th in the 1932 marathon, running under the Japan-
ese name, Taika Gon (Martin and Gynn 2000:145–161).1 Dyreson (2008) re-
cently found an interesting story on Taika Gon in an American newspaper. The
article stated, “He was severely beaten by Japanese police as the athlete returned
by ferry from a visit to his homeland, in order to catch the ship scheduled to
carry the Japanese Olympic team to Los Angeles” (Jefferson City Post-Tribune
1932:9). The story noted that Kwon hoped to recover from the injuries the
Japanese police had inflicted in time for the Olympic marathon. 
The third Korean athlete was Gi-jeong Son, often known by his Japanese
name, Ki-tei Son. Son was the Korean marathon champion at the 1936 Berlin
Olympics, although he was officially a member of the Japanese team. Gil-yong
Lee, a sports reporter at Dong-a Daily, said that it was a courageous act on Son’s
part. He paid the price with the loss of his job. The impact of the report was in-
calculable. The identification of Son as a Korean, in defiance of Japanese prop-
aganda, was a source of great pride for the long-suffering Korean people and
restored much-needed national self-respect. Son stated, “I felt desperate and
ashamed when I stood on the victory stand, wearing a shirt with the Japanese
‘rising sun’ on the left chest.” In the photograph of Son in Gil-yong Lee’s report,
the Japanese flag had been removed from Son’s uniform. As a result of this re-
port, several executives and reporters were jailed, including Gil-yong Lee. 
A Japanese journalist stated in his report that Son’s photo was not the first
that went to press at Dong-a Daily with the Japanese flag removed. Un-bae
Kim, who had finished sixth in the Los Angeles Olympics marathon four years
earlier, was the first Korean athlete whose photograph had the Japanese flag re-














moved from his shirt. A women’s monthly, New Home, ran a photo that only
showed Son’s legs, apparently in an attempt to avoid showing the Japanese na-
tional flag printed on his shirt. 
All of this clarifies the fact that Korean sport played an important role in
building assertions of independence during colonial times, representing for the
Koreans much more than simply sport. Sport was a means of gaining revenge
on the Japanese and added fuel to Korea’s struggle for independence. Three
years after their independence from Japanese colonization, Koreans finally ap-
peared under their own national flag at the 1948 London Games. However, their
joy did not last long as the Korean War broke out two years later.
The Korean War and the severe dislocations and political tensions in its
aftermath had very significant consequences for sports development in Korea.
The annual National Sports Festivals were revived and in 1972, a National
Youth Sports Festival was initiated, but it was not until the late 1970s before
any significant state investment in vigorous policies and facilities could be put
in place (for details, see Ok 2007: 300-319). It was the developments at the end
of this decade that began South Korea’s march towards hosting the 1988 Games,
although it was hardly clear at that point that such an opportunity was within
the realm of the possible. 
It began in August of 1978, when the 42nd World Shooting Championship
was held in Seoul, the first international sports tournament to take place in South
Korea since it had registered with the IOC in 1949. At the same time, the Korea
Weightlifting Federation also won the bid for the World Weightlifting Champi-
onship, which was to be held in Seoul in August 1978. However, the govern-
ment supported the former and the president of the Korea Shooting Federation,
Jong-gyu Bak, carried out preparations for the championship event with gov-
ernmental support. There were eight IOC members at the shooting champi-
onship, and they were impressed by the organization of the event, in which
1,518 athletes from 68 nations participated. Gi-ha Lee directed the opening cer-
emony of the event, utilizing Korean traditional culture and impressing both
the participants and officials. As a result, he was selected to be the director for
the 1988 Seoul Olympics’ Opening Ceremonies. After the World Shooting
championship, Jong-gyu Bak and other leaders became more confident than
ever about hosting international events. The IOC members congratulated the
Korea Shooting Federation on its success and even proposed that Korea host
the Olympic Games in the near future. The seed of a far-reaching idea was
planted with the shooting championship (Kim 2000:20–22).
On October 8, 1979, President Bak officially announced that Seoul would
pursue the host responsibilities of the Games with the following aims: 1) en-
couraging economic development and displaying national power; 2) promoting
Korean sports at the international level; 3) promoting friendship with the world
through sport; 4) establishing a diplomatic environment with communist and
non-allied nations; 5) reconsidering national solidarity through an international
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sports event (Department of Sport, Ministry of Education 1979). After the an-
nouncement, at a dinner party on October 26, 1979, President Jeong-hee Bak
was murdered by Jae-gyu Kim, the Central Intelligence Agency Director (Ric-
quart 1988:14). 
After the assassination of President Jeong-hee Bak, the Olympic plan ini-
tiative seemed to disappear from the scene. A military coup followed the assas-
sination, and General Du-hwan Jeon (known to the world as Chun Doo Hwan)
assumed power over South Korea. Jeon became the president and continued to
pursue the Olympic bid, although his staff was concerned by the enormous ex-
pense and effort required to host the games (Ricquart 1988:15). 
Olympic bid activity was seriously advanced after a meeting led by the
Sports Department at the Ministry of Education on March 7, 1980. On Septem-
ber 29, 1980 the KOC (Korean Olympic Committee) organized a 10-member
advisory meeting, which preceded an extended standing committee meeting on
November 6, 1980. The KOC submitted an Olympic bid candidate application
for the city of Seoul to the IOC on December 2, 1980. And on September 30,
1981, the host city decision was made with Seoul receiving 55 votes and
Nagoya 27. Thus, Korea became the second Asian nation to host the Olympics
since the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964 and the 16th country in the world to
host the Games. 
However, the political conditions were not favorable due to constant polit-
ical protests and ideological confrontation with the North. In fact, the ideolog-
ical confrontation with the North created various obstacles for the staging of
the Olympics. On the international level, Seoul was not a perfectly peaceful
place in which to hold the Games. There was a bitter historical relationship with
Japan, Korea’s former colonial ruler, as well as troubled diplomatic relationships
with the Communist nations, including the USSR and China. From a political
perspective, the United States was the only nation close to Korea. To a certain
extent, Seoul and the IOC gambled on sport as a mechanism to achieve harmony
on the peninsula.
After the IOC announcement, the government revised the National Law
for Sports Promotion so that it specifically focused on the exaltation of national
prestige (Ministry of Education of Republic of Korea 1962). Through this, the
Seoul Olympics were to be utilized as a means of expressing and demonstrating
national power. Furthermore, the Sport Department was reconstructed in March
1982 to place a national sports promotion policy as the central goal. The Seoul
Olympics Organizing Committee (SLOOC) and the Asian Games Organizing
Committee were established to integrate policies for the promotion of sports
and to prepare both international events. Once these organizations were rapidly
and carefully established, the next stage was to build new sports facilities in
which to host the Games. By 1985, 19,442 sports fields had been built or ex-
panded, and 59 sports parks were newly built. These were for the use of the
young and the general public. 
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Considering the political circumstances in the peninsula, there was due
concern that North Korea would almost certainly interfere with the successful
conduct of the Games. There were, in fact, several incidents, instigated by the
North, to impede the holding of the Games in the South. On October 9, 1983,
the North terrorized the Aung San National Cemetery in Rangoon, Burma dur-
ing the six-nation round of visits by President Jeon Doohwan. Jeon and over
thirty officials were at the site of the North Korean terror attack and 14 South
Korean officials died in the incident (Chosun Ilbo 2007). 
On November 11, 1987, in the year before the Games, a Korean Air 858
Boeing 707, which was on its way from Abu Dhabi to Bangkok, carrying 93
South Korean passengers, 2 foreigners, and 20 cabin crew members blew up,
killing all aboard. It was later revealed that Kim Jong-il, the leader of North
Korea, secretly ordered Kim Hyunhee (Mayumi Hachiya, using her Japanese
name on boarding) to install a bomb in the plane (New York Times 1987).          
North Korea also propagandized that the South would utilize the games to
finalize the division of the peninsula. The North believed that holding the games
in Seoul would be a disgraceful decision for the Olympic Movement. This prop-
aganda incited South Koreans to develop an anti-governmental stance and to
eventually produce an “anti-US” atmosphere (Senn 1999:220–221).  
The selection of Seoul for the 24th Summer Olympic Games was considered
a political time bomb by most of the world audience. The IOC had taken a de-
termined initiative, even facing political danger between the two Koreas until
the games were finalized (Pound 1994: xi–xii). 
Richard W. Pound, a member of the IOC Executive Board from 1983 to
1991 and a former vice-president of the IOC, revealed his great relief and emo-
tion after the closing ceremonies of the Seoul games in his book, Five Rings
over Korea, as follows: “I had a lump in my throat and suspiciously watery
eyes as the realization finally sank in that the Games had finished without in-
cident. Not only had the Seoul Games taken place, but they had been the most
successful in Olympic history” (Pound 1994: ix–x). 
As Pound added, Korea had become a democratic nation in an unimagin-
ably short period under the political pressures of North Korea, one of the most
authoritarian states in the world. There were also pre-existing tensions between
the superpowers left over from the Cold War. However, the Olympic Movement
contributed to the success of the Seoul Olympic story. It was an unforgettable
experience of joy for the world’s young generation (Pound 1994: x). 
Among other things, the three major elements of the modern Olympic
Games were successfully carried out during the event: the athletics themselves,
academic activities, and cultural festivals. There were 159 NOC nations par-
ticipating at the event and 8,391 athletes (2,194 women and 6,197 men) com-
peted at 237 events. Baseball, taekwondo, and women’s judo were the
demonstration events (Greenberg 1991:90). In modern Olympic history, there
may never have been an event of this magnitude: 167 countries officially par-
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ticipated, including about 40,000 athletes, officials, judges, and reporters and
11, 331 media members (4,978 from the written press and 6,353 broadcasters).
Unofficially 240,000 spectators attended the athletic, academic, and cultural
events. The Seoul Olympics were also historically significant as the last Games
to occur in the context of the Cold War.
The mascot of the Games was a baby tiger, “Hodori,” drawn from Korean
legends and used extensively in the Games promotional literature. The emblem
of the Games was samtaeguk, a traditional pattern that represented Korean na-
tional identity, meaning “harmony.” There was an official poster also represent-
ing the ideal of “harmony and progress.” The Organizing Committee produced
27 related poster styles to familiarize the public with the Games.
With a large contingent of 424 athletes in 23 events, Korea achieved its
highest-ever place in the medal count. It finished fourth after the USSR, East
Germany, and the US, winning 12 gold, 10 silver, and 11 bronze medals. For
the first time, Korea beat Japan, which finished in 14th place, and indeed Korea
would continue to best Japan through the 2008 Games (with the exception of
2004).  Korean sports writer Too-hyun Koh stated that this historical achieve-
ment was the outcome of intensive training at the “Mecca of sports in Korea,”
the Korea National Training Center, known as the Taeneung Athletic Village,
which was built northeast of Seoul in 1966 by the Korea Sports Council (Koh
1990:33–44). The training regimen provided the technical foundation for
Korea’s success, but equally important were their national spirit and societal
factors.  Indeed, the only incident to blemish the otherwise sterling Korean per-
formances was caused by the boxer Byun Jong-Il and his coaching staff, who
remained in the ring for over an hour after he lost his match in the bantamweight
division against Alexandar Hristov of Bulgaria (Bang 2005:421–422).
Economics, politics, and sport
There are various factors that contributed to the hosting of the 1988 Games
in Seoul, South Korea, but perhaps the most significant was the influence that
the economic and political environment had on Korea’s decision to host this
mega event. The emergence of the South Korean economy has often been called
“Miracle on the River Han” by both external and internal communities. The
1988 Summer Olympic Games can be called the “Miracle at Jamsil” as Jamsil
is where the main Olympic stadium was built, opening on September 29, 1984
in preparation for the prominent event. The construction occurred in the middle
of a period of tremendous economic development for the Koreans, a result of
the implementation of the Five-Year Economic Development Plan2 that aimed
to restore the nation after the suffering caused by Japanese colonization from
1910 to 1945 and the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 (Bak 1999:67–301; Na-
tional Unification Board, 1982: 39–34; Frank, Kim and Westpahl 1975). 
This economic transformation caused an industrial development that even-
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tually brought about a decline in the agricultural population from 46% of the
total population in 1970, to 29% in 1980, and 17.5% by 1990. More women
than men left rural areas for cities during this period (Nahm 1996:492). As a
result of the sharp changes in Korean industry, the Gross National Product
(GNP) increased quite substantially. According to Koreascope, Korean per-
capita GNP in 1960 was US$ 79. It then increased to US$ 253 in 1970, US$
1,597 in 1980, US$ 5,883 in 1990 and reached US$ 10,037 in 1995. This new
economic drive influenced Koreans’ perception of sport and the Olympics since
as their living standards improved, their leisure time increased accordingly. 
The economic situation also produced a heated controversy between Amer-
ica and the IOC. The 1988 Summer Olympic Games were extremely profitable,
not only for the Korean economy but also for the American media. The Amer-
ican media offered an astonishing amount of $750 million for all television
rights only. They intended to televise final competitions in the American prime-
time viewing periods. This was opposed by both the IAAF (International As-
sociation of Athletics Federations) and the IOC; however, an agreement was
reached between the IOC and U.S. television executives. This agreement re-
sulted in enormous profits for American television companies, including NBC.
Richard Pound dealt with the frustrating negotiations for the sale of the U.S.
television rights to the Seoul Olympics under the authorization of Samaranch.
In the end, the broadcasting revenue for the Games was $403 million, of which
Seoul received approximately 20% (Barney, Wenn and Martyn 2002:213–230). 
In the 1980s, with the social and economic changes, professionalism in
modern Korean sport also evolved. Previously, Koreans had developed profes-
sional sport for national purposes. For instance, it is often said that the govern-
ment supported the promotion of professional boxing in 1962 and professional
golf in 1968. However, their budget in the 1960s for professionalism was very
limited. As a consequence, professional sports only became popular in the 1980s
in conjunction with the Seoul Olympics and Asian Games. Professional baseball
began in 1982, and both professional football and professional ssireum (Korean
traditional wrestling) started in 1983. According to Son (2004), there were 8
professional teams and 1,655 players. Spectators for professional baseball and
soccer numbered 3,095,077 in 1983 and by 2002 there were over 6 million (Son
2004:3–14).
Military and political power also played an important role in promoting
the development of modern Korean sport. In the 1970s, three particular stimuli
helped with the transformation: Bak’s government sports policies, the interna-
tional sports movement, and socio-economic growth. The social foundations
for youth sport were extended with curricular reinforcement, the establishment
of youth halls, the holding of youth sports festivals, the promotion of interna-
tional exchanges in youth sport, and the spread of recreation. This development
and cultural diffusion were achieved with enormous government support. It
should not be ignored that sport during this era accelerated social mobilization,
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and the affluence of athletes and coaches. It was obvious that the newly-re-
formed government was using sport to control society, rather than to promote
self-realization and to cultivate character through physical activity. In addition,
the need for the development of national status in international arenas was often
reflected in the government’s sport policy. Modern Korean sport, as a conse-
quence, attached too much importance to elitism and the general public was
not able to participate. The seed of “sport for all” could not be planted at this
time due to this attitude of elitism (Ok 2007:320). However, the reformed gov-
ernment of Bak Jeong-hee (known to the world as Park Chung-hee) signifi-
cantly influenced Korean sport through the initiative, “Physical Fitness is
National Power.” Eventually, new foundations of modern sport were estab-
lished, which in the 1980s resulted in prosperity in Korean sport history. As
Mangan and Ha stated, “if the evolution of modern Korean sport is compared
to the four seasons, then the 1960s was the spring when the seeds were sown,
the 1970s was the summer when the roots took firm hold and the 1980s and
1990s were the autumn when the fruits ripened” (Ha and Mangan 2002:160–
162; Kim 2001).  
Not only was South Korea hosting the 24th Summer Olympic Games in
1988, but also the 1986 Asian Games and the Olympic Games for Handicapped
People in 1988 were to be held in Seoul. However, while South Korea moved
toward harmony, the North kept its door strongly closed to becoming part of
the movement. North Korea did not agree to sports exchanges with the South.
The possibility of forming a single Korean delegation to represent the nation at
international meets was nowhere in sight. South Korea, with the assistance of
the United Nations and the IOC, invited the North for sports exchange talks,
including co-hosting the 1988 Games, which would have been permitted by the
IOC, holding eight meetings from 1963 to 1990. North Korea, however, did not
put forth the effort to make it reality. 
Olympic Education and the 1988 Seoul Olympics
Olympic Education is also an important element when examining the Seoul
Olympics because it has been closely linked to government policy from its be-
ginning in the early 1980s. A historical trace can reach back to the mid-1960s
to recognize South Korean participation in the Olympic Education movement
through the IOA (International Olympic Academy) program, which started in
1960. Dr. Juho Jang was the first South Korean participant in the regular IOA
program. The Korean Olympic Academy was founded on June 23, 1977 with
Taeyoung Jang elected as its president. The South Korean Olympic Movement
began with the KOA regulations and the Olympic Education Program promot-
ing academic studies on Olympism in 1980. The KOA started organizing regular
symposia, workshops, lecture meetings, and exhibitions after its regulations
and programs evolved. After Seoul was selected as the host city for the XXIV
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Summer Olympics in 1982, substantial government support enabled the KOA
movement to hold academic symposia and meetings nine times between 1982
and 1988 with the following themes: Olympic Movement and Social Develop-
ment, People’s Olympics through Olympic Education, Tasks and Realization of
the Ideology of the Seoul Olympic Games, Korean Olympic Movement and Vi-
sion in the age of 2000, and Role of the IOA for Global Harmonization and
Peace. At the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the Korean Olympic Education Movement
hosted a reunion of over 200 IOA alumni.
The leading organization for the Olympic Movement in South Korea
started a formal educational process, launching the first KOA Regular Session
on September 18, 1989. The five days of the first session were held in order to
promote the Olympic ideal in Seoul. Financial support for the session and the
following courses were made by several supporters, though mainly by Dr. Un
Yong Kim, a former IOC member, and Dr. Se Jik Park, the president of the
SLOOC. Dr. Donghwan Kim (2008) summarized the most recent achievements
of Olympic education of the Olympic Academy for the last 20 years as follows:
1) development of Olympic educational programs for schools; 2) extension of
the 1988 Seoul Olympics’ spirit; 3) practice of the fair play movement with the
Korean Fair Play Committee; 4) interchange of activities with other interna-
tional Olympic academies; 5) holding of the Korea Olympic Congress; 6) un-
folding of public relations for the Olympic Games (Kim 2008).  
Since its inception in 1988, Olympic education in Korea has had three
major roles. The first role is to help athletes and people to overcome the so-
called “victory ideology.” The strong sense of competition and value associated
with a winning ideology can cause various problems. Participants in sport con-
sider the result rather than the process of the games if they are too oriented by
victory ideology. The principle of sportsmanship may be able to help athletes
break away from victory ideology. Olympism can play an important role in in-
jecting sportsmanship into society through Olympic education. Secondly,
Olympic education has played an important role in integrating people in South
Korean society. The symbol of the five Olympic rings represents harmony and
internationalism. Various social and ideological conflicts in the Korean penin-
sula can be resolved by the concept of internationalism cultivated through
Olympic education. Lastly, Olympic education can contribute to world peace.
There are numerous good examples of the world peace movement in South
Korea, such NGOs as Peace Corps for African starvation, Pakistan earthquake
relief, and WTF’s (World Taekwondo Federation) recent Peace Corps activities
(Kim 2008). 
An analysis of books and other sources on Olympic education, mostly pub-
lished before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, shows that most of the material deals
with Olympic history, world geography and history, physical education and
sports, social issues, and the meaning of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.
Among the content of the sources, books for elementary schools were utilized
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for the curriculum in order to make students aware of the meaning of the
Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement, the reason for international gath-
ering at the Games, athletic events, and so on. The contents for middle school
and high school are composed of important issues of the Games, discussions
regarding the relationship between society and the Games, visiting the Korean
Olympic Committee and observing Olympic affairs, the history of the Games,
the meaning of the Seoul Olympics, and so forth. At the university level, pro-
fessors whose specialty is sport history, teach and give students assignments to
study Olympic history and the meaning of the Games. Some universities, in-
cluding Yonsei University, offered specific classes for Olympism and relevant
issues, such as politics, economy, and social changes. Every year, college stu-
dents go to the IOA to learn about the Olympics, even though Olympic studies
and education seemed to lessen after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Never-
theless, Olympic education has played an important part in providing improve-
ments in South Korean education and society in general.  
The significance of the 1988 Seoul Olympics: 
sport and cultural transformation
The 1988 Seoul Olympics were the high point of modern Korean sport. They
were a product of the global sports movement, of national socio-cultural trans-
formations, and of official and popular political intention. In several respects, the
Seoul Games offer a model to any prospective host nation. First of all, the Seoul
Olympics promoted political democracy and diplomacy. They hosted 13,304 ath-
letic participants from 160 countries and could be regarded as a success, embody-
ing harmony and peace. They are also remembered as the last event to occur
within the Cold War era between world rivals. Furthermore, they contributed to
political reform, finalizing democratically the military regime through continuous
efforts, including the Declaration of June 29th (1988). After the event, for the first
time in Korean presidential history, President No Tae-woo made a speech at the
General Meeting of the United Nations. This showed that Korean politics and
diplomacy had been promoted to a certain degree.
Secondly, profits from the occasion stood at US$ 490 million, which even-
tually contributed to the advancement of the Korean economy. The amount was
higher than the profits of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, making the
Seoul Olympics the surplus Games due to the efficient preparation by the Or-
ganizing Committee. The committee promoted various sources for financial in-
come, including TV broadcasting rights, commemoration medals, lottery fund
raising, and badge sales—all economically marketed. Olympics-related busi-
ness contributed to the development of industries like tourism, leisure, and com-
munications and the restoration of the deflated economy. Korea’s improved
brand image helped to make economic advancement possible, with beneficial
trade opportunities and a massive increase in foreign capital inflow.
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Thirdly, the former IOC president, Juan Antonio Samaranch said, “This at-
mosphere not only helped the world peace, but also provided valuable aid for
the sporting world through the Olympic Movement” (Opening Address at
WACSO 1988). There were numerous changes in Korean sporting culture, in-
cluding physical education and sports science, after its announcement as the
host country. The Korean government started to promote physical education,
creating the Ministry of Sport, which has now become the Ministry of Culture
and Tourism. Sports facilities were rapidly expanded to encourage people to
perceive the significance of sport. The Seoul Olympic Sports Promotion Foun-
dation was established in April 1989 to finance sport and physical education,
and it continues to do this today. The Seoul Olympic Scientific Congress Or-
ganization held the Sports Science Congress, which was approved by IOC, and
it eventually contributed to the success of the Seoul Olympics, possessing three
important elements: games, culture, and scientific congress. The Scientific Con-
gress hosted 1,670 international scholars from 58 countries, as well as Korean
scholars, and 695 works were presented. It took six years to prepare for the Sci-
entific Congress and 120 staff from 12 subdivisions of sports science in Korea
actively put every effort into meeting the high standards of this caliber of aca-
demic conference. Sport and physical education sharply rose to a higher stage
of development as a result.
Another effect of the Seoul Olympics on modern Korean society was social
integration. There were concerns in preparing for the Games about whether
Korea would be capable of hosting them. However, the Games were success-
fully held due to cooperation among the Korean people in regards to prepara-
tion, and national confidence which convinced Koreans that they could do
anything if they had the courage to stick to their convictions. 
Another significant legacy of the Seoul Olympics was the cultural interac-
tions among the international visitors. About 500 cultural events were produced
to illustrate international culture as well as Korea’s cultural heritage. Traditional
Korean culture was introduced to the global audience throughout the festival
of culture and arts, exhibitions, and the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, com-
municating to staff, athletes, and tourists an understanding of Korean cultural
heritage. 
The Seoul Olympics can certainly be regarded as one of the most successful
victories for both Korea and the Olympic Movement, promoting world peace
and harmony through the diligent partnership of the SLOOC and the IOC, as
evaluated by Juan Antonio Samaranch. As previously mentioned, the Seoul
Olympics contributed to stronger diplomatic relations between Korea and other
countries, including communist and non-aligned nations, and a relaxation of
tensions between North and South Korea. Sport proved to be a strong political
tool to supplement national diplomacy. The 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics not
only brought global recognition to Korea through sport, but were a successful
achievement in the promotion of globalization.
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Endnotes
1 Two of the three marathon racers on the Japanese team were from Korea,
Kwon and sixth-place finisher Kim Eun-bai, who ran under the Japanese name
of Onbai Kin. Seiichiro Tsuda of Japan finished fifth, giving the “Japanese”
team that was two-thirds Korean the unofficial national team victory in the
race.
2 The First Five-Year Plan, from 1962 to 1966, reflected fundamental economic
strategies and the annual economic growth target was 7.1 percent: 1) to de-
velop energy supply, including electric power and coal; 2) to an increase agri-
cultural production and farmers’ income; 3) to expand important industries
and social overhead capital; 4) to improve the balance of payments by the ex-
pansion of internal trades 5) to promote utilization of manpower and national
land conservation; 6) to support technological advancement. The South Korean
government launched this economic development plan and achieved an annual
average economic growth of 7.8 percent in the first five years, from 1962 to
1966, of 9.7 percent in the second, from 1967 to 1971, of 10.1 percent in the
third, from 1972 to 1976, 5.6 percent in the fourth, from 1977 to 1981. The
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Olympism and East Asia:
A Philosophical Reflection on
Olympic Philosophy
HSU Li-Hong (Leo)
Olympic education has been the subject of many presentations at recent con-
ferences, including those organized by the International Olympic Academy
(IOA). With China’s hosting the third Summer Olympic Games in East Asia,
the Olympic Movement is increasingly prominent in East Asia. Inevitably,
Olympic education, as a part of the Olympic Movement, has also received
greater attention. In the last seven years alone, four major international confer-
ences have been held on this and related themes. The first was at the Japanese
Olympic Academy in November of 2003 on the theme of “The Olympic Move-
ment in Asia.” A second one was held in Beijing by the IOC in October of 2006,
which devoted a whole session to the theme of “Olympic Academies for the
Future.” The third was also held in Beijing in November of 2007 by the Beijing
Municipal Education Commission on the theme “Olympic Education and the
All-round Development of People.” And the fourth was again convened in Bei-
jing in July of 2008, on the eve of the Games, by the Humanistic Olympic Stud-
ies Center of Renmin University. The conference theme was “Great
Breakthrough: Olympic Theories and Practices in the East.” The results of all
these pedagogical presentations, I believe, are fruitful and applicable to different
regions in East Asia. 
Having reviewed some of these conferences, it is still worthwhile to refer
to the concluding remarks by IOC Director of International Cooperation and
Development, Mr. Sithole, at the Eighth Session of the IOA in May of 2006,
when he challenged the delegates to always consider what they can do for
Olympic education in their home countries and how they can contribute to the
enormous task of disseminating Olympic education in developing countries.
These are particularly important for those of us who work as sports educators
or at Olympic academies in the East Asian region. 
From an East Asian perspective, the Olympic Games have long been asso-
ciated with Western imperialism, Eurocentrism, and commercialization, but the
present era of globalization is forcing a reappraisal of nationalism, regionalism,
and globalism. Whether these “isms” are beneficial or detrimental for the sport-
ing world depends upon their uses in the wider society. However, when they
find expression in such exhortations as “winning is everything,” “winning at
all costs,” “our nation above all,” and “ethnic superiority,” they pose a danger
to sports development and to sports education systems. 




tion. This applies especially to most East Asian nations, given their entangled
histories of Western and local imperialism. The slogans of the Beijing Olympic
Games like “One World, One Dream” and “The world gives us 16 days; we
give the world 5000 years” send powerful, though mixed messages across East
Asia from China. A critical, comparative, and philosophical approach is re-
quired. 
In this chapter, I first want to emphasize especially to readers who are staff
of NOCs, policy makers, and sports educators in East Asia, that there still exists
a significant gap between the Games as sports events and the Olympic Educa-
tional Movement. One of the major problems for Olympic education in China,
as Ren (2004) already addressed, is the mass media’s overemphasis on sporting
performance. Mass media can play an indispensable role in the Olympic edu-
cation of the general public, but they “also attempt to mislead the public and
direct attention to athletic performances while neglecting the ethical and social
values of the Olympism” (ibid.: 77). The Japanese scholar Sanada (2004: 88)
also observed that in East Asia the Olympic Movement has been deployed as
part of all the bids to host the Olympics, but in most cases up to the present, the
educational programs did not continue after the Games. Korea’s Olympic
Movement, for instance, had no continuing educational presence in the school
physical education curriculum (Bahng 2004: 79). 
If we believe that Olympic sports have significant educational value, this
gap must be bridged as soon as possible. Therefore, my task in this chapter is
to clarify two questions about East Asia’s encounter with Olympism. The first,
about Olympism in East Asia, is whether the Western imperialism, Euro-cen-
trism and commercialization that lie behind the Olympics can be addressed by
the Olympic Educational Movement in East Asia. The second, about Olympism
for East Asia, is how regionalism, nationalism and globalism fit into the
Olympic Educational Movement in East Asia. I will begin with a discussion of
the ideological background of the Olympics.  
Olympism in East Asia: 
The force of Western imperialism, Eurocentrism 
and commercialism
There have been arguments and concerns from scholars that because the
Olympic Games were developed in the cradle of Western civilization in ancient
Greece, they are marked as Western imperialist or Eurocentric (cf. McNamee
2006). However, these two ideologies do not fit into the philosophy of the
Olympic Educational Movement because imperialism is a structure of political
and economic domination of one nation over others, and Eurocentrism is a
parochial claim of ideological domination; neither corresponds to the universal
values that Olympism entails. 
I have argued elsewhere (Hsu 1999: 254) that although the ideals of
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Olympism were derived and adapted from the ancient Olympic Games by the
Frenchman Pierre de Coubertin, the philosophy need not be seen as alien to
non-Western ethical traditions. Scholars such as Parry (1999) and Wigmore
(1999) have delineated the values of Olympism as tolerance, solidarity, respect
for others, fair play, equality, participation, non-discrimination, and character
development. All of these are prominent values in a vast range of ethical tradi-
tions. Wigmore more recently (2007) proposes Olympism as a philosophy of
citizenship, highlighting such values as co-operation, loyalty, honesty, team
work, fair play, friendship, trust, and competition. These too are not limited to
Western codes of citizenship.
Over the past century, there have been many interpretations of Olympism,
but they have all tended to instill it with a deeper positive meaning. Different
conceptions of Olympism will interpret the general philosophy in such a way
as to bring it to life in a particular context.  The fact that the Summer Games
were again held in East Asia provided another opportunity to showcase not only
Western-origin sports but also Asian traditional sporting practices. As the Japan-
ese Olympic Movement pioneer Kanō Jigorō argued, traditional sports have
deep communal value and to connect them with the values of Olympism can
contribute importantly to the shape of the Olympic Educational Movement in
East Asia.
Should the Olympic Educational Movement be seen as a purely commer-
cial activity? Definitely not. John MacAloon has reminded us that “the world-
wide professionalization of sport administration is a wonderful thing, but we
must help to insure that Olympic officials preserve awareness that the pursuit
of money and medals must always remain in the service of greater social, cul-
tural, and humanistic ends. If it doesn’t, then such sport is no longer Olympic,
even if it sends great athletes to the Olympic Games... the special role of uni-
versity professors who participate in Olympic academies is to remind all par-
ticipants of these real meanings of Olympism” (2004: 48). In sum, Western
imperialism, Eurocentrism and commercialism have no necessary basis in the
Olympic Educational Movement in East Asia.
Regionalism and Olympism for East Asia 
Athletes and coaches/trainers play major roles in the Olympic Games. They
may carry the values of Olympism throughout their life. However, often they
are also affected by federation and commercial sponsors and other institutional
pressures (see Macintyre 1981 on the more general problem of how institutions
affect their internal practices). These institutions can be their governing bodies
of their sports, from local schools and clubs through federations, NOCs, and
governments, up to international organizations. In this sense, it is very important
to analyze the relationship between athletes, coaches, and their relevant spon-
sors through these levels. This section explores whether the ethical values of
HSU Li-Hong (Leo)
112
Olympism can be exhibited in those different levels in connection with their
ideologies in East Asia. To do this, we must consider a matrix of relationships—
those among athletes, those between coaches and athletes, and those of organ-
izations and sponsors with both the athletes and the coaches. 
At the regional level in the West, athletes generally belong to community-
level clubs. These athletes develop strong bonds of solidarity and mutual con-
cern, especially in team sports. They can easily build up companionship and
sometimes even a long term, caring friendship. For example, in Europe, field
hockey is often considered a very friendly sport on a community-based level.
Some of my friends who live in the Netherlands have known each other since
their childhood through their field hockey club, and they have stayed in touch
and maintained a very good life-long friendship.  
In East Asia, nations such as in Taiwan, the regional level of sport is de-
veloped not through this kind of community-based sport club but through the
school system. Normally children are assigned to nearby schools and learn new
sports skills through their physical education lessons. And if they show talent
and interest in a certain sport, they may be chosen to continue on teams at higher
levels of competition. Being on a sports team in school is a great honor in Tai-
wan, especially for young basketball or baseball players. Children often develop
close bonds with their teammates during their sporting years and they remain
life-long friends. Even at a high school or a collegiate level, those sports team-
mates often retain relationships into adulthood. The positive values of regional
sports can therefore include friendship, trust, character development, respect
for others, teamwork, and solidarity.     
The relationship between coaches and athletes at this level of sport should
not be underestimated either. Coaches in East Asian settings are often like play-
ers’ surrogate fathers. The traditional value of respecting one’s teacher in East
Asia may be declining, but this kind of respect is still highly endorsed in the
Taiwanese school sports system. On the regional sport level, coaches often
spend extensive time in taking care of their athletes. A good coach in Taiwan
often uses his time, energy and money not just to improve his/her players’ skills
but also to promote the quality of their academic work and their daily life in
general. Hence, in Taiwan, the bond between coaches and athletes is often much
stronger than that between teachers and students.
There is less competitiveness in the relationships of organizations and spon-
sors with coaches, who seldom feel pressures from their sponsors. In Taiwan,
regional coaches usually also work as school PE teachers, which provides se-
cure employment. Therefore financial pressure from sponsors is not a real issue.
The team itself is normally sponsored by its school, and the pressure to “win at
all costs” is not so high compared with the national level and hence more easily
manageable.   
Athletes, too, at this level are less likely to be pressured directly by their
sponsoring organizations. Although they do need certain sports equipment or
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facilities, it is still quite affordable. Because travel for competition is within the
regional level, travel costs are modest. Thus, conflicts of interest and tension
between the two sides are still negligible.
In sum, it is relatively easy to manifest the ethical values of Olympism at
the regional level because the drive to win is not excessive and friendship, re-
spect for others, fair play, and trust can be easily maintained. Athletes, coaches
and their sponsors/institutions can exhibit their regional spirit through partici-
pation. Certain sports such as field hockey or ice skating in the West do show
these same ethical values, which remain even up to the Olympic Level. East
Asia can learn from this. 
Nationalism and Olympism for East Asia
When athletes train and compete at the national level, they receive more
attention and more support, but they also face higher expectations from the
pressure of winning. At this level, athletes can easily develop an excessive com-
petitive drive, which can lead to unethical conduct like doping and violence.
For example, in 1994 during a selection of the US national squad for the up-
coming Olympics figure skating, the favorite, Nancy Kerrigan, was physically
attacked in order to incapacitate her, so that her key rival, Tonya Harding, could
win her place on the team.   
Compared with coaches who work for the regional level, national coaches
inevitably place more pressure on their athletes—often from the pressure they
themselves feel in maintaining their own reputations and the pride of the nation.
Therefore, the overall well-being of athletes is even more vulnerable. It is well-
known that national coaches in East Asia have constrained their athletes’ free-
doms, encouraged doping, and sometimes exacted corporal punishment.  
On the national level, sponsors and institutions may be both businesses and
governments. Clearly, sponsoring companies will always push coaches to win
so that their logos and brands will get more favorable exposure, and these pres-
sures are passed from coaches to players, directly or indirectly. In Taiwan, na-
tional level sports coaches do not have very stable incomes and status. Often if
they lose major competitions, they will be forced from their position and must
find another job. These pressures can certainly threaten the ethical values of
Olympism, such as the tenet that “taking part is more important than winning”!   
Athletes at this level are not only pressured by their coaches but also di-
rectly by their sponsoring institutions.  At this level, athletes are chosen to rep-
resent their own country, and they bear the whole nation’s expectations. This
can be a particular burden for East Asian athletes, since losing a game means
the disgrace or humiliation of “losing face.” Often, there is a combination of
an excessive competitive drive and a hyper-patriotism. In other words, the more
gold medals, the higher national pride and the more money they receive. 
Here is an example of this that runs counter to the Olympic Educational
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Movement with respect to zealous patriotism. In the 2004 Athens Olympic
Games, Taiwanese people were proud to see their athletes receive two gold
medals in Taekwondo. The Taiwanese government was trying to demonstrate
the pride of the nation and the Taiwanese identity by giving them parades, put-
ting them on television, and giving them lots of money. Based on this success,
in early 2008, the national Ministry of Education decided to combine two major
sport colleges into one sports university by investing 3 billion NTD (about 10
million USD). Its major goal is to train more world class athletes (50 in each
year) in order to obtain more gold medals in the future Olympics. The human-
istic aspect of an educational curriculum in our PE/Sports Education has some-
how been neglected and emphasis has been given to elite technical training.
The athletes’ all-around development, not to mention the Olympic values of ed-
ucation, has been devalued.
Another manifestation of nationalism is in relations among nations, and
here too one can find many examples that violate the mutual respect for the
value of peace that Olympism entails. For instance, there was heated debate in
Taiwan towards the end of 2007 about whether the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay
should pass through Taiwan or not. Some Taiwanese were in favor of this, based
on Olympic ideals of peace and harmony; in the end, refusal to participate was
based on political demonstrations of national sovereignty. Further expressions
of excessive patriotism have occurred in bidding and hosting mega-events like
the Olympics (Sanada 2004). 
In sum, patriotism is not intrinsically antithetical to Olympic values. It
brings athletes from different nations closer together (in the spirit of friendship
rather than animosity) and it enhances mutual understanding.  However, in ex-
cessive forms, a strident nationalism can subvert the values that the Olympic
Educational Movement represents. 
Globalism and Olympism for East Asia
It is very common now to characterize our present era as one of globaliza-
tion, referring to the increasing interdependency among societies and individ-
uals at the economic, political, cultural, and social levels (Parry 2006: 189; cf.
Maguire 1999). Whether the world is fully globalized is debatable, since some
countries remain isolated from the rest of the world (including North Korea and
Myanmar in Asia) and so far they are reluctant to engage with other national
societies. It is fair to say, though, that many Olympic sports events receive
global attention and that most of these events are practiced around the world.
It is important to note, however, that “globalization” is not the same as “glob-
alism.” The former stresses the emergence and global diffusion of sport,
whereas the latter is a commitment to placing the interests of the entire world
above those of individual nations. 
The question here is whether globalism fits into the Olympic Educational
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Movement in East Asia? I believe it should and does since it exhibits values of
Olympism at an international level such as solidarity, respect for others (na-
tions), international friendship, and non-discrimination. But perhaps before we
measure globalism, we must consider another term that was proposed long ago
by Coubertin (1935) and that is “internationalism.” As he and others idealisti-
cally hoped, internationalism could have strong positive meanings if it referred
to cooperation and the promotion of common good among nations rather than
the pursuit of individual national interests. 
However, expectations for East Asia regional co-operation are not easy to
fulfill (cf. Sanada 2004). The many tense bilateral and multilateral relationships
exacerbate economic and political competition. Without a common language
such as English, even linguistic barriers are considerable. This contrasts
markedly with, for instance, the European Union countries, where barriers to
movement are much lower and proximity allows for easy travel and multi-lan-
guage learning.
Cultural differences may also be in play. Generally speaking, I believe that
we East Asians have a harder time expressing ourselves openly. John MacAloon
(2004: 50) has already urged that we Olympic scholars must insure that our
criticisms of current NOC policies are thoughtful and informed because “NOCs
must behave like public service organizations and not like closed corporations.
Such challenges are shared by all Olympic academies including those of East
Asia.”  
Fortunately there are grounds for optimism. Controls on sports doping, for
example, offer a working model of East Asian regional co-operation. In addi-
tion, the peaceful initiatives between North Korea and South Korea during the
2000 and 2004 Olympic Games Ceremonies have demonstrated cooperation
under even more strained circumstances. Some of this can be attributed to East
Asian youth, who are now travelling more, learning to appreciate different cul-
tures, and laying the foundation of mutual respect, which is one of the values
of Olympism. 
A similar measure can be used for our athletes. In Taiwan, many national
athletes have opportunities to travel to other countries to compete, but often
they go for the competition only. They do not socialize with local citizens or
their athletic competitors and return with an empty experience except for the
competition itself. This is a great loss for those of us who are concerned with
Olympism.  
One of my efforts for promoting Olympism in East Asia has been to deploy
pop culture. As we know, there are some East Asian pop stars (such as F4, Jay
Chou, Jackie Chan, and Bae Yong-jun) who are widely popular across the entire
region and who have considerable influence on East Asian youth. It is of course
difficult for educators, even sports educators, to mobilize such stars, but I do
believe we can learn much from the success and the marketing strategies of
such pop stars. Most importantly, it is clear that their popularity is not based on
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any nationalistic ideology but rather on an appeal to common elements in East
Asia. 
By bringing these powerful pop-cultural phenomena to the attention of our
leading policy makers, I hope to develop more sophisticated strategies for pro-
moting Olympism and Olympic education programs in our region. In this chap-
ter, I have shown that we must continue to work to bridge the gap that still exists
between the sporting Games themselves and the Olympic Educational Move-
ment that promotes the values that should be the foundation of the Games. 
In furthering Olympism in and for East Asia, Western imperialism, Euro-
centrism, and commercialism have no place in the Olympic Educational Move-
ment in East Asia. From a Taiwanese perspective, I have shown that there are
three levels of ideologies which might be able to fit into the same context of
Olympism. Of the three, only regionalism and globalism should be endorsed
because only they can exhibit the more positive values of Olympism, whereas
nationalism too easily entails an excessive patriotism that undermines these
ideals. Lowering nationalist fervor by increasing regional co-operation and ed-
ucating against prejudices between East Asian nations is the proper way for all
of us to work together. Without mutual understanding and international co-op-
eration in our region, it is impossible to achieve true globalism and realize the
full potential of Olympism as philosophy. 
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Sport, National Identity, 
and Taiwan’s Olympic History
HWANG Dong-Jhy, Alan BAIRNER, 
Kathleen HEITZMEN and CHIU Wei-Cheng
According to Lin Chia-lung (2002: 224), “the awakening of Taiwanese con-
sciousness among native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders’ deepening sense of
crisis have made identity politics the most salient issue on Taiwan’s political
agenda since the onset of democratization.” This chapter examines the extent
to which sports have been implicated in these identity politics.
Over the last two decades, the relationship between sport and national iden-
tity has provoked much critical discussion (Bairner 2001, 2008; Caldwell 1982;
Cronin 1999; Cronin and Mayall, 1998; Hargreaves 1992; Liang 1993; Maguire,
Jarvie, Mansfield and Bradley 2002; Silk et al 2005; Smith and Porter 2004). It
is a complex relationship in many parts of the world where identity is high-
lighted and reproduced through sporting rituals and competitive events.  In most
countries, sport is arguably a more consuming passion for the population than
politics (Caldwell, 1982), and it is a main catalyst for arousing people’s emo-
tions towards their political, social, cultural and national identities. 
From the birth of modern sports, nationalism and its passions have been a
major focus. Olympic athletes were organized into national teams for the first
time in 1908 at the London Games (Kent 2008). By this time, ruling elites had
infused sporting competitions with symbolic, emblematic, and ritualistic char-
acteristics that were visible in formal ceremonies much like religious festivities.
During international sporting competitions, particularly the Olympic Games,
the iconography of national identity is at its most visible with victorious athletes
standing on the awards podium, the colours of their nation in plain view. The
gold medal is placed around the winner’s neck, whose national flag is raised
and national anthem played. The winner stands as a victorious proxy warrior
for the nation. In this way, events such as the Olympics allow sport to be used
in the “national interest.” Sport becomes a political tool, not least in terms of
securing political legitimacy, strengthening or even creating national identity,
pursuing national independence or unification, and striving for political and so-
cial equality for a national, racial or ethnic group. Examples of this include Tai-
wan’s gold medal winning performance in taekwondo at the 2004 Olympics,
and Wang Chien-ming’s pitching for the New York Yankees in Major League
Baseball. Both of these became focal points for the Taiwanese people and im-
bued in them feelings of pride and, potentially, a sense of identity. This chapter
examines the construction and reproduction of national identity or identities in
Taiwan and considers in what ways sport, and in particular Olympic sport, has
u8
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been implicated in these processes.
This chapter begins with a brief commentary on the relationship between
sport and national identity. This is followed by an outline of the development
of modern sport in Taiwan. We then turn to the manner in which sport has been
implicated in the “Two Chinas” debate, particularly in relation to Taiwan’s ex-
periences at the hands of the Olympic movement. Finally, we  examine the con-
temporary role of sport in relation to Taiwanese identity. 
Observations on sport and national identity 
Although many have accepted that sport and national identity are closely
related, there remains a need to understand more fully how this relationship
manifests itself in specific political contexts (Bairner 2001). Most countries
have had to confront the national question, particularly when seeking to build
unity out of tribal, racial, ethnic and religious diversity. National signifiers such
as the flags, anthems, currency, food, value systems, acceptance by global or-
ganizations such as the United Nations, as well as membership in international
sporting organizations, are all taken as proof that nations can offer their people
a sense of identity and territorial integrity. What should be noted at the outset,
however, is that all of this applies more explicitly to nation-states than to na-
tions.
There are subtle differences between the English words, nation and state,
which have spawned two very different political concepts: the nation-state and
the nation. The word nation refers to a social group or community bound to-
gether by a common language, religion, race, history, tradition, customary rit-
uals or common characteristics. Nation-state refers to a tangible political entity
that possesses territory, citizens, a political structure, a legal system and con-
stitutional sovereignty. Thus, the nation can be regarded as a psychological,
cultural and social concept, albeit with material foundations, whereas the na-
tion-state is a political and legal designation which may or may not equate to
the existence of a nation with its own territorial integrity (Reijai and Enloe
1972). Shih Cheng-feng, a Taiwanese political scientist, argues that nationality
pertains to the recognition of a state machine or political entity (Shih 2000).
National identity, on the other hand, is more easily linked to the idea of the na-
tion (Bairner 2008).
According to Norbert Elias, the development of modern sport and the pro-
gression of national sentiment seemed to be unique historical phenomena that
emerged during the same period (Elias 1998). In other words, sport and national
identity possessed a common, fundamental historical characteristic, namely
“modernity” (Hobsbawm 1990). The relationship between sport and national
identity in this regard can be explained in part by reference to Hobsbawm’s idea
of “invented tradition” (ibid.). He notes, for example, that from as early as the
1870s and mid-1880s in Britain, association football was implicated in the con-
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struction of what came to be seen as institutional and ritual characteristics, such
as professionalism, the League, the Cup, routinely watching games on Satur-
days, football club supporters and their passions, all of which were observable
in industrial towns and major cities. Yet, in reality, at the outset football had
been an amateur, private school sporting activity used to cultivate middle and
upper class values. Only when partially separated from its class origins did it
become professional. 
Sport is undeniably conducive to encouraging national consciousness and
national identity, both of which can be expressed politically in a variety of ways
but refer to the existence of a national country with a national history, a national
mythology and national traditions. Although national identity may be closely
linked to what Benedict Anderson described as an “imagined community,” An-
derson himself was quick to point out that “imagined” is not synonymous with
“fabrication” or “falsity” (Anderson 2006: 6). Thus, national identity has real
foundations. Nevertheless, creating myths, legends and traditions has continued
to be a significant element of nation building. In this respect, the relevance of
sport to national identity has often resided in its capacity to perform a myth-
making function (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Before embarking on a dis-
cussion of the precise relationship between sport and national identity in
Taiwan, it is necessary to begin by outlining the development of sport in that
country. 
The development of sport in Taiwan 
Recent years have seen an impressive increase in Taiwan sports history
(for instance, Tsai Jen-hsiung 1995; Hsu Pei-hsien 2006; Hsieh Shih-yuan,
Shieh Jia-fen 2003; Hsieh Shih-yuan 2004). Most scholarly attention has fo-
cused on physical education in Taiwan’s schools during the Japanese era and
on the role of the Japanese in the introduction of modern sport to Taiwan. 
The Qing dynasty ruled Taiwan for more than two centuries, but initially
put no emphasis on infrastructure and education. It was not until the late nine-
teenth century that the Qing Empire lifted its ban on subjects going out to sea
(a ban originally put in place to curtail foreign invasion) and assigned Shen
Pao-jen and Liu Ming-chuan to manage Taiwan as an imperial province. Prior
to the Japanese occupation, Taiwan did come into contact with modern move-
ments, as British tea merchant John Dodd documented in his “Chronicle of Clo-
sure in Northern Taiwan.” In this book, Dodd, who had relocated to Tamsui,
Taiwan in 1864, describes a scene from 24 May 1885, when British gunship
officers and soldiers who had been with him for nine months, engaged in a va-
riety of sports, including lawn tennis, racing, cricket, high jumping, leaping,
billiards and so forth (Chen Rou-jin 2005). It is also noteworthy that in 1882,
Dr. George Leslie MacKay founded the Oxford Study Hall (the predecessor of
today’s Taiwan Theology College), and later launched the Tamsui Girls High
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School (the predecessor of today’s Tamsui High School). In 1885, the English
Presbyterian Church established the Presbyterian Church High School (the
predecessor of today’s Chang Rong High School). All of these schools were
subsequently to enjoy an outstanding reputation for sporting excellence. The
question of whether there had been a conscious effort on the part of schools to
promote modern exercise and physical education prior to the Japanese occupa-
tion has prompted sports historians to conduct further research.
John King Fairbank (1989) emphasized that, in the late nineteenth century,
Taiwan was an ideal colony, in that its residents did not possess a clear sense of
ethnic belongingness. The Japanese began their occupation of Taiwan in 1895
and under Japanese colonial rule the sports curriculum played an important role
in promoting (a Japanese) identity. Through a modernized education system,
the colonial rulers introduced school sports and their own physical culture as
well as Western sports to Taiwan, thereby marking the first occasion when a
government actively promoted sport in Taiwan in a systematic way (Tsai Jen-
hsiung 1995).
What can be deduced from Taiwan’s early sports history is that the Japanese
colonial government unrelentingly promoted sport in schools of all levels and
for all social strata. Superficially this appeared to be a benign policy. In reality,
however, it was used to secure Taiwanese approval for Japanese colonial rule.
In Taiwan, as elsewhere, as Stoddart (1982) observes, sport was often the major
tool used by the dominant class to deliver its official ideas and values. During
the Japanese occupation, sports meetings were regularly organized as important
events in schools. At these meetings, the Japanese flag was raised, the Japanese
national anthem and other military songs were sung, and speeches were ad-
dressed to the colonial subjects by various dignitaries. Additionally, military
marches were played to showcase regimented sporting formations and uniforms
during the opening and closing ceremonies. All of this sought to secure and re-
inforce respect for and obedience and loyalty to various national symbols, all
the while presented as uncontroversial rituals associated with the sports meet-
ings themselves. Moreover, the Japanese colonial government introduced
Japan’s traditional sports of judo, fencing, sumo wrestling, archery and such
into the physical education curriculum, thus further promoting the educational
objectives of the “Kominka” (Japanization) movement. In general, disseminat-
ing Japanese activities amongst the Taiwanese people was intended to lead to
a Japanese way of thinking and to the growth of a Japanese nationalist spirit. 
All of this had a significant impact particularly on intellectual life in Taiwan
for, as Ching (2001: 29) notes, “Regardless of Japan’s ambivalent relationship
to the West, for the Taiwanese intellectuals, Japan irrefutably represented the
modern, as compared to the colonizing West.” For the majority of people, sport
had greater significance than intellectual tastes in terms of conveying identity.
As part of people’s daily lives, sport served to provide a level of social integra-
tion and to ease the tension between the colonizer and the colonized. The Tai-
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wanese quickly took up a variety of new sporting activities, with male and fe-
male students keen to partake in track and field and swimming contests, and
male students eager to play tennis, basketball, rugby, football, hockey and base-
ball. In 1912, organized regional sporting events began to emerge. Baseball was
particularly well received island-wide, spawning youth, junior and adult leagues
(Morris 2004, Tsurumi 1999). In 1931, the Jiayi Agriculture and Forestry high
school baseball team made up of Taiwanese and Japanese students represented
Taiwan in the play-off competition for the Japanese High School Baseball
League, claiming second place (Hsieh Shih-yuan, Hsieh Jia-fen 2003). In 1935,
during the largest exhibition in Taiwan’s history, the Taiwan Sports Association
staged baseball games and other sporting events in Korea, Manchuria and Tai-
wan, in a bid to highlight Japanese colonial achievements (Cheng Jia-hui 2004).
The development of a baseball culture had a particularly profound significance
for Taiwan, and when the colonial power left the island after the Second World
War, baseball remained and became even more significant in terms of national
consciousness. 
Introducing Japanese-style sports education had less to do with making the
Taiwanese into Japanese than with training them to become obedient, industri-
ous Japanese subjects. Taiwan’s educated elite did not unconditionally accept
Japan’s strategy, and students’ experiences of studying abroad and exposure to
other ideological trends slowly began to awaken an alternative national con-
sciousness. The intellectual elite, including Lin Shien-tang, Chiang Wei-shui
and Tsai Pei-hou, initiated a movement that included the Taipei Youth Sport
Association aimed at promoting cultural exchange, sporting activities, and the
development of healthy bodies, but such efforts were banned by the Japanese
Governor’s Office and the Association eventually disbanded (Lei Yen-hsiung
1988). This episode reveals the Japanese colonial government’s unwillingness
to allow the Taiwanese to organize their own sports organization, and thereby
to potentially challenge Japanese cultural hegemony.
Under colonial rule, major differences emerged between the Taiwanese (in-
cluding aborigines) and the Japanese and were reflected in the sporting realm.
Indeed, the Japanese enshrined these differences in junior baseball competitions
which provided an arena for cultural resistance, justifying Anderson’s assertion
that the “imagined community” may not necessarily arise from a specific cog-
nitive national consciousness, but rather from the presence of a discernible op-
ponent. Thus, “people in Taiwan experienced clear categorical differences
between themselves and [the] Japanese which left them with a sense of non-
Japanese identity” (Brown 2004: 9). Conversely, their attempts to shape an iden-
tity or a community consciousness through participating in sport permitted the
construction of the Taiwanese as imagined opponents of the colonial govern-
ment, some of whom had unsuccessfully striven for the formation of a nation
state (Brown 2004: 8). In such ways did an apparently banal activity, sport,
come to encompass and underpin “complex” national emotions (Liang Shu-
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ling 1993; Chang Li-ke 2000). 
Taiwanese athletes were not only subjected to political and cultural dis-
crimination during the Japanese colonial period, but were also treated differently
by their motherland in the aftermath of this colonial experience. The Taiwanese
track and field athlete Chang Hsing-hsien, who had represented Japan at two
Olympic Games, was prompted to represent Taiwan/ “China” in the seventh
National Sports Games held in Shanghai in May 1948. Many Taiwanese who
had returned to the motherland after Japanese colonial rule did not distinguish
between “Taiwanese society and the Taiwanese” and “Chinese society and the
Chinese,” but rather merged “tangibly existing Taiwan” with “imaginary China”
(Chang Mao-guei 1993). After retiring, Chang Hsing-hsien addressed future
athletes, saying that he had never had the opportunity to participate in the
Olympics as a Taiwanese athlete. This prompted him to lament, “It turned out
that I did not have a chance to help out the nation with a little civilian sporting
diplomacy.” Chang Hsing-hsien’s son Chang Zhao-ping added, “The govern-
ment continues to deprive my father from serving in any important position,
reckoning that my father was Japanese.” Chang’s story can be seen as one of a
number that exemplify the ambivalent national identities - Chinese, Japanese,
and Taiwanese - in Taiwan after World War Two. 
Although the Japanese colonial government has left Taiwan, the sports cul-
ture, physical education and sport system it left behind continued to ensure
Japanese influence in Taiwan. For example, baseball has developed into Tai-
wan’s “national sport,” even though the post-war Kuomintang (KMT/ Chinese
Nationalist Party) government tried to ban it as a remnant of colonial rule.
However, this deliberate attempt to remove such an important social and cultural
experience was inevitably unable to wipe out the Taiwanese people’s collective
social memory. 
In reality, far from being able to ban baseball, the KMT government sought
to take the sport over (Lin Chi-wen 1995) and constructed a system aimed at
streamlining, rather than oppressing, grassroots baseball culture. Established to
oversee this process, the National Baseball Association took steps to develop
and strengthen the sport in Taiwan (Liang Shu-ling 1993; Lin Chi-wen 1995). 
The KMT had decamped to Taiwan in 1945 and on 28 February 1947, Mar-
tial Law was introduced. During what was to become the longest uninterrupted
period of Martial Law anywhere, the Taiwanese people’s freedom of speech,
publication, gathering, religious faith and so forth were severely restricted (see
Edmondson 2002).  Meanwhile sport became an important feature of KMT
propaganda. The earlier Taiwan Provincial Sports Games continued, but with
the opening ceremonies presided over by the KMT party chairman, and the re-
quisite singing of the national anthem, the president’s keynote speech, reciting
of slogans, the singing of patriotic songs, dances and drills, these events now
directly served the interests of the state. For example, the first Taiwan Provincial
Sports Games’ track and field competition was held at Taiwan University in
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October 1946, presided over by the highest administrative officer of the Taiwan
Administrative Office, Chen Yi. In the event, however, Chiang Kai Shek
presided, along with Madam Sung, and delivered the opening speech:
… You have now returned to the embrace of your motherland, and
have become the owners of the Republic of China; consequently, you
need to shoulder more national responsibilities, while my coming to
Taiwan this time has been to deliver the responsibility of developing
Taiwan, developing the nation to our people! Particularly of the youths
in Taiwan, where everyone needs to realize their own responsibilities
by working collectively, learning and developing a strong physical
stamina, and the only way to restore the ancient Chinese virtues is to
be aware of etiquette and justice, integrity, be responsible and disci-
plined … (Lei Yen-hsiung 1988: 9).
Here was the “party line.” Just one month earlier, a KMT publication had
emphasized that the Taiwanese people needed to undergo “re-education, for
their minds had been polluted and had been coerced to receive twisted thoughts”
(New Taiwan Monthly 1946: 1-3). Drawing upon Confucianism and even older
philosophies, the KMT continued to view the people’s “national spirit” as the
problem, failing to identify or shying away from addressing political, economic
and social issues (Barrington Moore 1966). There was widespread resentment
towards the KMT government, resulting in the tragic events of 28 February
1947 when the government eradicated a majority of the potentially influential
leaders of Taiwan’s embryonic national movement (Roy 2003). In such circum-
stances, the second Provincial Sporting Games in 1947 became a highly sig-
nificant event from which there would emerge traditions aimed at reaffirming
Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) as a national hero in the eyes of the Han people.
Thereafter, annual Chung Cheng (Chiang Kai Shek) Cup competitions
were staged by individual sports associations and by various local authorities;
newly built sports buildings were named either the “Chung Cheng Sport Arena”
or “Chung Cheng Sports Park,” all in an effort by the KMT rulers (through the
infusion of large sums of money into sporting activities and facilities) to pro-
mote party/state consciousness by way of symbolism and ritual and, further, to
inject their ideology subtly into the general public’s sporting and recreational
life. A prime example of the state’s intrusion into sporting recreational activities
was the “China Youth Corps” (CYC, the China Youth Anti-Communist National
Salvation Corps) formed in 1952, which was initially housed in the Department
of Defense. It stipulated that all students of high school and vocational high
school age were required to join, and branches were set up in schools. The per-
son directly in charge of the CYC’s school activities was a military instructor,
and the CYC’s insignia used the same symbol as the KMT party. The CYC of-
fered more than just sport. Other activities included combat training, hiking,
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mountain climbing; and wilderness camping. The CYC attracted adolescents
and youths by offering sporting recreational activities, together with arranging
summer and winter break recreational activities, and subsequently used those
opportunities for the purpose of party education and the promotion of a specific
Chinese national identity (see Brown 2004). 
The KMT also had plans to use international sports competitions to
reawaken the public’s collective awareness (Yu and Bairner 2008). The Hong
Yeh junior baseball team defeated Japan by 7-0 in 1968; the Jin Long junior
baseball team won the twenty-third World Junior Baseball championship in 1969
and in 1971, the Giants team won the World Junior Baseball Championship.
Around 1970, when the KMT regime was suffering setbacks in the international
political arena, the triumph of their international baseball team provided the rul-
ing party with an opportunity to reaffirm collective identity intended to divert
popular attention from, or even compensate for, political difficulties. Finally, at
the 1984 Olympics held in Los Angeles, the Taiwanese team took third place in
baseball (an exhibition sport), causing the China Times to publish an editorial
on 9 August headed, “Pondering the rise and fall of the sport of baseball”:
Recently of late, with the country encountering setbacks, we are con-
fronting numerous drawbacks and humiliation in the international
community, no less than an isolation that was difficult to withstand.
As a result, triumphing at international competitions brought the peo-
ple of the entire nation to share the glorious moment, and unleashed
the resentment in their hearts. While what provided us with the most
opportunities was none other than baseball. Baseball brought us self-
esteem, a sense of superiority, and the list goes on. Nevertheless, this
year’s baseball game did not satisfy us, or even verged on setback and
disappointment.… What we were looking for was an absolute victory,
for victory was very important to us, and we simply could not afford
to lose (Cheng Chin-jen 1989: 332-33).
International sports competitions offered a means for a country to secure
political legitimacy and consolidate national identity, particularly when these
were reflected in a representative team’s name and in the use of a national an-
them and a national flag. Since 1949, the KMT had wrestled with Communist
China on the issue of political representation in the international sports com-
peting arena and, particularly, in dealings with the International Olympic Com-
mittee (IOC) and other governing bodies. This representation issue in the
competitive sports arena reflected and helped to consolidate two different value
systems and political identities, thus warranting detailed examination of the
“two Chinas” issue.
This statement highlights how baseball, as manipulated by the government,
helped to integrate KMT ideology into Taiwan’s sporting culture. 
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The “Two Chinas” issue (1960s - 1980s)
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was ostracized by the Olympic
movement from 1949. After an absence of over thirty years, it was restored to
the Olympic family and competed at the Los Angeles Games in 1984, the first
occasion on which the PRC and Taiwan took part in the same Olympics. The
“two Chinas” issue was and has remained, first and foremost, political, emerg-
ing in the aftermath of the Chinese civil war when, following their defeat, the
Chinese nationalists fled to Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) es-
tablished the PRC and the KMT reformed Taiwan as the Republic of China
(ROC), a name that had been chosen by the first leader of the KMT, Dr. Sun
Yat-sen, as early as 1911. The political conflict between the PRC and the ROC
then carried over into the international sporting arena with both the PRC and
Taiwan claiming to be the sole legitimate representative of China. 
China’s relations with the IOC date back to the early 20th century when
China itself was known as the ROC. China’s National Amateur Athletic Feder-
ation (CNAAF) was recognized by the IOC in 1922. Prior to 1949, China (as
the ROC) participated in the Los Angeles Olympics of 1932, at Berlin in 1936,
and in London in 1948. In 1949, some Olympic Committee members fled to
Taiwan while the ROC government maintained contact with the IOC and
claimed jurisdiction over Olympic affairs both in mainland China and Taiwan.
The new ROC’s claim was challenged by the PRC, since the CNAAF was still
based in Nanjing (mainland China). Subsequently, the CNAAF was reorganized
and renamed in October 1949 as the All-China Sports Federation (ACSF),
claiming jurisdiction over all Chinese Olympic activities. These competing
claims for jurisdiction by the PRC and Taiwan inevitably led to conflict. 
The PRC had no communication with the IOC until February 1952, when
the ACSF sent a message expressing its wish to participate in the Helsinki
Games. The IOC was put in a difficult position, since Taiwan also intended to
take part. According to IOC rules, only one national committee was permitted
to represent a country and there were differences of opinion among IOC mem-
bers as to which Chinese committee should be recognized. Neither the PRC nor
Taiwan was willing to negotiate or to form a single team. The IOC adopted a
proposal permitting both committees to participate in those events in which
they had been recognized by their respective international sport federations.
Taiwan was disappointed by the IOC resolution and withdrew from the 1952
Helsinki Olympics to demonstrate its opposition. This was the first time athletes
from mainland China participated in the Olympic Games under the authority
of the PRC government.
Two years later, the PRC was formally recognized by the IOC as the
Olympic Committee of the Chinese Republic, later changed to the Olympic
Committee of Democratic China (Olympic Review, No. 66-67, May-June,
1973). At the same time, Taiwan was recognized under the name of the Chinese
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Olympic Committee. Thus, a “two Chinas” situation was created. At the 1956
Melbourne Olympics, both the PRC and Taiwan were invited to take part. The
PRC withdrew in protest of Taiwan’s participation and continued to demand
the expulsion of Taiwan from the IOC, compelling Avery Brundage, the Presi-
dent of the IOC, to write to Beijing on 8 January 1958:
Everyone knows that there is a separate government in Taiwan, which
is recognized internationally, and specifically by the United Nations
consisting of the governments of the world. Your government is not
recognized by the United Nations (Olympic Review, No. 145, Novem-
ber 1979: 628).
Disappointed by this, in 1958 the PRC withdrew its membership from the
IOC and nine other international sporting organizations in protest at the “two
Chinas” policy. During the 1960s, there was little contact between the PRC and
IOC or other sporting organizations and as a result, Taiwan was able to claim
representation on behalf of all China in international sports events. However,
in October 1971, after the PRC was admitted to the United Nations, the ROC
(Taiwan) was expelled. This political event greatly aided the PRC’s efforts to
participate in other international organizations and, specifically, the IOC. The
PRC applied to rejoin the IOC in 1975, was granted admission in 1979 and
since then has taken an active part in Olympic activities, culminating in Beijing
hosting the Summer Games of 2008. 
How had the PRC managed to overcome the issue of the “two Chinas”
from the late 1970s? When the country fell into relative chaos during the early
stage of the Cultural Revolution, most sports training and competitive systems
were dismantled, many sports officials and athletes attacked, sport academies
closed, and sports equipment and facilities neglected or destroyed. This situation
began to change when China re-entered international table tennis competition
at the Scandinavian Open Championship in Sweden in November 1970. This
was the first time that a Chinese team had gone abroad for an international
sports competition since the Cultural Revolution (The Times, 27, 28 and 30 No-
vember 1970). Later China was invited to join the 31st World Table Tennis
Championship in Japan in March-April, 1971. Mao Zedong agreed with Pre-
mier Zhou Enlai’s suggestion to send a Chinese table tennis team to Japan with
the famous slogan, “Friendship first, competition second” and Mao went on to
say: “We shall join this competition. We must not be afraid to bear hardship.
We must not be nervous and scared” (Li 1994: 535; Wu 1999: 238). Thus began
China’s so-called “Ping Pong Diplomacy” with the United States. 
After 1970, Mao changed his sport policy to one of open engagement with
certain partners, in particular the US, and consequently, an American table ten-
nis team was invited to play in China in 1971, the first officially sanctioned
Sino-American cultural exchange in almost twenty years. Mao increasingly re-
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garded Soviet hegemony as the greatest threat to China following the border
clashes of 1969 between Chinese and Soviet troops on China’s northeastern
frontier. He reasoned that a tactical accommodation with the US would be less
dangerous than the threat posed by the Soviet Union, a shift in attitude that was
reflected in Premier Zhou Enlai’s call for peaceful coexistence and friendly re-
lations between states with different social systems. 
Although the PRC was invited to send observers to the 1972 Munich
Games, the secretary-general of the All-China Sports Federation, Song Zhong,
turned down the invitation because of  Taiwan’s participation. China could still
not tolerate a “two Chinas” or a “one China, one Taiwan” situation (Beijing Re-
view 15(35), 1 September, 1972). In the early part of 1973, however, the Japan-
ese Olympic Committee suggested to various international sport federations
and national Olympic committees that China be reinstated as a member and
Taiwan expelled (The Times, 13 February, 1973). In April 1973, Willi Daume,
the West German IOC Vice-president, went to Beijing to discuss the possibility
of China rejoining the Olympic movement (New York Times, 22 March, 1973).
Although he was told that China would not be prepared to rejoin the IOC as
long as Taiwan was a member, China was making progress in achieving
Olympic recognition.
An important step towards the PRC’s eventual admission to the IOC came
in 1973 when the Asian Games Federation voted to admit the PRC and exclude
Taiwan from its Tehran Games. Thereafter, more federations recognized the
PRC which, in April 1975, made a formal application to rejoin the IOC, de-
manding its own conditions, the foremost being that Taiwan should be expelled
from the IOC and that the All-China Sports Federation would be recognized as
the sole sports organization representing the whole of China. Beijing regarded
the existing relationship between the PRC and the IOC as abnormal and unjust
particularly since the PRC had become a member of the United Nations (UN),
from which Taiwan was now excluded (Beijing Review 18(23), 6 June 1975). 
Prior to the 1976 Olympic Games, the PRC requested Canada to uncondi-
tionally bar the Taiwanese delegation from Montreal. Instead, the Canadian
government asked Taiwanese athletes to compete without any mention of the
word China or the term “Republic of China.” The IOC considered the Canadian
action to be a breach of a promise made in 1970 when Montreal was chosen as
the host city (Espy 1979) and, to avoid further confrontation with the Canadian
government, submitted a plan stating Taiwan should be allowed to participate
as “Taiwan-ROC” with a flag bearing the Olympic rings. This solution drew
opposition from both the PRC and Taiwan. The PRC indicated that ROC was
only an abbreviation of the title Republic of China and to adopt it would be to
officially acknowledge the “two Chinas.” On the other hand, Taiwan insisted
on competing under its own flag and name - the Republic of China. 
The PRC continued to maintain that there was one China not two Chinas
or one China and one Taiwan and refused to accept any conditions under which
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Taiwan could be recognized. To seek a solution to the dilemma, the IOC pres-
ident, Lord Killanin, tried to arrange a meeting between China, Taiwan and the
IOC in 1979. Taiwan refused to enter into direct negotiation with China, thereby
forcing the IOC and PRC to pursue a solution without consultation. At the Mon-
tevideo meeting of the IOC in April 1979, the plenary session passed a resolu-
tion to recognize the Chinese Olympic Committee located in Beijing whilst
continuing to recognize the Chinese Olympic Committee in Taipei. However,
the resolution made certain stipulations in relation to matters of names, anthems,
flags and the constitutions of the two committees. At the meeting, Song Zhong
claimed that:
The resolution passed… as it now stands, is unacceptable to us. We
hereby reaffirm that there is only one China, that is, the People’s Re-
public of China. And that Taiwan is part of China. The only way to
solve the problem of China’s representation is to recognize China’s
Olympic Committee as the national Olympic Committee of the whole
of China. As an interim arrangement, the sports organization in Tai-
wan may remain in the IOC bearing the name of “China Taiwan
Olympic Committee,” but it must not use any of the emblems of the
“Republic of China.” We shall only accept solutions compatible with
the above-stated conditions (Daily Report, 9 April, 1979: K1).
Song’s statement indicated that the PRC would not allow Taiwan to use
the name “Republic of China” or that of the “Chinese Olympic Committee -
Taipei” which would imply equal state status with China (“Chinese Olympic
Committee - Beijing”). The perceived solution was that Taiwan should be
clearly identified as part of China. Song called a press conference in Beijing
and repeated China’s objection to the resolution, saying that it would be tanta-
mount to China’s acceptance of the idea of “two Chinas.” Again Song laid down
the two necessary conditions: first, that China’s Olympic Committee had to be
recognized as the sole legitimate Chinese organization in the IOC; and second,
that the IOC should forbid the use of the state name, national flag and anthem
of the Republic of China by Taiwan. 
In June 1979, the IOC Executive Board meeting in Puerto Rico confirmed
China’s Olympic Committee’s title as the “Chinese Olympic Committee.” It
also recommended that Taiwan should stay in the IOC as the “Chinese Taipei
Olympic Committee” with a different national anthem and flag. After an IOC
executive board meeting in Nagoya, Killanin submitted a resolution to 89 IOC
members for a postal vote on 26 October 1979. According to this resolution,
the National Olympic Committee of the PRC would be named the “Chinese
Olympic Committee” and would use the flag and anthem of the PRC while the
Olympic Committee of Taiwan would be named the “Chinese Taipei Olympic
Committee” (CTOC) and its anthem, flag and emblem would be other than
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those used by the PRC and would have to be approved by the Executive Board
of the IOC. China welcomed this resolution, claiming that it took into consid-
eration the basic fact that there was only one China of which Taiwan was a con-
stituent part (Xinhua Yuebao, December 1979). 
Taiwan was disappointed with the IOC decision. Taipei’s Olympic Com-
mittee and Henry Hsu, IOC member in Taiwan, filed lawsuits at the Lausanne
Civil District Court against the Nagoya resolution claiming that it violated IOC
rules, a claim rejected by the court. In his ruling, Judge Pierre Bucher said that
it seemed obvious that Taipei’s Olympic Committee had no right to present a
suit against the IOC (Daily Report, 17 January 1980: A2). The new IOC Pres-
ident Juan Antonio Samaranch sent a letter to Hsu, dated 4 December 1980,
guaranteeing that Taipei’s Olympic Committee would get the same treatment
as any other national committee if Taiwan accepted the conditions of the
Nagoya resolution (Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee 1981). Consequently,
the Taipei Olympic Committee agreed to change its name to the “Chinese Taipei
Olympic Committee” and to adopt a new flag and emblem. According to the
agreement, the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee would be entitled to par-
ticipate in future Olympic Games and other activities sponsored by the IOC
with the same status and rights as all national Olympic Committees (Olympic
Review 162, April, 1981). At least temporarily the question of Chinese repre-
sentation was settled. For the PRC, there were no “two Chinas” or one China
and one Taiwan. The latter was subsumed under China – implicit in the naming
of the two Olympic committees. This outcome helped to facilitate communica-
tion between China and Taiwan through sport and was even seen as conducive
to the reunification process. For Taiwan, there was no option but to accept the
resolution if it wished to stay in the Olympic movement; for the IOC, one of its
biggest problems over the previous twenty years had been resolved. 
The increasing importance of sport to the PRC was linked to the interna-
tional significance of the Olympic movement. In China, sport has been fought
over by many different groups and it is relatively easy to demonstrate its role
in promoting nationalism and its importance to the ruling elite. According to
the ideology of Chinese centrism (Sino-centrism), Taiwan is regarded as part
of China, which prevents the Taiwanese from using their official national name,
flag and anthem in all international competitions. Since 1984, Taiwanese ath-
letes have competed internationally under the name of “Chinese Taipei,” but
the Chinese domestic media consistently refer to Taiwanese sports teams as
“Taipei China.” Sporting relationships between China and Taiwan are thus sym-
bolic of Chinese internal imperialism, even though the majority of Taiwanese
people oppose unification under the official Chinese nationalist slogan of “one
country, two systems.” 
For the 2004 Olympics in Athens, the National Council on Physical Fitness
and Sport announced that the Chinese Taipei Olympic team would consist of
85 competitors across 12 events. Coverage of the Games would be provided by
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digital broadcast stations with the IOC granting broadcasting rights to Taiwan
Television Enterprise Ltd., China Television Co., Chinese Television Systems
and Formosa Television. The CTOC praised the IOC for promoting cooperation
between the four stations not least because the mission of the CTOC remains
that of promoting the Olympic movement in Taiwan. 
Reaction in Taiwan to the successful Beijing Olympic bid was mixed. In
the build-up, Yuan Weimin, the President of China’s Olympic Committee
(COC), declined to rule out the possibility of Taiwan being involved in co-spon-
soring the Games should the bid be successful, as long as the “one China” prin-
ciple was adhered to. The CTOC argued that co-hosting the 2008 Games would
benefit Taiwan from an economic point of view, but above all, would be an op-
portunity to promote sporting exchanges and enhance the process of reconcili-
ation across the Taiwan straits. However, Yuan Weimin pointed out that, unlike
the football World Cup and European Championships, which allow for joint
bids from different countries, the IOC Olympic Charter only allows the Games
to be staged in one city of one country. 
Chinese state nationalism involves the imposition of cultural homogeneity
from above. One element of this policy is to force Taiwanese sports organiza-
tions to accept that the PRC is the only central Chinese government and that
Taiwan is merely a provincial authority. However, in the face of the continuing
threat from the PRC, many Taiwanese people have sought their own self-iden-
tification, rather than simply accepting a definition arrived at by the Chinese
government. That said, to a certain degree the debate over the “two Chinas”
has moved beyond debates about two nationalisms or national identities, with
the concept of post-colonialism helping to re-position central concerns. 
Republic of China, Chinese Taipei 
or Taiwan (1980s - 2008)
Taiwan’s national title has become a fundamental issue because a national
title relates not only to recognition on the international stage but also to internal
political identity. The Taiwan government adopted the formal title of the “Re-
public of China,” yet in the wake of the “two Chinas” issue was now referred
to as “Chinese Taipei,” at least in the international sporting arena. In turn, “Chi-
nese Taipei” became its name on various international, non-sporting occasions.
But did this mean that the Taiwanese people had come to accept the designa-
tion? Did the title “Chinese Taipei,” in and of itself, truly resolve the “two Chi-
nas” issue? What was the prevailing mood within Taiwan? All these questions
prompt us to delve even deeper into the discussion of whether Taiwan is best
described as the “Republic of China,” “Chinese Taipei” or “Taiwan.”
The “two Chinas” period coincided with the Cold War when the ruling
KMT thought it could harness international anti-communist sentiment to its
own goals. Specifically, it believed it could gain the support of the international
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community for its “legitimate” right to represent China. The plan failed. After
the 1960 and 1964 Olympics, international sporting organizations leaned to-
wards referring to Taiwan as “Taiwan,” but the KMT government adamantly
refused to accept this title and continued to assert its right to represent China,
resulting in diplomatic setbacks and the imposition of the title “Chinese Taipei,”
which allowed Taiwanese athletes to participate in international competitions
but did nothing to resolve the issue of Taiwanese national identity in the polit-
ical, social and sporting realms.
There was little explicit opposition in Taiwan to the use of the name “Re-
public of China” under the KMT’s martial law, but outside of Taiwan, specifi-
cally within the sporting arena, it was another matter. The KMT had attempted
to solidify Taiwanese identity internally using junior baseball. In 1969, Taiwan
sent junior players to the USA to compete for the first time in the William Porter
Cup. When the ROC national anthem was played, an ABC close-up showed an
advocate for Taiwanese independence holding a poster that read “It is a Tai-
wanese team not the Chinese team!” At the time, representatives from the US
headquarters of the Taiwan Independent League were handing out flyers to jun-
ior baseball fans, stating, “Come cheer for Taiwan’s junior baseball league” and
“Taiwan (Formosa) does not have freedom nor does it belong to China…The
Taiwanese are passionate about the baseball, but Taiwan’s mainlanders are not”
(Morris 2007). This illustrated the close relationship between baseball and the
construction of Taiwanese national identities (Yu and Bairner 2008). Sport had
made it possible for the legitimacy of the KMT regime to be challenged by the
Taiwanese abroad. 
The Olympic experiences of two well-known Taiwanese athletes, Yang
Chuan-Kwang and Chi Cheng, also shed some light on the relationship between
sport and national identity during this period. Yang Chuan-Kwang won a silver
medal in the decathlon at the Rome Olympics in 1960, earning him the nick-
name “Iron Man of Asia.”  Chi Cheng, subsequently nicknamed “Leaping An-
telope,” won a bronze medal in the women’s 80m hurdles in 1968. These were
the first two Asians to achieve such results, and also the first Chinese athletes
to be accorded respect by the international sporting community. But their mo-
ment of glory was not to last. In 1976, the Taiwanese and the Chinese teams
both tried to enter Canada as the sole representatives of China at the 1976
Olympics. Following discussions about Taiwan’s participation, as described
above, prior to the opening ceremonies the then Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre
Elliott Trudeau, refused to issue entry visas to the ROC delegation because of
the continuing “two Chinas” issue, thus leaving the delegation trapped on the
border between the USA and Canada. This was especially unfortunate because,
as early as the 1968 Mexico Olympics, Hsu Heng of the Taiwan Olympic Com-
mittee had succeeded in getting the IOC to accept the name of the “Republic of
China Olympic Committee” for Taiwan and its athletes. Yet at the Montreal
Olympics, eight years later, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau demanded that
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the ROC delegation use the name of “Taiwan” in order to gain entry and par-
ticipate in the Games. Not surprisingly, this prompted a strong protest from Tai-
wan. In an effort not to sacrifice the opportunity for athletes to participate, the
ROC Olympic Committee summoned their two world-class athletes, Yang
Chuan-Kwang and Chi Cheng, in the hope that their celebrity status might elicit
compassion and support from the international community and thereby facilitate
entry to Canada for the whole ROC delegation (Tsai Hsin-yi 2002; Kai Lu
2000). 
Countering the attempted illicit entry into Montreal, Trudeau issued a
blockade order against the Taiwan Olympic delegation. Thus, when Yang
Chuan-Kwang and Chi Cheng flew into Montreal international airport they
found it difficult just to walk, as they were surrounded by a large international
press contingent and were only able to check into the Olympic village with a
Canadian police force escort. They had undeniably attracted the attention and
support of the international news media, causing the IOC to call an emergency
meeting at which it was determined that the ROC Olympic delegation would
participate in the Games under the name of “Taiwan.” But neither the Taiwanese
flag nor the Taiwanese national anthem would be changed. In response, the Chi-
nese Olympic Committee commissioner in Montreal, Shen Jia-ming, reported
to the Education Minister Chiang Yen-shih and after consultation with Execu-
tive Yuan spokesman, Chiang Ching-kuo, tried to obtain an Olympic withdrawal
order in protest to the “Taiwan” name change. 
At the Nagoya conference in 1979, Yang Chuan-Kwang and Chi Cheng
said of that tumultuous time, “To athletes, the most important thing is to be able
to join the competition, and the issues of national flag, anthem and name are
not important to them.” It was a reflection of the times that the IOC insisted
that Taiwan participate in the Games under the name of “Taiwan,” whereas the
“Republic of China,” then under KMT rule, could only insist upon the name of
the “Republic of China.” The indifference of these Taiwanese athletes and their
verdict in 1979 are even more compelling given that Taiwan accepted the name
of  “Chinese Taipei” in 1981, after many international disputes over changing
the name from “Chinese Taipei” to “China Taipei,” for which in fact, Chi Cheng
had negotiated and protested. 
By 2001, individuals such as Chi Cheng and Yang Chuan-Kwang, who had
experienced Olympic wrangling and Chinese oppression, were rallying support
for a cross-strait long-distance run in support of Beijing’s petition to host the
Olympic Games. When the Olympic torch was unable to pass through Taiwan,
Chi Cheng stated straightforwardly that this was a shame, “after all it was rare
for the Olympics to be this close to Taiwan.” When she took part in the
Olympics for the first time at the age of 16, she had witnessed the exchange
between competitors and the formation of friendships and that is what she re-
membered when she thought of the Games; to her, the Olympic Spirit meant
Peace and Freedom (Yang Mong-yu, BBC Chinese website, 22 November,
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2007). From the experiences of these two athletes, we can see both benign feel-
ings towards the Olympics, but also helplessness in the face of international
sport politics.
The Olympic torch is intended to symbolize peace, unity, progress, mutual
respect and accommodation. The Chinese regime used it (and their bid to host
the 2008 Olympics) to integrate into the international community, albeit with
the potentially ominous ambition of pursuing the dream of a harmonious soci-
ety. Conversely, the international community thought that the PRC would soften
its existing image in order to win the bid to host the Olympics successfully (Tsai
Hsin-yi 2002; Chen Hui-ying 2007; Tsai Ming-yen 2007; Yeh Wei-jun 2004).
Despite their proclaimed intent to take the Olympic torch on a “Harmonious
journey,” the Chinese authorities planned a route that raised questions about
their political motives in relation to Taiwan (Huang Shu-rong 2007). The major
point of contention was that the route for the Olympic torch announced on 26
April 2007, included Taiwan as part of the domestic leg, indicating Taiwan to
be a local government under the jurisdiction of the PRC. Additionally, the COC
demanded that no national flag, national emblem, or national anthem represent-
ing Taiwan should appear on the torch relay route, which triggered great public
resentment in Taiwan. The IOC has historically emphasized a separation of the
Games themselves and the policies of individual governments for fear of al-
lowing nation-state politics to impede international sporting exchanges. The
fact remains, however, that it has proved very difficult, if not impossible, to
protect the Olympics from political undertones (Tsai Hsin-yi 2002; Chen Hui-
ying 2007; Tsai Ming-yen 2007). Certainly the torch relay and its repercussions
reinvigorated discussions about Taiwan’s identity.
The simple announcement of the logistics of the Olympic torch relay
touched a raw nerve for many Taiwanese people and inevitably discussions on
the related subjects of Taiwan’s sovereignty and the significance of the China
connection ensued. As revealed in a poll conducted by Taiwan’s Executive Yuan
Mainland Affairs Council, over 60% of the respondents expressed the view that
to allow the torch to pass through Taiwan would diminish its claim to sover-
eignty, and for that reason, Taiwan should not accept such an arrangement (Tsai
Ming-yen 2007). When asked about the torch passing through Taiwan during
the first stage of the PRC’s domestic route, with the stipulation that Taiwan be
referred to as “Taipei, China,” nearly 65% of the respondents said this was un-
acceptable, and only 16.3% of the respondents said they would accept Taiwan
being the first stop on China’s domestic torch route. As to whether the issue of
the torch passing through Taiwan should be negotiated, those in agreement and
those opposed accounted for 42.7% and 45.7% respectively. These figures re-
veal that over a half of the respondents had doubts about Beijing’s goodwill,
although a substantial minority wanted continued negotiations with Beijing in
order to allow the Olympic torch to be taken successfully via Taiwan (Huang
Shu-rong 2007). 
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According to this poll, the concept of Taiwan as a political entity had gar-
nered increasing support following political change in the 1980s and 1990s.
This reflects the complex history of Taiwan and how national consciousness
emerged as an issue after martial law was lifted in 1980s (Sun, Yu-ping, 2005).
Chinese identity, which was presumed to be monolithic in the past, fractured
into Taiwanese and other identities. Additionally, Taiwan’s “baseball national-
ism” reached a new milestone on 30 April 2005, when Wang Chien-ming en-
tered Major League Baseball and initiated the so-called “Taiwang era.” Chen
Tze-shuan (2005) argues that the modernization of Taiwan’s baseball not only
conforms to Tomlinson’s (1985) understanding of national modernization
processes but the “Taiwang” baseball identity was a by-product of global cap-
italism, thereby differing from the feelings associated with junior baseball suc-
cesses in the 1970s which were dictated solely by nationalism (Chen, 2005). 
The term “Taiwang” consisted of a blending of the complex themes of na-
tional emotion, hero worship and commercialized sport within an identity ma-
trix. Furthermore, the very essence of this matrix can be traced to the media
and thus related not only to different levels of individual identity, but also helped
to construct a national identity within the context of the global mediatization
of Wang Chien-ming’s games. In terms of nationalism, the pride of Taiwan,
Wang Chien-ming helped to solidify the Taiwanese sense of pride about their
country and validated their feeling of possessing a distinct identity. In terms of
global capitalism, Wang Chien-ming became more than a product; he has (per-
sonally) introduced Major League Baseball into the Taiwanese and other Asian
markets. As for internationalism, Wang Chien-ming and other international ath-
letes who are able to thrive in the US and get the widespread support from
American and global fans, create a commonality across borders that is con-
ducive to the process of friendship and reconciliation among countries of the
world. Wang Chien-ming is not simply an example of an Asian athlete making
it in the “major league” world of sport. In relation to nationalism, global capi-
talism and internationalism, his career has reflected and contributed to the evo-
lution of Taiwanese identity. It was as though Wang Chien-ming was not just
pitching for himself or for the Yankees – he was pitching for all of Taiwan! This
phenomenon highlights a collective awareness that is a response to Taiwan’s
extended international isolation and alienation, but also points to a collective
optimism that Wang Chien-ming can enhance Taiwan’s international visibility. 
The complexity and uniqueness of the Taiwanese engagement with the
issue of national identity that have led Taiwan to be described as “a laboratory
of identities” (Corcuff 2002: xxiii) and, more metaphorically, “the orphan of
Asia” (Wu 2005), are the consequence of changing external opposition and con-
comitant internal dialogue and resistance. National identity, whether in the po-
litical, social or sporting fields, has evolved in the last decade. A once dominant
Republic of China identity has increasingly been challenged by a Taiwanese
identity. Particularly after the political reshuffle of 2000, Taiwanese identity be-
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came a major political issue. Meanwhile sport was not only a tool for the pro-
motion of Taiwanese identity but was also used as evidence of the emergence
of that identity. For example, at the 2004 Olympics, Taiwan finally captured
two gold medals in taekwondo, prompting a celebration on the return of the
medallists reminiscent of national spectacles not seen for many years in the
country. At the same time, the “May 11 Taiwan Sport Renaming Campaign”
launched a national campaign which sought to urge the people and the media
to correct their old habits and rename the “Republic of China team” (Zhong
hwa dui) the “Taiwan team,” and the “Mainland Chinese team” the “China
team” (Zhong guo dui). This campaign encouraged the general public to correct
the media or anyone else who “erroneously” referred to the Taiwanese team as
the Chinese team (Huang Shu-Fang, 2004).
Despite such efforts, the official representative team from Taiwan has con-
tinued to be referred to as “Chinese Taipei” in international sporting events. Al-
though this is contrary to popular sentiment in Taiwan, and challenges the
popular understanding of Taiwanese identity, this has not dampened Taiwan’s
interest in participating in international sports. Furthermore, the growth of “Tai-
wanese identity” has been nurtured by continuing international suppression.
For example, the PRC has frequently exerted pressure on host countries to
change the name of Taiwan’s team from the internationally agreed “Chinese
Taipei” to “China Taipei.” Similar influence is even exerted in the academic
world of sports studies. Thus, during the 2004 Pre-Olympic Congress held in
Thessaloniki, Greece, all references to Taiwan were replaced by the term “Chi-
nese Taipei” regardless of whether the reference was to a location, school name
or even a thesis title appearing in the congressional proceedings. Such behaviour
does not serve to reinforce Chinese identity in Taiwan. Rather, it tends to in-
crease Taiwanese consciousness among scholars. In such circumstances, the
formation of such a consciousness has become a key issue in the relationship
between sport, national identity and Taiwan’s unfolding Olympic history.
Conclusion: Sport, national identity 
and Taiwan’s Olympic history
Discussions of nationality tend to presuppose that if a nation possesses sov-
ereignty its members should have the freedom to handle their own affairs. Either
explicit or implicit is the belief that citizens share a common identity (Wang
Tze-hong 1999). The Japanese colonial government’s internal rule sought to
implement a modernization movement whereby Taiwanese athletes first par-
ticipated in the Olympics. The KMT Republic government’s internal rule em-
phasized community and national identity, to which the achievements of Chi
Cheng and Yang Chuan-Kwang contributed greatly. Because international sport-
ing competitions continued to be nation-centered and individual athletes had to
be attached to a country’s sporting organization in order to participate in the
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Olympics, an athlete’s identity was necessarily tied to the nation, and con-
versely, the nation’s identity was linked to that athlete and his/her successes
and failures. 
Identity depends, in part, on recognition by others, or sometimes on the
absence of such recognition, but it can also result from others’ misrecognition.
Because of the desire for recognition and thus the elimination of misrecognition,
a country’s legitimacy in the international sporting domain becomes supremely
important. The Olympic movement’s emphasis on national symbolism is such
that the struggle for formal Olympic membership has become a political bat-
tlefield based on the belief that Olympic acceptance can, or even will, result in
wider political recognition. Thus, the disputes between Taiwan and China re-
garding representation in the Olympics (over the one China principle and the
“two Chinas” issue) have clearly been about more than just sport. At its very
core the argument has been a fundamental disagreement about Taiwan’s place
in the world with Taiwan asserting independence, and China seeking to retain
control over a territory believed to be its own. Taiwan has been subjected to
Spanish, Dutch and Japanese colonial rules, successively over the past five cen-
turies, and since the KMT government decamped to Taiwan in 1949, the dispute
over identity questions has continued. However, because over many years no
consensus has been reached through internal dialogue on Taiwanese identity,
building a Taiwanese identity, externally – i.e. in terms of how others view Tai-
wan — became increasingly important. 
In the identity formation process, as Cohen (1985) argues, the position of
the other party is indispensable. Constructing “the other” is complex because
the boundaries between ourselves and others are relative and interactive (Keller
2003). Furthermore, Castells (1997) emphasizes that building a social identity
tends to be rooted in a power relationship. Drawing upon his analysis, sporting
culture can be categorized in three ways in relation to the development of na-
tional identity. 
First, there is legitimized national identity (or nationality). Sporting organ-
izations are shaped by a dominant system. This form of national identity is
linked to both civil society and the state. When the Japanese controlled a ma-
jority of Taiwan’s sporting organizations, the latter were intended to promote
an identity supportive of their rule. The same point can be made in relation to
the KMT and later, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Regardless of who
has been in power, Taiwan’s legitimacy in international sporting organizations
has been deeply affected by the Chinese government’s declaration that “the
PRC is the sole legal Chinese government, and Taiwan remains part of China”
(Tsai Hsin-yi 2002).
Second, there is a resistant national identity. This is a response to suppres-
sion or discrimination by the politically dominant. Scheff (1994: 281) empha-
sizes that “Nationalism built on ethnic groups tends to create a sense of
distinction because of alienated perceptions and political, economic or social
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inequality.” Thus, having experienced oppression at international sporting
events, at the hands of various sporting organizations and international sporting
symposia, Taiwan has been forced to substitute “Chinese Taipei” or “Taipei,
China” for either “Republic of China” or “Taiwan.” This has prompted a ma-
jority of Taiwanese people to oppose “Chinese identity” and seek alternatives.
Finally, there is projected national identity. Here the functionaries of sport-
ing society, in their search for cultural capital, have constructed a new national
identity by which to redefine the position of their sporting organizations and
have sought to create a completely new sports structure. Simply put, this ex-
pression of national identity becomes the main feature of sporting culture. In
the recent decade, as Taiwan’s sporting trajectory has gathered momentum, a
projected national identity has begun to emerge. 
Each of these three forms of national identity is relevant to Taiwan’s
Olympic history. In Taiwan’s history, the interactive influence of national iden-
tity, global capitalism and nationalism has concurrently spawned a new identity
matrix that links Taiwan with international identities yet does not lose sight of
Taiwanese individuality. To date, the emergent Taiwanese consciousness can
best be understood by reference to concepts such as “civic nationalism” (Ed-
mondson 2002) or “pragmatic nationalism” (Wu 2002). How it will develop is
difficult, if not impossible, to predict. What is certain, however, as this chapter
has demonstrated, is that sport will continue to play a significant role in the un-
folding process.
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The Beijing Olympics and 
Expressions of National Identity 
in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong
Patrick W.C. LAU, Michael H.S. LAM, 
and Beeto W.C. LEUNG
The Olympic Games are sports mega-events of brief duration, but they can gen-
erate strong feelings of national pride that may have long term consequences
for the host city, its residents, and the national population (Waitt 2001, Gordon
2001, Roche 1994). Mewett (1999) argued that Olympic Games are useful for
glorifying and uplifting the nation-state because they provide special occasions
for symbols that invoke a nationalist meta-discourse. The Olympic Charter (IOC
2004) proclaims that the Games are not contested between nations, but the fact
that all athletes must be trained and selected by national federations undermines
this. Athletes must wear uniforms that identify the nation they represent, and
on the victory medal stand, the national flags of the three medalists are raised
and the gold medalist’s national anthem is played. In these and other ways, the
IOC recognizes and promotes national identity (Guttmann 2002). 
This nationalism was evident even in the earliest of the modern Olympics,
in Athens in 1896, a time when nationalism is sweeping through Europe. Amer-
icans were not immune; local Athenians were taken aback by chants for Amer-
ican athletes of “USA, USA, USA” by the few fellow countrymen who came
to watch, dressed in patriotic colors and waving the American flag (Guttmann
2002; also Thorne and Clarke 1989, Ritchie and Smith 1991). It was therefore
quite predictable that the politics of sports would be conspicuously connected
with the politics of national identities and international relations in the crucible
of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 (Xu 2006).
Ikhioya (1998) showed that national identity connotes social immersion,
identification, involvement, and loyalty. It is a state of patriotic affiliation and
commitment to one’s nation. He further elaborated that national identity as a
social phenomenon includes citizens’ pride and trust in their country and a com-
mitment and consciousness of that national entity. Similarly, Lee, Chan and So
(2004) showed that national identity is more than merely positive feelings or
the recognition of frequent social interactions. It involves imagining oneself
belonging to a national community, an emotional attachment to this national
community, and an understanding of the rights and duties of being a nation’s
citizen. The Olympic Games were recognized by Ikhioya (1998) as a stage to
enhance such awareness and orientation. Through the Games, spectators be-
come strongly attached to the Games athletes of their nation, identifying psy-
chologically with the athletes as spectators at the Games or television viewers
u9
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at home. The media have the role of ensuring that the products of national iden-
tity are produced on practical terms with emotional intensity. Furthermore, the
reliability of program schedules and actual delivery is critical, and governments
become the agencies to ensure the fluency of the information flow. 
Previous studies have documented ways in which the Olympic Games and
sports are associated with national identity. Keech, Fox and Bramham (2001)
showed that sport is an instrument of national unity, consolidating cultural na-
tionalism and national consciousness and contributing to the search for cultural
identity. Gill (2005) also found that national identity is analyzed specifically as
a performance, and sport is the context in which this performance takes place.
Brownell (2005) compared the relationship of sports to nationalism in the US
and China over the last century. She found that the sports of both the US and
China are closely related to the construction of national identity. The Chinese
people hoped that the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games would mark China’s emer-
gence as a world power. In North America, ice hockey is crucial to the mainte-
nance of Canadian identity (Bairner 2001). In Brazil, Labriola and Negreiros
(1998) showed that sports competition is not simply a competition but a system
of demonstrating Brazilian national character through soccer. Garland (2004),
for example, pointed to a change in tabloid press reporting during the 2002
World Cup, away from the invocation of the “hooligan” stereotype and towards
the expression of “a belief that English success on the football field has led to
a growth, or even a rebirth, of the idea of Englishness and English patriotism.”
International sporting contests are seen as a form of ritualized war, serving as
symbolic representation of the inter-state competition (Elias 1996). The impor-
tance of sport in developing national identity in Australia, Canada and the USSR
is also outlined by Caldwell (1983).
Hong Kong and Taiwan separated from Mainland China through historical
treaties and civil war and have followed very different social, political and eco-
nomical trajectories over the last century. Hong Kong experienced de-nation-
alization in the decades after the Second World War. However, it has been
undergoing a re-nationalization after the return of sovereignty from the United
Kingdom to China in 1997. Throughout this historical period, Hong Kong peo-
ple were constantly readjusting and negotiating their identities (Lee, Chan &
So 2004). People in Hong Kong started to face the reality of appropriating a
new dual Hong Kong-China identity, and hence there is a clear trend of increas-
ing identification with Hong Kong as well as the Chinese authorities (Fung
2004). According to the recent studies of Lau and Lam (2007) and Lau, Lam
and Leung (2008a, 2008b), Hong Kong children demonstrated a positive rela-
tionship with the hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and reflected its bene-
ficial impact for building their national identity. Hong Kong children may
increase their national identity elements such as Chinese citizenship, patriotism,
sense of belonging, the time planned to spend on Beijing Olympics, the appre-
ciation of Chinese culture, positive feelings, happiness, excitement and a pride
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in China. In the Taiwan context, its unique history after 1949 and the political
conflict between the native Taiwanese and those who migrated from the Main-
land (Lin 2003) have provoked a very public and continuing historical and cul-
tural discussion on nationality. The main theme of this research has been
citizens’ identification as Chinese, Taiwanese or both (Chu and Lin 1998). Very
few studies have investigated the association between Olympics and national
identity in the Chinese populations of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Given
the general evidence of associations between national identity and the Olympics
and other sports mega-events, we felt it important to investigate the impact of
hosting the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing on the national identities of these
populations. 
We began with the general question of whether and how sport identity (SI)
or physical activity (PA) contributed to Chinese national identity (NI). We sur-
veyed Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan secondary students during the
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games and examined the results in terms of gender, age,
birth and residence, as well as sport identity and physical activity level. We be-
lieve the findings have important implications for future government policies
in sports education.
METHODS
The survey was conducted with 927 students from six secondary schools
in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The ages of the participants
ranged from 12-17 years. Males numbered 526 (52%) and females totaled 486
(48%). Participants were asked to sign consent letters, which explained the re-
search aims and procedures prior to the study. They were also reminded that
their participation in the study was voluntary and that they could withdraw at
any time without penalty.
A written ten-item questionnaire was used as survey instrument, based on
Ikhioya (1998) and the enthusiasm multi-item scale (Waitt 2001). Sample ques-
tions posed for degree of agreement included the following: 
• “I think the 2008 Olympics can bring a positive impact for building the na-
tional identity when knowing Beijing will host the 2008 Games.”
• “My awareness of my China motherland is aroused when knowing Beijing
will host the 2008 Olympic Games.”
• “I am proud to be a Chinese when knowing Beijing will host the 2008 Olympic
Games.”
Using principal axis factoring analysis, only one factor was extracted and
all the items were above the factor loading standard (.40). National identity was
measured by the National Identity Scale (Lau & Lam 2007). 
The Athletic Identity Measurement Scale (AIMS) (Brewer et al 1993) was
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employed to measure the sport identity of children, that is, the degree to which
a youth identifies himself/herself as a sports person. The AIMS is designed to
measure both the exclusivity and strength of identification with the sport role.
The reliability alpha of AIMS is between .87 and .93 from two studies (Brewer
et al 1993). The AIMS also consisted of 10 items. Each of the items is a simple
declarative statement that can be answered on a 5-point Likert scale. Sample
items from the scale include “I consider myself an athlete” and “I spend more
time thinking about sports than anything else.”
The Physical Activity Questionnaire for Children (PAQ-C) was designed
to measure school-aged children’s general levels of physical activity participa-
tion. It is a self-administered recall measure that is easy for children to under-
stand (Lau, Yu, Lee, So, & Sung 2004b). It includes nine questions about the
level of sport involvement during the last seven days. Significant and satisfac-
tory convergent validity was obtained through the correlations with the moder-
ate to vigorous sport activities measure (Simons-Morton et al 1990) and an
electronic motion sensor (Caltrac). The items asked children about the type and
frequency of their sports involvement in school, during lunch, in the evening,
and during other spare times. Sample items from the scale are “Sports in your
spare time: Have you done any of the following activities in the past seven days
(last week)?” and “Mark how often you did sports (like playing ball games,
doing dance, swimming, etc) for each day last week”. 
A translation-back-translation method was employed to clarify the wording
and linguistics of the English version questionnaire. The Chinese version was
then developed and proof-read by school teachers and primary school students
to ensure the accuracy of the meaning and understanding of the translation. The
questionnaires were administered to the children in a group setting after school
hours. Students took approximately 25 minutes to complete the questionnaires. 
Descriptive statistics for all key variables were calculated. Partial Pearson
product moment correlations were used to examine the associations between
students’ national identity, sport identity and physical activity level, controlled
for demographic variables. Independent samples t-tests and One-way ANOVA
were conducted to compare the differences of gender, age, birth and residential
places, sport identity as well as physical activity level on national identity. Mul-
tiple regression analyses were conducted to investigate the role of sport identity
and physical activity level on the formation of national identity of Chinese sec-
ondary students.
Survey results
The reliability of the 3 scales was all satisfactory (National Identity Scale:
α=0.97; AIMS: α=0.90; PAQ-C: α=0.89). Descriptive statistics for the whole
and subgroups of the sample were presented in Table 1. 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare the differences be-
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tween the subgroups of age and gender. Results indicated that participants in
Age Group 1 (junior secondary students) had significantly higher NI, SI and
PA level than Age Group 2 (senior secondary students), with t(1015) = 3.24,
p< .01; t(981) = 2.51, p< .05 and t(859) = 7.97, p< .01 respectively. Moreover,
girls were found to have significantly higher NI than boys t(1010) = -2.72, p>
.01). On the other hand, boys were found to have significantly higher SI and
PA level than girls (t(974) = 7.10, p< .01 and t(857) = 5.31, p< .01) (refer to
Table 1 for details).
Since the sample sizes of the different birth-residential place groups were
not equal and heterogeneity of variance was observed among the groups in the
three key variables, the Brown-Forsythe one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was used (Brown & Forsythe, 1974). Results revealed that there was
a significant main effect of birth-residential place on all key variables—national
identity, F(3, 507) = 408.86, p <.001; sport identity, F(3, 501) = 22.74, p <.001
and physical activity level, F(3, 745) = 102.67, p <.001. The results were con-
sistent with those found by standard one-way ANOVA (assuming equal group
sizes and homogeneity of variance). Post hoc comparisons on both NI and PA
level, using the Games and Howell procedures (Games and Howell 1976) to
adjust for the unequal group sizes and heterogeneity of variance, revealed that
all comparisons among the four subgroups were significant. That is, the “China”
(CN) group has significantly higher NI than all the other three groups; the
“China-HK” (CN-HK) group had significantly higher NI than the two other
groups and in turn, the “Hong Kong” (HK) group had significant higher NI than
the “Taiwan” (TW) group respectively. On the other hand, the CN group has
significantly higher PA level than all the other three groups; the TW group had
significantly higher PA level than the two other groups and in turn, the HK
group had significant higher PA level than the CN-HK respectively. Finally,
post hoc comparisons on sport identity between the four different subgroups
revealed that the CN group has higher sport identity than the other three groups
and the CN-HK group has significantly higher sport identity than the other two
groups; and the HK and TW group did not differ from each other in their sport
identity (refer to Table 1 for details). 
Partial correlation analysis, controlled for age, gender and birth-residential
place, was conducted to examine the relationship between NI, SI and PA level.
Results revealed that NI was significantly and weakly correlated with SI (r=.28,
p<.01) and moderately with PA level (r=.42, p<.01) respectively. Consistent
with previous literature, SI was also found to be significantly correlated with
PA level (r=.56, p<.01). 
A sequential multiple regression analysis was thus conducted to test the
relative significant contributions of different variables to the target variable—
NI. Demographic variables including age, gender and birth-residential place
were entered into the first step. Since birth-residential place variable (containing
four subgroups) was a categorical variable, three dummy variables were created
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in order to conduct the regression analysis. The CN group was adopted as the
reference group in the analysis. Only gender and birth-residential place were
found to be significant predictors of NI (F (5, 1198) = 221.5; p< .001; adjusted
R2= 47.8%). Sport identity and PA level were then entered into the model in
the second step. Both SI and PA level were found to be significant predictors
of NI (F (7, 1196) = 189.8; p< .001; adjusted R2= 52.3%; refer to Table 3 for
details).
Another sequential multiple regression analysis was conducted, using only
students from HK (“HK” group) as the sample. Similarly, age and gender were
entered into the first step. Only gender was found to be a significant predictor
of NI (F (2, 391) = 1.81; p> .05; adjusted R2=.01%) in the first step. Sport iden-
tity and PA level were entered into the model in the second step. Contrary to
the result using the whole sample, only PA level was found to be significant
predictor of NI (F (4, 389) = 4.96; p< .001; adjusted R2= 3.9%). That is, about
3.9% unique variance was accounted for by PA level.
National identity among the three regions
Based upon the ANOVA results, “China-China” group had the highest na-
tional identity, followed by the “China-HK” and the “HK-HK” group. And the
lowest was the “TW-TW” group. The differences of Chinese national identity
among Mainland China (M = 4.61), China-Hong Kong (M=3.95), Hong Kong-
Hong Kong (M = 3.87), and Taiwan (M = 2.84) secondary students during the
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games were distinct according to their mean values.
Based upon the previous findings between Olympic Games and national identity
(Ritchie & Smith 1991; Gordon 2001 and Gill 2005), the low politics of sports
and Olympics have conspicuously been recognized as an instrument of hege-
monic power to generate patriotic feelings and national pride, especially for the
residents of the host country. That was the main reason that the 1990 Asian
Games hosted in Beijing evoked positive nationalism among the majority of
Chinese people (Brownell 1995). Consequently, the Mainland Chinese naturally
demonstrated the strongest national identity among Hong Kong and Taiwan
students when Beijing was granted to host the XXIX Olympics. Li and Su
(2004) also stated that, in the process of new nation building, the link between
sports and nationalism has persisted even until today. This notion is further sup-
ported by the regression analysis results that birth and residential place con-
tributed the most in national identity development (Lau, Lam & Leung 2008a
and 2008b).
Since there is no previous study investigating and comparing the three re-
gions on Chinese national identity during the Olympic Games, this finding may
serve as baseline data. Although there are no previous references for comparison
during the Games, the national identity of Hong Kong students during the
Games coincided with or even intensified compared to the recent studies of Lau
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and Lam (2007) and Lau, Lam and Leung (2008a and 2008b) that Hong Kong
children demonstrated a positive relationship before the hosting of the 2008
Beijing Olympics and reflected the positive impact for building their national
identity. Hok Yau Club (2005) and Youth Online Association (2006) had con-
ducted surveys on Hong Kong adolescents’ Chinese identity after China re-
sumed Hong Kong’s sovereignty in 1997. The results of Hok Yau Club indicated
that Hong Kong adolescents have been demonstrating greater Chinese national
identity (75%), stronger patriotism for China (60%), and this trend is more dom-
inant and obvious when compared to previous two-year survey results. Youth
Online Association also demonstrated 52% of respondents who described them-
selves as Chinese instead of Hong Kongese and 82% of them agreed that “as
Chinese, they are proud to contribute in the Beijing Olympic Games. ” These
figures can be a reference on the increase of Hong Kong adolescents’ Chinese
national identity after 1997. In addition, both studies suggested that the mega-
sports event victories of China (80%) and the hosting of Olympic Games in
China (65%) would significantly enhance the Chinese national identity among
Hong Kong adolescents. Likewise, Fung (2004) deemed that a new dual Hong
Kong-China national identity has emerged after 1997 and there is no conflict,
but an even stronger trend in the development of this unique identity in Hong
Kong. 
Because they are not under the “One Country, Two Systems” and the sov-
ereignty of the PRC Government, the much lower Chinese national identity
demonstrated by Taiwanese students is foreseeable and understandable. The
“greater China mentality” is highly contested in contemporary Taiwanese so-
ciety and it is squarely resisted by the pro-independence politicians. Over the
past 15 years, Taiwan has witnessed fast-track democratization and indigeniza-
tion that gave rise to a stronger sense of Taiwanese identity as opposed to Chi-
nese identity (Xu 2006).  However, these circumstances changed somewhat
when the conservative and anti-communist Kuomintang (KMT) won over the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which favors a new Taiwanese nation
building. Concerning the possibility of a new national identity that combined
Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity, Xu (2006) believed that the Beijing
Olympics could play a constructive role. 
The contributions of national identity 
Correlation results demonstrated significant relationships between sport
identity, PA level, and national identity in all students. This finding suggested
that the higher the sport identity and PA level, the greater would be students’
national identity. In the regression analysis, birth-residential place was found
to be the most significant predictor of national identity. The sport identity con-
tributed weakly to national identity. This finding was congruent with the previ-
ous studies in which sports acted as an important arena for the development of
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national identity (Bairner 2001; Jarvie 2007; Tuck 2003 and Lau, Lam and
Leung 2008a and 2008b). To explain this result, it is necessary to understand
more about sport identity. Sport identity is defined as the degree of strength and
exclusivity to which an individual identifies with the athlete’s role (Brewer, Van
Raalte and Linder 1993). The relationship between sport identity and sport in-
tention, involvement and commitment has long been supported by Theodorakis
(1994), Anderson and Cychosz (1995), and Lau, Fox and Cheung (2006). 
Based upon these previous positive associations between sport identity and
national identity, the present study revealed that higher sport identity led to
greater sport participation and commitment. This finding coincided with the
findings of Todd (1987) that members of the Ulster British who represented
Ireland in sports competitions were more aware of an Irish identity. Ruane and
Todd (1996) also argued that sport identity can be a positive force in promoting
British identity, Northern Irish identity and Ulster or Irish Protestant identity.
Though there were no related studies investigating the relationship between na-
tional identity and sport identity during the Olympic Games in Asia, we can
find support from the example of Liu Xiang, a Mainland China athlete, who
watched the raising of his national flag with tears after he won China’s first
track and field gold medal of China at the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics. It
reminds us of the broader argument of Smith and Porter (2004) that sporting
identities, such as allegiances to national sports teams, often invoke a patriotic
nationalism.
Group differences among constructs
Overall, younger students had significantly higher scores in national iden-
tity than older students, which is a finding consistent with previous studies con-
ducted in Hong Kong. According to Hok You Club (2005) and Lau and Lam
(2007), younger children demonstrated stronger national identity than older
children because of their less critical thinking and weaker political sensitivity
to China. In the present study, the age group was mixed with Chinese and Tai-
wanese students. As a result, the thinking, perception, and sensitivity to Chinese
national identity could be very different. Especially during the years before and
since 1997, when Hong Kong was returned to China, the Hong Kong population
has constantly been reevaluating and readjusting its identity (Lee, Chan and SO
2004). People in Hong Kong started to face the reality of a new dual Hong
Kong-China identity, and hence there is a clear trend of increasing identification
with the Hong Kong as well as the Chinese authorities (Fung 2004). Moreover,
the “Taiwanese identity” and indigenization have rapidly developed since 2000
under the governance of the Democratic Progressive Party. Separation of the
three regions by age groups is recommended for deeper analysis.
With regards to gender differences, our finding that girls reported signifi-
cantly higher national identity was inconsistent with previous studies. We ex-
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pected that national identity would be a fairly neutral concept, implying no gen-
der stereotyping. We also expected that heightened awareness of female rights
in the last decade in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China might balance gender in
notions of national identity. Cases in Japan (Harden 1994), Holland (Verkuyten
1997), and Hong Kong, China and Taiwan before the Beijing Olympic Games
(Lau, Lam, and Leung 2008a and 2008b) were evidence of this. 
Our results may be explained by the heightened emotionality that sur-
rounded Chinese national identity during the Olympic ceremonies, which show-
cased Chinese history, and the sporting events themselves, in which Chinese
athletes performed with unprecedented results. There are those who have argued
that women perceive and express relatively positive emotions, such as happiness
or joy, more so than men (Hochschild 1979 and 1983; Sutton 1991; Lively and
Heise 2004), so women respondents may have registered more positive and
passionate attachment because of this. Another explanation is that in recent
Olympics, there have been more female Chinese athletes than males and Chi-
nese women have won more gold medals than the men in  every Games since
1988 (Dong 2008). In the 2008 Beijing Olympics, more than two-thirds of Chi-
nese medalists were female, and thus, our female survey respondents might be
expressing more intense resonance with these female athletes and medalists.  
Conclusion
In sum, among students from the three regions before the Beijing
Olympics, those from China demonstrated the strongest national identity. “Birth
and residential place” contributed the most to national identity scores, while
sport identity had the weakest connection to national identity and physical ac-
tivity level had a moderate relationship. 
Sport has long been recognized as a causal agent in forming and sustaining
identity (Lau et al. 2006; Weiss 2001). As one of the world’s largest transna-
tional sporting events, the Olympic Games has a deep impact on national iden-
tity (Tomlinson 2006). But precisely what form of sport influences people’s
national identity is still not clear since the concept of sport is vague. It is nec-
essary to pursue further the distinctions between sport and the Olympic Games
as well as the different symbolic forms of sport in order to understand even
more clearly the causal links between sport and national identity.      
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the key variables in whole sample and different subgroups 
Age Gender Birth & Residential Place1,2  Total 















































































Note: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) were presented. 
1 
2Refer to the text for the detailed results of post hoc comparisons 
3Due to missing data, the total sample size for the variable “level of physical activity” is 851. 
*p<.05; **p<.01 
 
CN: born and lives in China; HK: born and lives in Hong Kong; TW: born and lives in Taiwan;  
CN-HK: born in China and has immigrated to and lives in Hong Kong 
Table 2. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for National Identity  
 
Model, Step, and  
Predictor Variable 
 B SE B 95% CI 
    
Constant** 4.361 .190 3.987, 4.735 --- 
Age .004 .017 -.022, .030 .007 


























    
Constant** 2.937 .225 2.495, 3.379 --- 
Age* .027 .013 .002, .053 .047 


























Sports Identity** .103 .028 .048, .157 .087 
.242 .034 .176, .307 .185 
2
2
Note. CI = confidence interval. ; *p < .05, **p < .01 
Step 1  
Step 2  
Level of Physical Activity**  
For the step 1 model, Adjusted R  = 47.8, F(5, 1198) = 221.5, p < .001;  
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National Identity, Olympic Victory,
and Chinese Sportswomen in the
Global Era
Dong Jinxia
Without exaggeration, sport is a mirror in which nations, communities,
men and women now see themselves. The reflection is sometimes
bright, sometimes dark, sometimes distorted, sometimes magnified.
This metaphorical mirror is a source of mass exhilaration and depres-
sion, security and insecurity, pride and humiliation, bonding and alien-
ation. (Mangan 2006)
The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing attracted roughly 10,000 athletes from
204 National Olympic Committees, over 50,000 media personnel, hundreds of
thousands of tourists, and over 4 billion TV viewers worldwide. It conveyed to
all a vivid picture of China and the Chinese people. The successful staging of
the Games and the remarkable achievements of Chinese athletes made the
games “truly exceptional,” as IOC President Jacques Rogge declared at the clos-
ing ceremony. Given that the Olympic Games are grounded in the nation-state
system, they are undoubtedly an effective platform for the assertion of national
identity. 
China’s integration into the Olympic movement is a product of globaliza-
tion, following China’s opening its doors to outsiders in the late 1970s. How-
ever, this rapid globalization has generated much concern about the nature and
strength of national identity. Some worry that globalization poses a threat to
building national identity, while others feel that globalization actually creates
more spaces for the expression of national identity. 
As in the past, Chinese women again captured more medals than the men
at the Beijing Games, continuing to hold up “more than half the sky.” This raises
some fascinating questions about the relationships between national identity,
Olympics, globalism and gender. How has the national identity of China been
constructed through the pursuit of Olympic victories? What roles have Chinese
sportswomen played in boosting China’s new image in the world? What impact
have the Beijing Olympics had on the national identity of China and gender re-
lations? Based on a study of government materials and academic literature on
Chinese sport and on interviews conducted with coaches, athletes and admin-
istrators, this chapter will explore the complicated relationships between na-




National Identity and Olympic Strategy
It is widely accepted that identity is a subjective sense of belonging by
which the members of a group “identify” with one another. National identity is
a collective psychological state, a necessary condition for the political and legal
survival of the nation-state (Bostock and Smith 2001:4, n.1). As an ideological
construction, national identity “needs to be constantly nurtured, reinvented and
maintained” (Cashmere 2002:305). It is formed of “widely circulating dis-
courses of national belonging: representations of what a nation is and is not; of
the nation’s character, its accomplishments, its defining traits, and its historical
trajectory” (Hogan 2009:3). 
Indeed, the modern national identity of China has changed over time. For
centuries prior to 1840, China saw itself as the center of the world because of
its five millennia of civilization and two millennia of centralized rule — with
some justification, since it was a sophisticated, advanced culture when Europe
was backward and America did not even exist as a nation. However, from the
mid-nineteenth century until the end of World War II, China was humiliated by
the Western powers and Japan. The Chinese wished to create a new global iden-
tity, one characterised by prestige, esteem and respect, after the communist
regime came to power in 1949. 
International sport, as a contest between nations in the competitive arena,
obviously plays an important part in creating a collective awareness of national
identity. Given that the Olympic Games are the world’s largest sports event,
Olympic victory was considered talismanic of China’s rising world status. In
1952 when China was still fighting America in the Korean War, forty-one del-
egates, for the first time in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
were sent to the Helsinki Games. However, because of the difficulty of resolv-
ing the “Two Chinas” issue, the IOC invitation arrived so late that only one of
the PRC athletes reached Helsinki in time to compete. In the following years
Chinese athletes achieved records in a number of elite sports, such as the men’s
weight-lifting world record by Chen Jingkai (1956), the women’s high jump
world record by Zheng Fengrong (1957), and the first world championship of
table-tennis by Rong Guotuan (1957), but none of them appeared in the
Olympics. This was because China boycotted the 1956 Olympic Games in Aus-
tralia and withdrew from the IOC and eight other international sports federations
due to the “One China” situation. Thereafter, China was isolated from the major
international sporting organizations for two decades. In the case of China, the
Olympics and politics were closely intertwined.
When China began to open itself to the West in the late 1970s, the IOC re-
opened its door to China, and PRC’s seat in the IOC assembly was restored in
1979. “Go beyond Asia and join the advanced world ranks” was voiced by the
Chinese diving team in 1980, and the slogan soon became the goal of the Chi-
nese sports community. In 1984 the Chinese buried their humiliating “nil”
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record in the Olympic gold medal table by winning fifteen gold medals at the
Los Angeles Games. It was a performance that stirred up an intense patriotism
among the Chinese. At the time, the Chinese who once believed they lived in a
“socialist heaven” during the Maoist era suddenly discovered the backwardness
of their country and the severity of its problems, resulting in distrust within the
Party and in the nation. During a period of low national morale, the Olympic
success gave the Chinese a measure of pride, dignity and confidence. Therefore,
sport (including the Olympics) was regarded by Chinese political and sports
officials as an instrument for the promotion of national pride and identity. 
The Olympic success at Los Angeles fuelled China’s ambition to become
a world sporting power. In 1985 an Olympic strategy was introduced and be-
came the blueprint for elite sports programmes in China. Emphasis was shifted
to Olympic sports, and all available resources in the country were concentrated
on a few key sports in which athletes had the best opportunities to win medals
at the Olympic Games. However, the road to world supremacy was difficult.
At the 1988 Olympic Games, the PRC won only five gold medals; lagging be-
hind even South Korea, it placed eleventh in the final medal totals. This failure
not only disappointed the Chinese but reinforced their determination to become
an Olympic power in the near future. 
National policies and management of sport were adjusted in the early 1990s
in order to secure Olympic success. For example, the timing of the National
Games was changed from the year before the Olympics to the year after; only
Olympic sports and traditional Chinese martial arts were incorporated into the
National Games after 1997. Thereafter, a winning-oriented sports policy dom-
inated the sports community, from athletes to coaches, researchers to adminis-
trators. In 1994, an “Olympic medal-winning plan” was drafted and the next
year a special fund for Olympic related sports facilities, nutrition and sports re-
search was established. Its first-year budget was 65 million yuan (US $8.13
million) and it has increased annually. In total, over 200 researchers have been
involved in 56 Olympic-related projects (Zhang 1996).
To ensure Chinese victories in 2008, the “Plan to Win Glory in the 2008
Olympics” was drafted in 2002, following which each individual sports man-
agement centre drafted a “Project to Implement the Plan to Win Glory in the
2008 Olympics.” The Plan identified a number of sports in which China ex-
pected to excel, including shooting, men’s and women’s judo, men’s and
women’s weight-lifting, classic wrestling, free wrestling, women’s wrestling,
Taekwondo, diving, gymnastics, table-tennis, and badminton.
To maximize eventual Olympic performances in 2008, membership of the
national teams expanded from 1316 to 3222. Some 1700 athletes of 55 national
teams for 28 sports intensely prepared in the lead-up to the Games, though only
less than half could participate (Yang Ming et al.: 2008). Accordingly, sports
budgets soared dramatically. In 2003 the budget for sports development (in-
cluding both elite and mass sport) was over 1.5 billion yuan (over US$181 mil-
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lion), of which over 900 million (US$ 108.7 million) was from governmental
financing. This was more than 45 times that of the 1981 budget and nine times
that in 1991. By 2006 the budget reached over 2.1 billion yuan (US$253.7 mil-
lion), of which 1.26 billion yuan (US$152.2 million) was from governmental
financing.  A special budget for Olympic-related research was also put in place
in 2002 by the State Sports Administration. In its first year the budget of 14
million yuan (US$1.75 million) sponsored 49 projects comprising 144 studies.
There was also another special budget for athletes’ nutrition. Athletes were
treated differently according to performance and event. For example, the key
athletes from long-distance running, race walking, men’s hurdles, and women’s
weight-throwing were subsidized at 50 yuan (about US$ 7.25) each day, the
key athletes from other teams were given 30 yuan (US$ 4.3), and other athletes
received only 10 yuan (US$ 1.4) (Guojia tianjing yundong guanli zhongxin
2007).
With the approach of the Games, final training plans for key athletes were
determined, and competitions were scheduled line with the 2008 Olympic
schedules. It is estimated that the Chinese government spent a total of roughly
800 million yuan (US$ 16.79 million) in each of the lead-up years in elite sport.
China won 51 gold medals and 100 total medals at the Beijing Games, making
the investment in each gold medal less than 15.7 million yuan (US$ 2.29 mil-
lion), and about 8 million yuan (US$ 1.17 million) for a medal (Chen Weisheng
2008). 
In addition, various measures were taken to insure athletes committed to
the Olympics. For example, an athletes’ insurance system was established, and
their incomes rose significantly after the income distribution system for athletes
was reorganized. Athletes, as an independent occupational category in the sports
field, were now listed in the national occupational management system (Renti
Zi 2002). To avoid the possible negative impact of commercial activities, in
2006 the State Sports Administration (SSA) prohibited athletes on national
teams from all commercial work until after the Beijing Games unless they were
approved by the SSA. National interest took precedent over individual liveli-
hood. 
The consequence of this unswerving pursuit of success was the astonishing
achievements of Chinese athletes during the Olympics in the last two decades
(see table 1). At the Beijing Games, China fulfilled its dream as its 51 gold
medals topped the gold medal list for the first time in history.
In summary, Olympic victory has been regarded as the public embodiment
of national strength and becoming an Olympic power has been China’s persist-
ent and ultimate dream. Its patriotic preoccupation with the Olympic Games
derived predominantly from past humiliation. Olympic success has been an in-
strument for building a positive national image, self-esteem and self-confidence
to resume the historic role of “the pre-eminent power in East Asia” and “to
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bring to an end the overlong century of humiliation and subordination to the
West and Japan” (Huntington 1996:229).
Women and the Olympic Victories
Internationally, women have participated in the Olympics in increasing
numbers for the past century and by the 2008 Games, women athletes reached
more than 42 percent and competed in 137 events of all sports with the excep-
tion of boxing and baseball (softball for women). Equal participation of women
in the Games has been one of the IOC’s goals since the 1980s. 
It is noticeable that Chinese women took the lead in reaching the goal.
More than equal, Chinese women were actually higher represented than men
for four successive Olympiads from 1992 to 2004 (see Table 2 and Figure 1).
Though other countries such as Japan also saw more women representatives at
different periods in Olympic history, they did not dominate it as long as Chinese
women did.
Chinese women have achieved much more remarkable performances than
men in the Olympics since 1988 (see Figure 1). In addition to the Olympic
medals, women performed better than men in virtually all the team sports in
the Beijing Games (see Table 3). There were only four nations whose women
won more gold medals than their male counterparts—China, Australia, Holland,
and Japan—and it was China’s women who have won the most gold medals
(see Figure 2). Internationally, Chinese women were also remarkable. Their
27½ medals bested the totals of women from the USA (15), Japan (5), and
Korea (4). It is beyond doubt that women played the major part in fulfilling the
Chinese dream of becoming an Olympic power – symbolic of China’s overall
power.
Women’s prominent performances reinforced the Chinese government role
in building a vigorous national identity. Even as early as the 1980s, the govern-
ment used the five consecutive world titles of the national women’s volleyball
team as a political slogan to spur the modernization of the country. This was
not unlike the role played by the Japanese women’s volleyball team in the early
1960s. After winning the world championships in 1963 and the Olympic Games
in 1964, the team members were lauded as heroines by the Japanese. Indeed,
there was a direct link between the two teams. Following the Tokyo Olympic
Games, coach Daimatsu and seven team members were invited by China’s Pre-
mier Zhou Enlai to teach Chinese athletes “Japanese-style volleyball,”
(Olympian Voices 1964) and this had a lasting impact on Chinese volleyball.
The 1960s generation of players later became the coaches in the 1970s and
1980s when the Chinese female players gained international success. 
There is no doubt the Chinese sportswomen have been a source of national
exhilaration and pride. Women’s athletic accomplishments have strengthened
the cohesion of the Chinese nation and demonstrated a new, confident face of
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China to the world. As a result, many women’s sports have obtained special
treatment. First, the percentage of female athletes at provincial and national
levels has increased over time (Zhang 1996). In 2006, 48.3 percent of the 1,746
national team athletes were women.2 Second, after the mid-1980s, most
women’s teams have adopted the practice of ‘training with male sparring part-
ners’ to ensure and maximize women’s success. Because women are considered
more likely to win honors for the nation, their rigorous training with men is a
state priority. This practice has continued, as confirmed by the 2008 Olympic
wrestling champion Wu Jingyu: “For 11 years he (her training partner) has been
with me in training. I learned to kick other’s heads starting with his” (Liu Chen
2008).
This policy of preferential attention to female athletes was part of the prepa-
ration for the Beijing Games. For instance, in 2001, women were identified to
make breakthroughs in tennis. Promising players were located, trained and then
sent to competitions abroad to gain experience and improve their skills with
the eventual aim of Olympic medals (Hua 2005). As a consequence, the doubles
players Li Ting and Sun Tiantian advanced from 171st in the world in 2002 to
am Olympic gold medal in 2004. The priorities given to women, incidentally,
led to complaints by men that the state ignored them and denied them opportu-
nities to go abroad for competition (Liu Xiaoxing 2006). Clearly, these “realis-
tic” calculations for success in the Olympics, favoring elite women performers
in the interest of national interest, have helped to reconstruct gender relations. 
The sporting success has resulted in increasing and luring material incen-
tives that were virtually nonexistent before the 1980s, a result of sports reforms
in the context of wider socio-economic reforms. It is noticeable that the state
winning bonuses for an Olympic gold medallist have increased dramatically
over time (see Figure 3), from 8,000 yuan (US$ 3484 in 1984 to 350,000 yuan
(US$ 50,725) in 2008. A gold medal bonus was the equivalent of 12 times per
capita GDP in 1984; in 2008, it was 19 times, yet another measure of the official
importance of sport victories.
On the top of victory bonuses, athletes gain other material incentives. The
tennis double players Zheng Jie and Yan Zi, on winning the Australian Open in
2006, for example, were each given 200,000 yuan (US$ 25,000) by their home
province Sichuan, on top of the Open’s AUS $440,000 prize money. In addition,
the Tennis Management Centre awarded each of them 500,000 yuan (US$
65,789) for their world top ten ranking. The 2004 Olympic tennis double cham-
pions Li Ting and Sun Tiantian reaped about 2 million yuan (US$ 250,000)
from national, provincial and home city bonuses as well as commercial fees.3
Rewards have come in other forms. Following the growth of private en-
terprise and sponsorship, commercialization has become pervasive after the
mid-1990s. Not surprisingly, it is the successful and beautiful sportswoman who
is more likely to get endorsement contracts and media attention as well as other
social rewards. Guo Jingjing, the nation’s most famous female sports star,
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earned endorsements with companies like Coca Cola and Nike after Athens
2004, where she won two gold medals. For a time, she was endorsing nine prod-
ucts for an income of 9.5 million yuan. Her popularity was further enhanced
after her personal relationship with Huo Qigang4 (who came from a rich Hong
Kong family) was revealed in 2006. Her success repeat in winning two golds
at the Beijing Games consolidated her status as the highest profile woman in
the media.
However, sport commercialization has its drawbacks. Less popular sports
such as women’s soccer, despite its record of international success in the 1990s,
find it hard to obtain sponsorship and must depend on the limited and fixed
government budget. In 2005 the monthly salaries of the female soccer players
ranged from 2000 and 3000 yuan (US$ 250 – 375). At a time when the average
Chinese monthly income was 1167 yuan (US$ 146), some players earned as
little as 1000 yuan (US$ 125). The less successful and less attractive women
athletes can fall quickly after retirement. Zhou Chunlan, the national weightlift-
ing champion in 1988, ended up as a masseuse in a bath house, with a daily in-
come of 4.5 yuan. When this was reported in the media, it aroused heated debate
on post-athletic jobs and acute concern about athletes’ lives after sport. The co-
existence of government funding and corporate sponsorship has created unex-
pected difficulties for some sports and some athletes.
Celebrated female athletes have received glowing profiles in the Chinese
media and have been frequently applauded by the media as national heroines.
“Chinese Girls,” which featured the famous volleyball players, was adapted
from a book for a TV documentary program. Fu Mingxia, the four-time
Olympic gold medallist at the Olympic Games between 1992 and 2000, was
named the world’s Best Woman Platform Diver by the US magazine Swimming
World. After she retired from diving, she went on to study at prestigious Ts-
inghua University and married the former finance minister of Hong Kong,
Liang Jinsong in 2002. Even today her life, including her marriage and children,
are popular news in the media. 
Women’s success in international sports and their subsequent financial and
social benefits have raised sportswomen in the public’s esteem and promoted
women’s social status both in the sports community and society at large. Ex-
athletes are now promoted to high-level coaching and administrative positions.5
The former table-tennis star Deng Yaping, for example, became a member of
the IOC Athletes Commission and then a member of the Chinese NOC. She
was deputy director of the Beijing Olympic Village and is now deputy general
secretary of the Beijing Municipal Communist Youth League. Since the initial
award for the “Best Ten Athletes of the Year” in 1978, women have dominated
the list for 26 years.
In the twenty-first century women have continued to garner the majority
of Chinese success in international competitions. For example, women ac-
counted for 270 (64.3 percent) of the 420 world titles won by Chinese athletes
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between 2003-06, and they have maintained their dominance in such sports as
diving, badminton, table tennis, shooting, weight lifting, wrestling, gymnastics,
and trampoline. They have made rapid progress in sailing (gold), rowing (gold),
hockey (silver), synchronized swimming (bronze) and group rhythmic gym-
nastics (silver). Of course, some men have had success in past years, such as
the 110m hurdler Liu Xiang, who won the Athens Olympic Games in 2004 and
broke the world record in 2006, and who triumphed in the world championships
in 2007; the men’s gymnastics team won seven gold medals in Beijing 2008,
and men won two golds in boxing. Indeed, the gap between men and women
narrowed significantly in 2008 in terms of Olympic medals and participants,
as shown earlier in Figure 1. 
It is clear from the above description that Chinese women have played a
dominant role in realizing the Chinese Olympic dream and building the national
identity of China. Elite women performers have been favoured in the interest
of Chinese national image. They have benefited greatly from the medal-oriented
policy and achieved astonishing achievements in the Olympics, which in turn
have helped to promote women’s social, economic and political status. National
identity building and gender have been intimately intertwined. The state policy,
women’s achievement in sport and their high profile media coverage together
have impact on the reconstruction of gender relations in the sports community
and society at large. 
The Beijing Games: 
A global event with Chinese characteristics
China has made steady progress in political, economic and social domains
after the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, especially after the
economic reforms were initiated in the late 1970s. However, the nation still
feels it has a score to settle with the West in order to restore its image and re-
establish its self-esteem. 
To win the right to host the Olympics was the first major step. In 1991,
Beijing submitted its application to the IOC for the 2000 Olympic Games. The
former President Jiang Zeming once stated in 1992: “The quest for the
Olympics was to raise national morale and strengthen the cohesion of the Chi-
nese people both on the mainland and overseas” (Xu Qi 1992:36-7). However,
the bid failed in 1993, when Beijing lost to Sydney by two votes. This failure
only fuelled a stronger nationalism. The 1999 American bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 spy plane collision over the South China
Sea6 further fuelled the rising nationalism, which saw the anti-U.S. demonstra-
tions and the resultant harsh criticism of “Western values.”
To stage the Games was considered a chance for Beijing to showcase to
the world a new, vigorous image of an open, modernized, civilized and well-
developed metropolis. It was also intended to restore China’s national grandeur,
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erase past memories of defeat, and ensure present memories of victory. Thus,
Beijing opened a second bid for the Olympic Games in 1999. Virtually all of
China, from the government to its citizens, pledged all-out support for Beijing’s
bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games. Noticeably, Western opposition to the
Chinese bid for reasons of China’s human right records did not frighten the Chi-
nese; rather, it strengthened their determination - at home and abroad - to fight
and win. As a result, the comfortable win by 56 votes over the rival cities ef-
fectively consolidated a sense of national identity in China.
The Chinese made a concerted effort to ensure the Beijing Games were the
best in Olympic history. They invested more than 290 billion yuan (US$ 40 bil-
lion) in modernizing Beijing’s airport and other infrastructure, in building the
required thirty-one competition venues, and in cleaning up municipal pollution
and environmental hazards (Zhonggong Beijing shiwei zuzhi bu 2006). As a re-
sult, the eye-catching stadiums, the state-of-the-art airport terminal, and modern
subway lines, among other things, changed the image of Beijing, which re-
flected “the country’s effort to give shape to an emerging national identity”
(Ouroussoff 2008).
Preparing for the Games, however, was not without its problems. The
budget for the National Stadium known as “Bird’s Nest” was reduced from 4
billion yuan (about US$ 506 million) to 2.267 billion yuan (US$ 287 million).
This was partly a result of the IOC’s “downsizing plan,” which halted the sta-
dium’s construction for five months; the stadium was not completed until April
2008 (Pan Chengqing 2008). In addition, the contentious European and North
American legs of the torch relay dealt a blow to Chinese enthusiasm for the
“Journey of Harmony” under the slogan “One World, One Dream.” Again,
Western condemnation of China over the issues of human rights resulted in a
surge of nationalist and anti-foreigner sentiment in the country (Elegant 2008).
Of course, domestic policies and education also played their part in gener-
ating nationalism. Take the sports community as an example. Various educa-
tional activities have been organized in the past decades to stress to athletes the
importance of patriotism (the Chinese phrase is ai guo zhu yi, “loving the
state”). For example, a number of national teams, such as gymnastics and vol-
leyball, regularly visit army barracks for a few days of military training. By liv-
ing with soldiers, athletes and coaches experience the hardship of the military
camps and are meant to realize how preferably the state treats them. And to mo-
tivate people from various backgrounds in working for the Games’ success, a
special oath ceremony was held separately for volunteers and staff at each
Olympic venue and the other sectors involved in the days prior to August 8,
2008. Athletes, coaches and officials of Chinese Olympic Delegation swore that
“I’ll fight tenaciously and try my best to be the first….to add colour to my life,
to add luster to the Olympics … and to win glory for the motherland” (Yang
Ming et al. 2008).
National identity is frequently conflated with nationalism, which is a de-
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votion to the nation, a belief in the primacy of nations, and the actions designed
to protect and promote the interests of a nation (Hogan 2009). Motivated by
nationalism and by enthusiasm for the Olympics, the Chinese people wanted
to contribute to the Beijing Games. Although the Games needed just 100,000
volunteer workers, prior to their opening, more than one million people had
volunteered and an additional one million Beijing residents had offered to be
city service volunteers (Du Xinda 2008). In the end, over 1.5 million volunteers
made their contribution to the successful Games.
It should be noted that the strong sentiments of Chinese nationalism have
mixed with an increasing sense of globalization. This is evidenced by popular
attitudes towards migrant Chinese athletes. After the introduction of economic
reform and the opening of China’s borders, a large number of Chinese athletes
migrated abroad and by the 1990s they were known as “the overseas troops”
(hai wai bing tuan). This phenomenon gained national attention when He Zhili,
a former Chinese table-tennis world champion, represented Japan in the Asian
Games in 1994 and defeated her former Chinese team-mates and the hitherto
world champions Deng Yaping and Qiao Hong. This precipitated an intense na-
tional debate and led to stricter control over athletes’ migration in the 1990s.
Zhili’s post-competition remark that “it is the happiest moment in my life to
defeat the Chinese” not only shocked many Chinese but also impelled officials
to better instil patriotism in their athletes (Long Xiong 1996). This was one of
the reasons that some Chinese and some foreigners feared that there would be
a chauvinistic backlash if China did not win at the Beijing Games (Dong 2007),
although this did not turn out to be the case. Foreign star athletes like the US
swimmer Michael Phelps, the Jamaican sprinter Usain Bolt and NBA player
Kobe Bryant were among the most popular with the Chinese audiences. “Some-
times we feel we are better supported here than back at home,” the American
basketball player Chris Paul said (Dan Wetzel 2008). Prior to the Beijing
Games, the Chinese women’s volleyball team was considered as the country’s
only hope for a team gold medal, but even this was dashed by its defeat at the
hands of an American team coached by Lang Ping, a famous Chinese player in
the 1980s. Nonetheless, the Chinese spectators praised Lang Ping for her intel-
ligence, fair play, and skill. Ren Yanli, the softball player accused by fans in
2004 as “China’s traitor” because she represented Japan and defeated her former
Chinese team, denying China’s dream of a softball medal at the Athens Games,
became a special guest on the CCTV program “My Olympics” in Beijing 2008.
What a change!
Although the Chinese spectators demonstrated an unprecedented patriotism,
filling the Olympic venues with tireless cheers of “Jia You” [Go, China], they
also extended warm hospitality to foreign athletes and applauded excellent per-
formances regardless of athletes’ nationalities. Though sprinter Liu’s withdrawal
disappointed millions (and some accused him of being afraid to lose), most Chi-
nese expressed their concern over his injury. The Chinese Vice President Xi Jin-
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ping expressed the hope that Liu would fully recover and achieve great success
in the future. The Liu incident reflected a changed attitude towards winning and
athletes where the Chinese demonstrated their sympathy as well as support.
It is also significant that an increasing number of foreign coaches were em-
ployed by China’s national teams after Beijing won its Olympic bid in 2001.
After the State Sports Administration issued a regulation encouraging the em-
ployment of foreign coaches in 2003, even more national teams including soft-
ball, handball, archery, fencing and rhythmic gymnastics recruited foreign
coaches from America, Canada, Germany, France, Korea and even Japan. The
purpose was clear: to help China maximize its results in the 2008 Games. In
the Chinese delegation to the 2008 Games, twenty-eight coaches for seventeen
sports including archery, canoeing, women’s handball, hockey and softball,
men’s and women’s basketball, synchronized swimming and fencing were for-
eigners from sixteen countries. The foreign coaches not only helped the Chinese
improve their performances but also provided an opportunity for the Chinese
to learn more about foreign cultures. The men’s sabre gold medallist Zhang
Man declared: “My French coach Christian Bauer offered tremendous help in
improving my fencing skills. He is the best coach in the world. This gold medal
belongs to him” (Zhou Yan 2008). There was public acclaim for Jin Yongbo,
the Korean coach of China’s silver-medal women’s hockey team, the best result
in its history (Yu Li 2008) and for the Japanese coach of the Chinese synchro-
nized swimming team that for the first time won an Olympic medal. 
China’s employment of foreign coaches raises the question of whether this
weakens the link between sport and national identity. It does seem so, at least
at the level of coach-athlete relations. However, at a broader level, their contri-
butions have not undermined national pride because in fact they helped the Chi-
nese to achieve such Olympic success. Indeed, the foreign coaches have not
only helped to improve Chinese performances and coaching standards, but they
have also introduced changes in the coach-athlete relationship. As one woman
softball player pointed out: 
Before the Canadian coach Michael came, we kept our coaches at a
respectful distance, rarely embraced them. We never expressed our
thoughts to them frankly…Michael has become a good friend. We
would tell him directly if we are not happy and he listens to us carefully
without disapproval. Then he gives us his opinion and advice. (Liu
Ziyuan 2006)
Without a doubt, a more relaxed and more equal interactional style is de-
veloping, which female athletes in particular find beneficial. 
The above examples illustrates some of the ways that the Beijing Games
stirred strong nationalism among Chinese at home and abroad, which was
shaped by state policies, patriotic education, and international tensions. How-
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ever, they also suggest that China’s rising economic, political, and sporting
power in the world has made it both more confident and more tolerant. The
Games accelerated China’s assimilation into the world scene in spite of unex-
pected misunderstandings and unwanted confrontations. Nationalism and in-
ternationalism co-exist in today’s China. It is inappropriate to dichotomize the
national and the international. Just as the local and the global are mutually con-
stituted, so too are nationalism and internationalism, and their complex rela-
tionship must be explored. Wu Jianmin, the former foreign minister of China,
regarded the combination of nationalism and internationalism as the “Chinese
Spirit” (Wu 2008).
Sportswomen, gender relations and nationalism
in the twenty-first century
In this new century there have emerged some changes in the lives of sports-
women and their relationships to their husbands in China. Though marriage is
an important issue for Chinese women, sportswomen also have the other iden-
tity of athlete to contend with. However, sports success is often more important
for athletes. Before the mid-1990s, female athletes were often required to deny
their relationships with boys and were unable to get married when they partic-
ipated in competitive sport. Love affairs and family, so the argument went,
would distract them and reduce their commitment to sports, an argument that
forced sportswomen to choose between family or their athletic career. However,
times have changed and starting around the mind 1990s a number of married
women and mothers appeared in the sports arena, such as the 33-year-old
Olympic wrestler Xian Dongmei in Beijing 2008. Not long after she won at the
Athens Games she married her training partner Liu Bo. Due to severe injuries
she stopped training and in 2006 gave birth in 2007. Four months before the
Beijing Games, the 33 year old judoka resumed training and once again was a
gold medallist. She triumphed over major problems, among them losing 11 kg
within three months and overcoming the pain of severe knee injuries. Her
courage moved the whole nation. She became a media heroine (Xinlang tiyu
2008). 
Xian is just the tip of the iceberg. There were more married female athletes:
the two time badminton Olympic Champion Zhang Ning, the tennis players Li
Na and Zheng Jie, and several members of the women’s hockey, volleyball and
football teams were married. A special note should be taken of the 50-year-old
Luan Jujie, though she represented Canada in the Beijing Games. Luan was the
1984 Olympic champion representing China. After giving up competition, she
and her family migrated to Canada. As a mother of three children and a coach
in a fencing club, she had not trained for many years. After Beijing won the
2008 Games’ bid, she started to dream again of competing in the Games. To
fulfil this dream she began training in order to qualify for the Beijing Games.
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Faced with financial problems and declining physical abilities, she did not give
up. Though she did not go far in the Beijing Games, her determination won her
respect throughout China (Yang Shilong 2008). She became a positive role
model for millions of girls and women in China and beyond. 
For their contribution, men are establishing new positive role models. In
modern China not a few husbands are more than content to play a supporting
role to their wives who succeed in sport since women’s victories in international
competitions can not only win respect and status for themselves but their fam-
ilies as well. Li Na, mentioned earlier, has offered a vivid picture of this support.
Her husband, a former tennis player, joined the women’s national team as a
coach in 2007, accompanying her everywhere for competitions. His tolerance,
comfort, instruction, massage, care and love have helped Li Na greatly, improv-
ing her performance significantly in the past year. Witnessing this change, an-
other female player Zhen Jie, one of the women’s double champions of the
Australian Open and Wimbledon tournaments in 2006, also asked for permis-
sion to let her husband join the national team as a coach (Liu Xiaoxing 2008).
“Without exaggeration, it can be claimed that gender relations in the family,
which directly affect women’s commitment to elite and other sports, have been
gradually changing from male dominance to a male and female partnership”
(Dong 2003). This reflects the shifting nature of the values associated with a
woman’s career and family. Now it seems that a woman can be strong and com-
petent in sport without denying her femininity. The prolonged sports careers of
women shows that the old belief of love and marriage distracting from a female
athlete’s commitment has faded away. Cultural changes have been taking place.
Nevertheless, with the introduction of Western professional practices and
with increased financial independence, athletes wanted to determine their own
destinies - athletically, financially and socially. Inevitably, this thinking could
challenge the conventional ideas of conformity, loyalty and sacrifice of indi-
vidual interest - the foundation of the traditional sports arrangements. The sto-
ries of Olympic diver Guo Jingjing and the rising tennis player Peng Shuai to
some extent reflect this. After the Athens Games, Guo was actively involved in
a number of commercial activities for months, and did not return to the national
team for training in January 2005. As she violated the regulation that an athlete
who gets involved in any commercial activity has to get permission first from
the Management Center of Swimming, while also handing over half of the in-
come gained to the Center, she was expelled from the National Diving Team.
Later she apologized to the Centre, handed in the required sum of money and
was allowed to rejoin the team and continue her diving career. In 2006, tennis
player Peng Shuai played impressively in international competitions and won
an award of US$ 260,000, of which 65% was supposed to go to the National
Tennis Center according to the relevant regulations. She claimed that since the
tennis coaching in China was not advanced and the Centre would not employ
foreign coaches for her due to the limited budget, her ranking would be hard to
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improve if she stayed within the current training system. Thus, she decided to
withdraw from the national team to follow in the “professional” mode. How-
ever, for various reasons, just as Guo did, she finally changed her mind and re-
joined the national team. The two stories indicate that in a society with a
deep-rooted respect for authority, it is still extremely difficult for a few female
athletes to challenge the superior coaches, the sports culture and the established
order. They face not just one man/woman, but the whole system behind coaches
and the traditional Confucian culture behind the system. However, confrontation
is essentially the product of a new self-assurance on the part of women athletes
who now are ever more conscious of their rights, their power and their oppor-
tunities. As a result, the national sports administration had to change its policy
and give the majority of any winning bonuses and rewards to the performers.
Women in other sports have expressed dissatisfaction and challenged unfair
or unsatisfactory aspects of the national system. The rhythmic gymnast Ding
Ning, for example, attacked the bias of the judging at the National Games. After
merely winning a bronze medal for the 500m speeding skating in the Asian
Winter Games in January 2007, Wang Meng criticized the coaching methods
of the head coach of the national team.7 The two incidents dominated the media
headlines for days. They reflect both the complications generated by recent
sports reform and the more independent, individualistic and self-assertive
sportswomen in the twenty-first century. Sportswomen have initiated change
and are now a part of it. They have successfully demanded fairness, consistency
and dignity of treatment and consideration of their concerns. They have tested
the limits of administrators’ tolerance and rocked the foundations of the cen-
tralized sports system. 
More than this, sportswomen have taken even more action. In 2006, the
long distance runner Sun Yingjie8 with three other team-mates9 sued their coach
Wang Dexian for keeping their bonuses and salaries for years (Zhang, Wang
2006). This event attracted maximum media attention and led to skeletons tum-
bling out of the sports community closet.10 There was also precedent. In the
1990s the “Ma Family” athletes and the skater Chen Lu challenged their
coaches over monetary issues (Dong 2003). While financial concerns were the
compelling immediate cause for these confrontations, the growing confidence
of women and their desire to control their own lives was undeniably a major
factor. Increasingly, sportswomen have vehemently voiced their opposition to
the manipulative control and overbearing domination of their coaches and ex-
erted massive pressure on doctrinaire and dogmatic coaches.
Matters, however, are still far from perfect. The astonishing achievements
of Chinese women in sports today, “though contributing to the improvement of
women’s status in society in general, and challenging the stereotype of
‘women’s inferiority to men,’ does not mean that women have made a com-
pletely successful progression towards equality in all social spheres” (Dong
2003). Socio-economic reform in China has certainly raised living standards
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for women along with men, but it has also led to the return of aspects from the
previously male-dominated Chinese society. While a number of millionaire
businesswomen, female executives and managers as well as film and sports
stars have emerged, some women were discriminated against in employment
and job promotion. An investigation into women’s social status in 2001 showed
that more than half the respondents (both men and women) believed that men
were superior to women (Zhongguo fulian and zhongguo guojia tongji ju 2001).
As a result, the sex ratio in China has increased recently, from 116 in 2001 to
119 in 2007, well above the international average of between 103 and 107
(Wang Zhuoqing 2007). While change is in the air, traditional forces are resilient
and cultural change is neither straightforward nor smooth. History has demon-
strated that Chinese culture has enormous conservative resilience. 
Sportswomen face the dilemma of playing in a sports world that accords
them relatively equal status while living in a wider society shaped by traditional
Confucian values and modern market forces. This had its effect on the women’s
soccer team’s failure to qualify for the semi-finals at the Beijing Games. The
team’s poor showing had several causes. First, there was a shortage of promis-
ing players. There were only about 7000 female soccer players in the whole
country in 2007. Second, the game had virtually no commercial appeal. Enter-
prises did not want to sponsor women’s teams and events, and there were few
spectators (Zhang Min 2006). Behind this shortage of young female soccer tal-
ents there were social and cultural factors. The slogan “men and women are the
same” has been dated and replaced by a new injunction that “women should
behave like women and display their distinctive features.” In this circumstance,
girls prefer to be fashion models, singers and film stars, which can earn them
money while maintaining their “feminine” features. Thus, soccer participation
has little appeal to women.
Confucian tradition also played its part. Despite continuous and often dra-
matic political, cultural and economic changes in the twentieth century, the Con-
fucian legacy is still visible in Chinese society. The Confucian ideal of women
is compliant, humble, yielding and respectful, which is far away from the qual-
ities required by the game of football: competition, aggression and power. For
this reason, football is regarded by many as a “man’s sport” in China. A male
writer even stated in his book: “Women who do not understand football are real,
classic and perfect women. Women who are involved in football are damaged,
modern and horrible women” (Lu 1997:160) Clearly, conventional convictions
die hard. Thus, football is not as popular as other sports for women in schools
and universities. 
In spite of obvious progress in achieving equality in elite sports, women’s
role in sports leadership has not been completely realized. At the Director level
of the State Sports Administration and its affiliated units, there are just 20
women, about 12 percent of the total. In the Chinese Olympic Committee there
are only 8 women out of the 40 Executive Committee members. On the Exec-
Dong Jinxia
176
utive Committee of BOCOG, there were only 3 women out of 19 members.
Women’s low representation in leadership has attracted attention in the country,
but is hard to change overnight. 
China has meshed with the world more closely in the twenty-first century.
After thirty years of economic reforms, China has become the world’s third-
largest economy. Real per capita income—both in cities and in rural areas—
has multiplied more than five times. China is expected to be the world’s leading
economic power by 2025 (Hawksworth 2008:13). According to a survey in
2008, some 86 percent of respondents were satisfied with China’s current situ-
ation and 82 percent were optimistic about China’s economy, much higher than
most of the other countries in the world (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2008). 
With increased confidence, an overwhelming majority of Chinese feel
proud of their long historical heritage and wish to revive it and retain it. One
clear illustration of this was the emphasis on Chinese traditional culture via the
symbols of the Beijing Games. The Olympic emblem, entitled “Chinese Seal—
Dancing Beijing” [zhongguo yin, wudong de Beijing], featured a single Chinese
character on a traditional red Chinese seal with the words “Beijing 2008” writ-
ten in an eastern-style brush stroke. The official mascots of the 2008 Games
consisted of five little children [Fuwa] embodying the natural characteristics
of the Fish, the Panda, the (Tibetan) Antelope and the Swallow together with
the Olympic Flame. Collectively and individually, they carried a Chinese mes-
sage of friendship, peace and blessings to children all over the world.11 The
opening and closing ceremonies of Beijing 2008 emphasized the five-thousand-
year Chinese culture through an impressive and applauded choreographic dis-
play.
While China makes every effort to continue its cultural traditions, the Chi-
nese are also eager to learn from others about contemporary ideas, technology
and management in order to become part of the global community. To organize
the Beijing Games successfully, a sizable number of foreign experts in design,
security, environmental protection, competition administration and publicity
were employed as Olympic advisors, consultants and evaluators. Half of the
900 Olympic News Service workers were from other countries. The case of Na-
tional Indoor Stadium provides a vivid picture of this. Of the 197 Olympic staff
eight were foreigners who worked in the Sports Presentation and Media Oper-
ation sections; in addition, a number of experts from companies like Omega
and NBC and 20 foreign college volunteers working for the New Olympic Serv-
ice (NOS) were in place before and during the Games; the officials, experts and
staff from the international gymnastics and handball federations numbered over
300.12
This integration of Chinese and foreigners certainly promoted mutual un-
derstanding on which mutual respect could be built. According to a study of
“Chinese Image in the Eyes of Foreigners” conducted by Chinese Media Uni-
versity, the Beijing Games significantly upgraded the national image of China
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among foreign respondents and those who had direct contact with Chinese and
were highly involved in the Olympics had a better impression of China as a
whole (Chen Zhenkai 2009).
The Games produced a generation of the “Bird’s Nest.” China Youth Daily
conducted a survey of 3,006 internet users immediately after the Olympic
Games. The results showed that 47.4% of them considered themselves as the
“Bird’s Nest” generation; 55.3% claimed that “after the Games they are confi-
dent on everything without fear” and 48.4% thought they were rationally patri-
otic (Han Heyuan 2008). Confidence and patriotism are two features that were
also rated highly in other similar surveys. The most recent survey of university
students on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the “May Fourth Movement” in-
dicated that 75.4% of universities were proud of being Chinese citizens and
87.9% were confident in a socialist road with Chinese characteristics (renmin
luntan 2009) This will have impact on future development in China, on its do-
mestic and international policies and its relations with other nations. 
It is clear from the above discussion that in the new century rapid changes
have taken place in every aspect of China’s society, including women’s lives
and the relationship between men and women. Some changes are inseparable
from women’s own endeavours and courageous action. Sportswomen set an ex-
ample in this respect. They have launched challenges to authorities and superior
coaches about the traditional attitude towards women’s role in society and fam-
ily. Their action, though not always victorious, has had impact on the changes
of state policy, management and gender relations. The fact that sportswomen
have obtained enormous support from their husbands reflects the changing re-
lationship between husbands and wives in Chinese society. The relationship is
complex, diverse and dynamic in today’s China. However, the road towards
equality and partnership is not straight and without difficulties and challenges.
With China’s full integration into the world, there is a rising confidence and
patriotism among the Chinese that owes its existence to the success of the Bei-
jing Games. 
Conclusion
China’s persistent pursuit of Olympic victory for half a century was moti-
vated by the memories of its past grandeur and of humiliations experienced,
and it demonstrated keenness to build a new, vigorous, modern nation. The un-
precedented level of official and popular support for the Beijing Games re-
flected China’s determination to strengthen its international profile. The 2008
Games, through successful organization and remarkable athletic performances,
indeed helped advance this international image, and it was the female athletes
who led the charge. With the bulk of the medals, women assured the Chinese
dream of becoming an Olympic power.
In line with national economic and social reforms, sports funding and man-
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agement have undergone extensive changes. The international mobility of ath-
letes and coaches has integrated China into the world sports system, challenging
the conventional ideas and practices. Through their athletic victories, sports-
women have won respect for themselves and glory for the nation. However,
being handicapped by the legacy of conventional forces, they have voiced their
opposition to manipulation of their finances by their coaches and other unjust
practices in the sports community. While relationships between coaches and fe-
male athletes, between male and female athletes, and between wives and hus-
bands are changing, traditional norms are resilient. Both change and continuity
are recurrent themes in Chinese sport in the twenty-first century. Women must
learn quickly how to negotiate both the legacy of traditional culture and the
practices of contemporary global sports. Whether they will gain greater confi-
dence in achieving equality and realizing their potential, however, is an open
question.
Table 1 Medals won by Chinese athletes in the last four olympics
1992 16 22 16 54 4th
1996 16 22 12 50 4th
2000 28 22 15 65 3rd
2004 32 17 14 63 3rd
2008 51 21 27 100 2nd
Gold Silver Bronze Total Rank
medals medals medals medals
Table 2 Chinese male and female participants in the Olympics, 1992-2008
females 132 200 188 269 312
males 118 110 93 138 327
percentage 52.8% 64.5% 66.9% 66.09% 48.8%
of women
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
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1 Data from the Department of Economics of the State Sports Administration
(unpublished).
2 Data from guojia dui guanli chu [the administrative department of the National
Team], Aug. 6, 2006.
3 nvxing “zhifu,” liuzhong wuqi: fu mingxia ru haomeng, guo jingjing linglei
tianhou [female stars “become rich” with six weapons: Fu Minxia married a
rich and powerful family, Guo Jingjing is another kind of queen of heaven],
http://www.sportsmkt.com, 18 Oct., 2006.
4 He is a grandson of Huo Yingdong who was a shipping magnate with a wealth
in excess of US$ 1 billion in 2004, one of the Hong Kong’s richest men.
5 Sun Jinfang, the former volleyball player, is now the director of the National
Tennis Association; Lang Ping was the head coach of the Chinese Women’s
Volleyball Team between 1995 and 1999. She is now the head coach of the
American Women’s Volleyball Team; Tang Jiuhong, the seven-time world bad-
minton champion in the 1990s, was promoted to Deputy Director of the Hunan
Provincial Sports Administration in 2004.
6 On April 1, 2001, a US EP-3E ARIES II was operating about 70 miles away
from the Chinese island of Hainan when it was intercepted by two Chinese J-
8 fighters. The collision caused the death of a Chinese pilot and the EP-3 was
forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan. The 24-member crew was
detained and interrogated by the Chinese authorities until a letter of apology
was issued by the United States Government. 
7 She later had to apologize for her action at the team meeting and was disqual-
ified for the World Short-track Championships and World Team Champi-
onships. 
8 Sun, the champion of 5000m and 10,000m races at the 2002 Asian Games,
was caught drug positive at the National Games in 2005. Though she was
banned for two years, she kept training and hoped to participate in the 2008
Games.
9 They are Ai Dongmei, Guo Ping and Li Juan. 
10 It was claimed that coach Wang once beat Sun badly. The toes of the athletes
who sued the coach in court became disfigured obviously and even worse
they are now unemployed and lead very difficult lives.  
11 “The Official Mascots of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games,” http://en.bei-
jing2008.com/80/05/article211990580.shtml
12 The author worked in the National Indoor Stadium. The data is either from
the information provided by the venue management team or observations and
interviews.
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The Beijing Olympics as a Turning
Point? China’s First Olympics in East
Asian Perspective
Susan Brownell
It is commonly stated that the 1964 and 1988 Olympics were “turning points”
for the integration of Japan and South Korea, respectively, into the global com-
munity.  It was anticipated that the Beijing Olympics would be a “turning point”
for China.  Now that the Beijing Games are over, we can ask whether anything
“turned,” and if so, in which direction?  This essay deals with a central paradox
of the Olympic Games – they reinforce nationalism and internationalism at the
same time.  A one-sided focus on nationalism, such as characterized much of
the media coverage of the Beijing Olympics, can lead to the erroneous conclu-
sion that the Olympic Games exacerbate rather than moderate political conflicts.
Wishful thinking that the Beijing Games would be a turning point for human
rights and democracy led to the conclusion by China watchers in the West that
the Beijing Games were not the turning point that was hoped for. However, re-
flection on what actually “turned” in Japan and South Korea helps us to see
what we should actually be looking for in the case of China.  This retrospective
suggests that the interplay between nationalism and internationalism was similar
in all three Olympic Games, and offers a more optimistic prospect for China’s
peaceful integration into the international community. 
Most of the modern Olympic Games held between 1896 and 1988 took
place in the shadow of wars, past, present, and future.  The political animosity
surrounding Beijing 2008 was especially highlighted by contrast with the com-
paratively tranquil background of the four preceding Olympics.  The Albertville
1992 Winter Games had been the first Olympics in history considered to have
“100% participation,” with no boycotts or IOC-dictated exclusions (in addition
to these reasons, before World War II nations often did not compete for lack of
funding or indifference from the central government).  South Africa’s exclusion
since 1964 had ended in 1988, but the tail end of the Cold War had extended
into the Seoul Games with the boycott by North Korea, Cuba, and Ethiopia.
The Barcelona 1992 Summer Olympics were marred only by the IOC’s barring
of Yugoslavia; both there and at the preceding Albertville Games, the former
Soviet Union was represented by the Unified Team.  From the Barcelona
Olympics onward the Games were considered to forward integration and rec-
onciliation, and the political issues that dominated public opinion were domestic
or regional (Catalonian sovereignty in Barcelona 1992; the rise of the American
South and racial integration in Atlanta 1996; Aboriginal rights in Sydney 2000;




Although after the Tibetan uprisings in March 2008 some Chinese ex-
pressed the hope that the Beijing Olympics might promote ethnic reconciliation
like that between Aborigines and Whites in Sydney 2000, a closer look would
have revealed that in Australia the work of reconciliation through the Olympic
Games had begun at least as early as 1996, when the use of aboriginal symbols
in the Sydney segment of the Atlanta closing ceremony had provoked protest.
In Beijing, however, the use of ethnic minority symbols, including Tibetan sym-
bols, was notably absent in the opening ceremony, which was especially sig-
nificant since the use of dancing and singing minorities to symbolize national
unity is a common fixture in Chinese national celebrations.  The restoration of
dialogue with the Dalai Lama and a discussion about whether to invite him to
the opening ceremony only emerged after the March uprisings, which suggests
that previous to that time no serious attempt had been made to utilize the Games
toward reconciliation between Tibetans and Han.  Indeed, the National Tradi-
tional Games of Ethnic Minorities of the People’s Republic of China, which
had been one of the showpieces of the P.R.C.’s ethnic policy since their initia-
tion in 1953, suffered from a lack of attention due to the focus on the Olympics
when the eighth installment was held in Guangzhou in December 2007.  Most
of the opening ceremonies performers were Han students dressed as minorities
and many of the athletes were Han students at sport institutes recently recruited
to learn “traditional ethnic sports.”
Another reconciliation that did not take place at a symbolic level was that
between the people and the Communist Party as represented in the figure of
Chairman Mao.  As Geremie Barmé and Jeffrey Wasserstrom have observed,
Chairman Mao was absent in Zhang Yimou’s opening ceremony, which skipped
from the Ming dynasty to the late 1970s and gave the spotlight to Confucius,
whom Wasserstrom called “the comeback kid” of the Beijing Games (Barmé
2008: 179-82; Wasserstrom 2008: 172). The Communist Revolution was also
generally absent from Olympic symbolism.  This was due to a decision that
traced its roots back to the 1990 Asian Games, China’s first hosting of a major
international sport festival.  The cultural performance in the Asian Games cer-
emony had been choreographed by the same national team of choreographers
that had designed the cultural performances for the previous three Chinese Na-
tional Games – starting in 1979 with the first post-Cultural Revolution perform-
ance, which had the theme “The New Long March.” The themes and symbols
utilized by this team of choreographers had gradually evolved away from the
political symbols that dominated ceremonies after 1949 and toward “cultural
symbols.”  The 1990 Asian Games had taken place one year after the Tiananmen
Incident, which had been a disaster for China’s international relations and a se-
vere setback for its plans to reach out to the world through the Asian Games.
(The Asian Games were, nevertheless, the occasion for the first official cross-
straits exchanges, and Taiwan sent a large official delegation - Liang 2007: 333-
55). In 1990 it was recognized that “ethnic cultural” symbols were more
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attractive to the outside world in general and also constituted a shared cultural
repertoire with East Asians and overseas Chinese (Brownell 1995: 60-62, 315-
18).  
By the time the planning for the Beijing ceremonies had begun, this strat-
egy for drawing in international audiences was known as the “Cultural China”
strategy.  It traced its roots to multiple international developments, including
the 1980s and 1990s works of Harvard historian and philosopher Tu Weiming
and other “New Confucianists,” as well as government policies for promoting
the “cultural industry” in Japan and South Korea in the mid to late 1990s; the
international orientation of the Korean cultural policies had gained impetus
from the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul (Yim 2002:
46). “Cultural China” was also expressed in the Chinese government’s support
for “Confucius Institutes” around the world, and it was linked to Hu Jintao’s
concept of “soft power.”  For the Beijing 2008 Olympics, a key policy recom-
mendation from the People’s University concluded, “On this basis, we cau-
tiously propose that in the construction of China’s national image, we should
hold the line on ‘cultural China,’ and the concept of ‘Cultural China’ should
not only be the core theme in the dialogue between China and the international
community in Olympic discourse, but also it should be added into the long-
term strategic plan for the national image afterwards” (People’s University
2008: 194).  Although the vast majority of educational and cultural programs
surrounding the Beijing Olympics targeted the domestic population (see the
discussion of Olympic education below), a debate about the target audience for
the opening and closing ceremonies was resolved in favor of the international
audience.  Film director Zhang Yimou, the choreographer of the ceremonies, is
not well-regarded inside China, where his work is seen as pandering to Western
tastes with a superficial and exoticized picture of traditional Chinese culture.
His “Eight Minute Segment” in the closing ceremony of the Athens Olympics
was so disliked that the bid competition for the choreography of the 2008 cer-
emonies was re-opened.  That Zhang was finally re-confirmed in 2005 indicates
that the final decision was to prioritize international tastes over domestic.  
In his essay in this volume, Manzenreiter is suspicious of the Cultural
China approach, observing, “A century ago such a spectacle demonstration may
have sufficed to explain the ruling elites’ claim for power. At the present, how-
ever, it hardly convinces those who do not want to believe.”  However, the gen-
erally positive reception of the Beijing opening ceremony in the West may
indicate that there are many out there who do want to believe.
In the end, the only significant violence did not pit sovereign states against
one another but took place in China’s Tibetan areas. However, this should not
mislead us into thinking that the Beijing Games did not take place in the shadow
of war – a point that, I believe, was very present in the minds of the East Asian
audience but was missed by Westerners with shorter and more spatially distant
memories.  And it is important to remember that the Beijing Olympics were the
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first Olympics to take place in an East Asian country that is not host to U.S.
military bases. This was the “present absence” in 2008 in comparison to Tokyo
1964 and Seoul 1988; the chapters by Shimizu Satoshi and Ok Gwang in this
volume remind us that the U.S. military presence played a very important role
in the local interpretations of the Games even if today it does not figure large
in the international memory.
Shimizu, Christian Tagsold, and Jilly Traganou remind us that many of the
symbols of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics established continuity with pre-war
Japanese national symbols (Shimizu and Tagsold in this volume; Traganou
2008). Japan did not have an official national flag or anthem in 1964: the hino-
maru flag and the kimigayo anthem had been proscribed by the occupation au-
thorities after World War II and were not officially reinstated as the national
flag and anthem of Japan until 1999, and indeed, they have been plagued by
controversy ever since.  However, the logo of the Tokyo Olympics consisted of
the rising sun over the five Olympic rings, which was also used in the first of
the four official posters. While designer Kamekura Yūsaku denied that his de-
sign was the hinomaru, stating that it was meant simply to be a red sun, he had
played an active role in nationalist representations of Japan in wartime propa-
ganda.
The 1964 torch relay was the longest held to that date; indeed, a sense of
rivalry with Japan’s coming-out party may well have been a principal reason
that China insisted on holding the largest-ever international torch relay.  The
Tokyo 1964 torch passed from its origin in Olympia, Greece, across the Middle
East and Asia, into countries that Japan had once invaded, finishing with Burma,
Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong and Taiwan (but not Korea) -
and then on to Okinawa, which at that time remained a U.S. military colony.
As Shimizu recounts in this volume, the Mainichi Shimbun wrote, “In Okinawa,
it gave power, hope and encouragement to the islanders who are longing for
the day when America returns Okinawa to Japan.” Indeed, an Okinawan move-
ment for reversion to Japan was gaining strength as the Olympics neared. Dur-
ing the relay in Okinawa, hinomaru flags were waved by spectators on the
roadside and the kimigayo anthem was played, which, as Tagsold points out,
lent cultural weight to Japan’s claim to Okinawa.  
In Tagsold’s chapter, the role of the genbakuko (atom boy), and the Self-
Defense forces in the opening ceremony offer points of comparison with the
Beijing Olympics, as does his argument that the Tokyo Olympics enabled the
“re-nationalization” of Japan by associating the classical national symbols (flag,
anthem, emperor, military) with the Olympic symbols of internationalism and
peace.  This subtle symbolic shift was largely unremarked in the West, and the
absence of international contestation contributes to today’s recollection of the
Tokyo Olympics as a peaceful turning point in Japan’s integration into the in-
ternational community.  Tagsold also argues that Sakai’s igniting of the torch
enabled Japan to assume the role of victim in World War II as the first nation
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to bear the brunt of atomic attack.  While detailed scholarship on U.S. and Asian
reactions to the use of symbols associated with emperor, nation, American
killing, and the Asia Pacific War in Tokyo 1964 is lacking, it appears that neither
the U.S. nor the Asian victims of Japanese colonialism and war publicly op-
posed the use of symbols representing Japan’s “re-nationalization” or its claim
on Okinawa.  
Before the Beijing 2008 Games, the major regional tension - between
China and Taiwan - flared up in April 2007 over the route of the torch relay,
when Taiwan insisted that the torch must enter Taiwan and exit through a third
country so that it would not be portrayed as a territory of mainland China with
a dependent status similar to that of Hong Kong and Macau.  Given the huge
IOC effort to mediate between China and Taiwan in the decades of China’s ex-
clusion from the IOC (1958-1979), it was significant that no high-profile ne-
gotiations were held and five months later it was simply announced that Taiwan
would be bypassed – but this can be understood if one realizes that this was ac-
tually a peripheral affair by Olympic standards, since no boycott of the Olympic
Games was being proposed and that is the central concern of the IOC.  The IOC
organizes the Olympic Games, but the local organizing committee organizes
the torch relay.  The basic problem of the participation of both parties in the
Olympic Games had been resolved decades beforehand by the IOC’s 1979
Nagoya Resolution stipulating that Taiwan cannot use any of the national sym-
bols of the Republic of China in Olympic venues, but must compete under the
name, flag and anthem of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee. This
“Olympic formula” is today the agreement that enables the participation of both
Taiwan and China in many other international organizations.  The China-Taiwan
tension was eased by the March 2008 election of the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou as
Taiwan’s President, opening a new page in China-Taiwan diplomacy.  Tony
Hwang’s chapter lays out the historical background for the relationship between
China and Taiwan within the Olympic Games and demonstrates that in 2008
many Taiwanese were not prepared to accept the official Chinese version of
that relationship.  
Like all host countries, China attempted to use the Olympic Games to pro-
mote its own agendas.  The torch relay was intended to symbolize national unity
when it announced that the international relay would advance from Vietnam to
Taiwan and on to Hong Kong.  Taiwan, however, refused to take part in a route
that represented Taiwan as a domestic stop.  In 1964, it had been argued that
“Okinawa is the terminal point of the overseas course of the Olympic Flame”
(Shimizu, this volume).  Similarly, China and Taiwan agreed that the neutral
word “overseas” would be used to describe the relay before the torch landed
on the mainland, rather than the problematic term “international.”  But this had
not been enough to gain the approval of the Taiwan government, probably be-
cause it knew full well that, as in 1964, local media and politicians would argue
that this was in fact the start of the domestic relay.  In stark contrast to the U.S.’s
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laissez-faire approach to Okinawa in 1964, the P.R.C. government maintained
an uncompromising position against any symbols of Taiwanese (or Tibetan) in-
dependence and sovereignty.  
Lau’s chapter also found that his Taiwanese student sample had the weakest
national identification with “China,” while mainland Chinese students had the
strongest.  In the middle were Hong Kong students, who seem to be in the
process of developing a dual Hong Kong-China identity, perhaps facilitated by
the Beijing Olympic Games.  Dong Jinxia’s chapter cites a China Daily poll in
which young Chinese defined themselves as the “Bird’s Nest generation” with
qualities of newfound confidence as well as rational patriotism. China is posing
a challenge to the conventional definitions of the nation by creating political
forms and “national” identities that are different from the conventional Western
versions.  Since its return to the mainland in 1997, Hong Kong has been defined
as a Special Administrative Region (SAR), but within the IOC it retained its
own Olympic committee, which had existed since 1951 and was grandfathered
in and renamed the Chinese Hong Kong Olympic Committee.  Since its return
to the mainland in 1999, Macau has also been defined as a SAR but it has no
separate Olympic Committee because it had never had one, so its athletes must
represent China.  Taiwan is not a SAR, but within the IOC the Chinese Taipei
Olympic Committee has equal status with the Chinese Hong Kong Olympic
Committee (and, in theory, with all other “national” Olympic committees).  As
China continues its rise in the world, it may re-shape the current monolithic
and simplistic Western design of the world system of nation-states — or it may
ultimately be forced to conform to it.
The Parade of Athletes in the opening ceremony provoked minor issues
that were mostly missed by the non-Chinese-speaking world.  When the first
cross-straits sports exchange was to take place at the 1990 Asian Games in Bei-
jing, the Chinese translation of the English “Chinese Taipei” became a point of
contention.  The mainland had typically translated it as Zhongguo Taibei, but
Taiwan translated it as Zhonghua Taibei, a distinction of one character that
makes little difference even to Chinese speakers except that, if one were to split
hairs, one might understand Zhongguo as implying “Chinese national territory”
and Zhonghua as implying “Chinese people.”  The 1989 agreement between
the two sides had stated that China would allow Taiwan to use Zhonghua Taibei
in official Olympic venues, but China would retain its customary usage in non-
official settings, including media coverage and sports announcing in mainland
events.  Leading up to the opening ceremony, there had been rumblings in the
Taiwanese media that if Taiwan were to be announced as Zhongguo Taibei when
it entered the stadium, then Taiwan should boycott the Games; this was based
on an erroneous understanding of the agreement and actually was never in ques-
tion.  When Taiwan entered the stadium, it was announced in English, then in
French, and finally in Mandarin as Zhonghua Taibei. When Chinese Hong Kong
entered, it was announced according to mainland custom as Zhongguo Xiang-
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gang.  Another problem had been created by the Chinese decision to use Chi-
nese character stroke order in determining the order of the entering nations, be-
cause this put Chinese Taipei and Chinese Hong Kong next to each other - China
as the host country marched in last, and so it was not a factor.  As with the torch
relay, Taiwan refuses to march adjacent to China in the Parade because it would
symbolize it as a province of China; this is a problem in English, as well, which
has been solved by having Taiwan march with the “T’s.”  The problem was
solved by inserting the Central African Republic between Taiwan and Hong
Kong — since “China” literally means “central country,” the Central African
Republic shares the character zhong with them.  Ironically, the stroke order
placed Japan before Chinese Taipei, but with Taiwan’s former colonial status
no longer problematic for Taiwanese identity, this was not an issue.
As in the lighting of the torch by Sakai in 1964, the incident in the Paris
leg of the torch relay, when a Tibetan protester tried to wrench the torch away
from a young Chinese female Paralympic athlete in a wheelchair, produced an
image of China as a victim that received a great deal of attention in the Chinese
media.  The victimization function was further carried out by the nine year-old
survivor from the Sichuan earthquake disaster area who entered the stadium
beside the flagbearer, basketball icon Yao Ming, in the opening ceremony.  The
small flag carried by the boy was upside down, an international nautical symbol
for distress.  However, it appeared that the boy had unintentionally flipped the
flag, because no official explanation was issued, and Xinhua news agency re-
quested clients not to use a photo of it shortly after sending it out.  While not as
forceful as the image of Japan victimized by the atom bombs, within China
these symbols did preserve the Chinese narrative of victimization in the midst
of the most grandiose Olympics ever.
Looking back on the 1964 torch relay and Olympics from the perspective
of 2008, one wonders why the Tokyo Games did not incite a furor as the Beijing
Games did. Given the extensive Japanese atrocities associated with colonialism
and war, and Japan’s failure to make effective apologies and reparations to vic-
tims at that time, the key symbols and torch relay seem even more inflammatory
than those surrounding the Beijing Games. Tagsold’s accompanying essay ar-
gues that the symbolic work was sufficiently subtle to bypass domestic legal
and moral arguments, and few Western observers were aware of the ongoing
conflicts between Japan and the nations it had occupied and colonized a gener-
ation earlier.  But, he argues, more important was the general historical context;
in the Cold War era, the effort to delimit the Olympic Games as “apolitical”
was stronger than it is now because the international political stakes were
higher.  I would argue that in 1964 this produced a stronger “will not to know”
than was present in 2008.  One big difference is that the 2008 Olympics were
a media mega-event far exceeding what the Tokyo Olympics were, and this pro-
vided a platform for human rights and Tibetan NGOs with a higher level of
media savvy and organization than had heretofore been seen in the Olympic
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context.  It was easy to be misled by the heat of the media coverage into be-
lieving that profound “political” conflicts were occurring.  However, closer ex-
amination reveals that there was no serious momentum toward national boycotts
of the Games, and more national Olympic committees (204) and national rep-
resentatives (over 100 “national dignitaries,” of which about 80 were “heads
of state”) took part in the opening ceremony than in any previous Games.  It
was the first opening ceremony attended by an American president outside of
the U.S.  From my position as a Fulbright Researcher in Beijing with regular
contact with the U.S. embassy, I felt that the Bush administration strongly
wanted these Games to take place and to be successful.  Well-informed ob-
servers such as He Zhenliang, China’s senior IOC member and sports diplomat,
felt that Sino-U.S. relations had been strengthened through the Games and per-
haps had become closer than they had ever been since 1949.
As in Tokyo, soldiers had a large presence in the Beijing Olympics, includ-
ing the participation of 9,000 People’s Liberation Army soldiers in the cultural
performance of the opening ceremony.  The Chinese “riot police” (the Chinese
term is literally “violence-prevention police”) had high visibility during the
Olympic Games.  This is a category of security personnel whose domestic num-
bers and functions had been expanded in 2005, at the same time that China also
started sending riot police on U.N. peacekeeping missions.  Clad in black, phys-
ically bigger (many are former wushu and judo athletes), and more highly
trained and educated than the regular and armed police, they were brought out
in large numbers to protect sensitive locations in Beijing.  Their training drills
were shown on CCTV in dramatic ways that promoted a positive image of them
as anti-terrorist police ready to help evacuate a stadium in case of a bomb or to
secure the release of innocent spectators taken hostage.  The riot police are more
frequently deployed to control the local populace than to deal with terrorists –
indeed, on the night of the opening ceremony I watched them clear out the
crowd that had gathered in the square at the central train station to watch the
opening ceremony on the big-screen TV, when the security personnel decided
that the crowd was too big and the situation was dangerous.  However, the effect
of the Olympic coverage may have been similar to that described by Tagsold
for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces – their image was improved by linking
them with keeping the peace at the Olympics.
One more point in Tagsold’s analysis is also relevant to Beijing.  He ob-
serves that the planning of the symbolism of the Tokyo Olympics and the open-
ing ceremonies was led by the Ministry of Education, which controlled most
of the interpretation of national symbols from 1959 onward (2007: 118).  Ma-
sumoto Naofumi (2007) has recently brought to the attention of Anglophone
scholars the fact that formal educational initiatives related to the Olympic
Games were organized outside of the organizing committee for the first time in
the context of the 1964 Tokyo Summer Games.  I have argued that since that
time there has been an “East Asian stream” in the “Olympic education” initia-
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tives that have surrounded the Games, which has been ignored by Eurocentric
scholars (2007; 2008). From 1961 to 1964 the Ministry of Education distributed
four Olympic readers and guidebooks to primary and secondary schools and
colleges nationwide.  Two books were produced by the organizing committee
for distribution to schoolteachers from 1960-61: 1,000 copies of The Glorious
Tokyo Olympics (130 pages) were distributed in Kanto area schools and 1,000
copies of Olympic Facts & Figures for Teachers’ Use (36 pages) were distrib-
uted to school teachers.  In addition to school textbooks and school activities,
the Ministry of Education promulgated the “Citizens’ Olympic Games Move-
ment” aimed at educating the people in the streets about the Olympics, increas-
ing national pride, and improving understanding of foreign countries (Tagsold
2007: 126-27).
The important role played by the Japanese Ministry of Education is partic-
ularly illuminating for a comparison with the Beijing Olympics.  With the sup-
port of the Chinese Ministry of Education, the Beijing Municipal Education
Commission in collaboration with the Beijing Olympic Committee for the
Olympic Games (BOCOG) organized the largest “Olympic education” program
ever implemented by a host city.  When this effort began, the director of the ed-
ucational programs for the 1998 Nagano Winter Games was invited twice to
Beijing for consultation.  Nagano’s “One School, One Country” sister school
program was adopted (this program has been utilized in every summer and win-
ter Olympics since 1998, excepting the 2004 Athens Olympics).  Beijing
quickly far exceeded what Nagano had done — a source of pride due to the ri-
valry with Japan.  A total of 200 primary and secondary schools in Beijing City
and another 356 schools nationwide were designated as “Olympic Education
Demonstration Schools,” which were responsible for devoting at least two hours
per month to Olympics-related activities, and for conducting “hand-in-hand
sharing” activities with other schools and the surrounding community.  One of
the three themes of the Beijing Olympics – translated as “People’s Olympics”
or “Humanistic Olympics”— also drew on the concept of the 1964 “Citizen’s
Olympic Games Movement” but unfolded it on a much larger scale.  China’s
effort involved the mobilization of 70,000 college students through the Com-
munist Youth League system as “Games-time volunteers” to help at all official
Olympic venues.  Approximately 400,000 “city volunteers” were enlisted to
staff 550 volunteer stations and maintain social order throughout the city.  A
multitude of cultural and educational activities for the community were organ-
ized through the central Party Office of Spiritual Civilization Development and
Guidance and its Beijing branch.  
Interestingly, Ok states that the International Olympic Academy (IOA) in
Olympia, Greece, was one of the main inspirations for Olympic education sur-
rounding Seoul 1988.  In China, too, Ren Hai and Pei Dongguang (Donnie Pei),
the university academics who spearheaded the implementation and design of
Olympic education programs, had received their first inspiration there (see
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Brownell 2009).  Niehaus’s chapter provides background on the joint effort of
the German Carl Diem and the Greek John Ketseas that led to the initial pro-
posal for the IOA in 1938 and its eventual establishment in 1961.  Diem was
perhaps the key scholar to first promote the concept of Olympic education.  He
visited Japan and China in 1929.  He also performed the amazing feat in 1941
of writing a book on Asiatische Reiterspiele [Asiatic Equestrian Games], de-
spite not speaking an Asian language, in a time when almost nothing on ancient
Asian sports had been published in Western languages.  From 1959-61 he was
an advisor to the Japanese Olympic Committee for the Tokyo and Sapporo
Olympic Games (Kluge 2002).  The first session of the IOA was held in 1961,
and so the beginning of the IOA was occurring at the same time as the Olympic
education efforts for the Tokyo Olympics.  It is possible that Diem’s ideas about
Olympic education actually found fertile ground in Japan before they did in the
West, and the timeline makes it possible that the German and international effort
at the IOA built upon the Japanese experience and not the other way around.
This contribution of Japan to the history of Olympic education has since been
ignored by Westerners writing in English and German.  In short, there was an
East Asian influence in the history of Olympic education which was a product
of the importance placed on education as a means of facilitating integration
with the outside world, and this “East Asian stream” circled back from the West
into Beijing in 2008 (see Brownell 2007; 2008b).  
At the same time, Leo Hsu’s chapter in this volume points out that this was
accomplished by adopting almost wholesale the Western-centric ideology of
Olympism with very little effort to inject Far Eastern philosophy, values, or
sports.  But this was part of the process by which Japan, Korea and China joined
the Western-dominated global community on its own terms.  In Hsu’s timeline,
the serious questioning of Western-centrism in Olympic education only began
in 2003.  Hsu is one of the leading translators of Olympic education materials
from English into Chinese, and his chapter is an example of this effort to re-
think Olympic education for East Asia.  This process is also evident in Niehaus’s
description of the inclusion of judo in the Olympic program, the first non-West-
ern sport to be included.  He demonstrates that this was only accomplished by
fashioning judo to fit the mould of Western sports and downplaying elements
of Japanese tradition that could be interpreted in the West as Buddhist evangel-
izing.  China’s failure to have wushu included in the 2008 Olympic program
despite a big fight with the IOC illustrates the difficulties still faced by non-
Western sports.  If Olympic education and sports may be taken as a barometer
of the balance of power in global culture, then a shift of power away from the
West and toward East Asia is only in its incipient stage and may perhaps start
emerging in the near future.  The World Martial Arts and Combat Sports Games
in Beijing in 2010 might well have marked the “revenge of wushu” and the be-
ginning of a shift of power in global sport, since it was organized by SportAc-
cord, an increasingly powerful central hub for the organization of world sport
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via the International Federations.  The event was spearheaded by the president
of SportAccord, Hein Verbruggen, who from 2001 to 2008 had been the IOC’s
liaison with China as the Chair of the IOC’s Coordination Commission for the
Beijing Olympics.  He resigned his position as an IOC member on the day of
the Beijing closing ceremony.  Therefore it appears that this shift of power is
taking place outside of the IOC and it remains to be seen whether this effort
will complement or rival the IOC’s preeminence over global sport.
In his chapter, Tagsold demonstrates that in the educational programs in
Japan, national identity was re-located within a larger international context.  In
China, too, the educational project was oriented toward imagining China taking
its place in the international community.  The content of the school programs
largely imparted knowledge about the world outside China, and in this respect
it differed markedly from the inward-looking focus of previous national edu-
cational/propaganda campaigns.  In his chapter, Niehaus criticizes the 1964
Olympic education, arguing that “For the Japanese, learning about the Olympic
Movement and thus about other countries, paradoxically meant not only
strengthening the notion of a mono-ethnic nation, but also Japan’s feeling of
‘uniqueness.’”  I did not feel that this criticism applied to China.  The Beijing
organizing committee promised that it would deliver “high-quality” and
“unique” Games, and in his much-anticipated evaluation of the Games in his
address at the closing ceremony, Jacques Rogge concluded that they had been
“truly exceptional.”  This phrase was much-dissected in China with puzzlement
as to whether being described as an “exception” was a complement or not.
China already felt “unique” enough; the greater emphasis in Olympic education
was on China’s integration with the world.
Western observers tended to dismiss Beijing’s Olympic education as just
another nationalist propaganda campaign, but I believe they were missing the
important point: true, one major goal was patriotic education – but as in Tokyo,
the old nationalist symbols were re-shaped by association with symbols of in-
ternationalism, the global community, and world peace (for a more detailed ex-
position of this argument, see Brownell 2009). This is the paradox of the
Olympic Games – they reinforce nationalism and internationalism at the same
time.  Perhaps the national identity itself is not greatly changed, but it is an im-
portant shift in orientation if the holders of that identity start to see their nation
as an equal partner among friendly nations instead of a victimized nation among
hostile nations.
One illustration of this point is a conversation I had with a Tsinghua Uni-
versity student who, as an Olympic volunteer, was standing beneath the flagpole
when the Chinese flag was raised in the Olympic opening ceremony.  He asked
me what I thought of Beijing’s Olympic education programs – didn’t I find that
much of it was just a “show” by the government?  I told him that while many
of the activities might be considered to be “appearance-ism,” I thought that
teaching students that their country was taking its place among other nations
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as an equal, and that China would no longer be “bullied” by other nations,
would have an important effect on the students for the future.  He was silent
for a moment, and then confessed that when he saw the Chinese flag being
raised in the stadium and heard the wild cheering of the crowd, he had gotten
tears in his eyes, and this had been the first time in his life that this had ever
happened to him.  From this perspective, he agreed with my conclusion. Our
conversation took place during a dinner to which I had been invited so that I
could advise him on whether to accept admission to the Master’s Degree pro-
grams at the University of Pennsylvania or the University of Southern Califor-
nia, with an eye to which city would offer better future employment
opportunities. 
In sum, if the 1964 Games were a turning point in Japan’s peaceful inte-
gration into the international community, we can probably point to a similar
outcome of the 2008 Beijing Games.  On the other hand, the Tokyo Games, far
from eliminating past symbols of militarism and war, only re-oriented them.
The same will likely be true of the effect of the Beijing Games on the elements
of revolution, socialism, Communist ideology, and anti-Western sentiment that
figure so large in Chinese national identity.  In both Japan and China, the idea
of national victimization at the hands of the West remains, although in China it
appeared that a change was finally starting.  In the official rhetoric, the Beijing
Games were supposed to “erase the label of the Sick Man of East Asia” that
had loomed in the Chinese imagination for over a century as an insult applied
to China by the West and Japan.  Young Chinese told me that they recognized
that the Sick Man of East Asia was political rhetoric used to stir up patriotism
and that they did not think much about it themselves – although, as one college
student put it, they would “never forget the history” that it represented.   
If the political background of the Tokyo Olympics was emotionally-
charged, Gwang Ok’s essay in this volume reminds us that the lead-up to the
1988 Seoul Olympics involved outbreaks of actual violence related to the
Games. On October 8, 1979, President Park Chung-hee (Bak Jeong-hee) offi-
cially announced the intention to bid for the Olympic Games; on October 26,
he was assassinated at a dinner party by the director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and in 1980 General Chun Doo-hwan (Jeon Du-hwan) seized power
in a military coup.  In September 1981, Seoul was selected as the host city by
the IOC.  In October 1983, a North Korean assassination attempt on President
Chun at the Aung San National Cemetery in Rangoon killed 14 South Korean
officials.  And then in 1987, less than a year before the Olympic Games, two
North Korean operatives left a bomb on Korean Air #858, killing 115 people,
including 93 South Koreans.  The confession of the operative who survived de-
spite eating a cyanide capsule stated that the order was intended to disrupt the
Seoul Olympic Games, and was personally penned by Kim Jong-Il, now Pres-
ident of North Korea.  It was primarily because of this act that North Korea was
listed as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” by the U.S. State Department in 1988.
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It was not removed from the list until October 11, 2008.  
This history has since been overshadowed by the positive recollection that
the Olympics “brought democracy” to South Korea when Roh Tae-woo as-
sumed the presidency in 1987 through a constitutional election and a promise
of democratic reforms.  This rosy view of Olympic history often neglects the
subsequent events in which Chun and Roh were convicted of mutiny, treason,
and bribery and blamed for the 1980 Kwangju massacre of several hundred pro-
democracy protesters.
There were many people, including IOC members and Chinese journalists,
who wondered if the Beijing Olympics could stimulate a democratic transition
in China like that attributed to the Seoul Olympics.  If they were looking for a
dramatic change, they were disappointed.  But there were key differences in
China.  One difference was the lack of a real external military threat.  Jarol
Manheim argues, based on interviews with South Korean government and
Olympic officials, that one hope of the ROK government was that, by focusing
world attention on South Korea, the Olympics would increase world awareness
about the North Korean threat and purchase a form of insurance against northern
aggression (1990: 291-93).  It would appear that the Games succeeded on both
counts.  In the analysis of IOC member Dick Pound, it was because of this “in-
surance” that the conservative military stood back and allowed a democratic
transition to begin before the Games had even started; the military gained a
sense of security from the expressions of support for the Games issuing from
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as other members of the socialist
bloc (Pound 194: 320-23).
Unlike South Korea, in the past three decades China has experienced peace-
ful transitions of power in the midst of sweeping social and economic change,
and there is currently widespread popular support for gradual instead of dra-
matic political change.  The Tibet uprisings and the violent acts, or foiled in-
tended acts, of groups classified as “terrorist” had an internal function similar
to the external threat to South Korea; they strengthened the conservative posi-
tion of the Chinese security system.  It was not clear to me how well the political
history surrounding the Seoul Olympics was known by intellectuals and pol-
icy-makers in China – but if it were fully understood, I can imagine that South
Korea’s move toward democracy would serve as a counter-model because of
the massive popular demonstrations that accompanied it, while in China there
is currently a strong aversion toward mass protests.  This does not, however,
mean that the same forces that pushed South Korea toward political reform
were not at work in China.  Manheim’s interviewees believed that the presence
of the international media, the negative image of South Korea it conveyed to
the world, and the legitimacy it conferred on demonstrators and opposition
politicians forced the ruling party to make significant political concessions (p.
291). Global scrutiny of China in 2008 was much greater and it does appear
that this pressure had effects.  The domestic pressure for greater media freedom
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and government transparency increased in the year after the Games, not just
because of the Olympics, but also because of the Wenchuan earthquake and the
tainted milk scandal.  Vibrant debates about China’s inability to effectively com-
municate a national image to the outside world were initiated, and large gov-
ernment investment was made in foreign communications and public
diplomacy.  The temporary Olympic law that guaranteed more freedom to for-
eign journalists was extended indefinitely just as it expired on October 15, 2008.
A higher level of organized dissidence in comparison with recent years was re-
vealed when Charter 08, a document calling for political reform signed by 303
Chinese intellectuals and activists, was initiated in late spring 2008 and publicly
issued in December 2008.  The Information Office of the State Council pub-
lished its first Human Rights Action Plan in April 2009.  I believe that these ac-
tions were the result of the ferment that was stirred up by China’s intensified
interaction with the outside world in the process of organizing the Games.  This
ferment may produce some immediate changes, or it may produce no concrete
changes at all; most likely it will produce some gradual changes, which is what
Chinese people seem to support.  China is changing but only greater distance
will allow us to look back and assess it.  
Tagsold’s essay describes the rise of the anti-Olympic movement in Japan
called “trops” (“sport” spelled backwards). The opposition to Nagoya’s bid for
the 1988 Summer Games was a wake-up call for the IOC, which has given in-
creasing attention to environmental issues in the ensuing years.  In China in
2008, sports scholars frequently stated that the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games
gave rise to an “anti-Olympic movement” in Japan (apparently not understand-
ing that the movement did not really emerge until 1988), and they felt that this
might also occur in China.  A 2002 article in Journal of Physical Education in-
troduced the trops concept to China, but described it as advocacy for popular
sport as opposed to the Olympics, and did not mention its environmental con-
nection (Wu and Gao 2002: 9-11).  While popular protests against rapacious
development and environmental destruction have been cropping up all over
China, and were occasionally linked to the Beijing Games, it did not appear
that an organized anti-Olympic movement ever congealed.  Censorship regula-
tions promulgated by the Central Propaganda Department before and during
the Games restricted the publication and broadcasting of criticism of the
Olympic Games, which might cause one to suspect that any incipient anti-
Olympic movement was squelched, and that the shape of public opinion in
China might be similar to that in Japan in 1988 if people were allowed to openly
criticize the Olympics.  However, closer analysis reveals that the underlying is-
sues were different in China compared to Japan.  Japan’s trops movement has
thrived in a context in which there has been a strong political will to host
Olympic Games, which has aroused the opposition of citizen’s groups.  Alto-
gether, Japanese cities have put forward five unsuccessful and four successful
bids for Olympic Games, including Tokyo’s successful bid for the 1940 Summer
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Olympics, later rescinded; Tokyo’s unsuccessful bid for the 1960 Summer
Olympics and successful bid for the 1964 Olympics; Sapporo’s unsuccessful
bids for the 1968 and 1984 Winter Games; Nagoya’s bid against Seoul for the
1988 Summer Olympics; Osaka’s bid against Beijing for the 2008 Games (re-
vealing a lack of solidarity in the East Asian bloc within the IOC); Sapporo’s
successful bid for the 1976 Winter Games; and Nagano’s successful bid for the
1998 Winter Games.  Shimizu and Tagsold both discuss the urban development
that accompanied the 1964 Olympics, with Shimizu arguing that it facilitated
the transformation of the Imperial city into a physical space appropriate for the
new post-war nationalism.  William Kelly (2010) discusses the massive urban
development projects proposed in the Tokyo 2016 bid. Japan’s repeated bids
seem to indicate that the momentum toward organizing Olympic Games in as-
sociation with large-scale development is more powerful than the anti-Olympic
and pro-environment movements.  This impetus has been so strong that Japan
has violated customs of bloc voting within the IOC and sacrificed East Asian
solidarity for its Olympic bids.  Similarly, a chapter by James Thomas (forth-
coming) based on his fieldwork among urban squatters in Seoul in 1988 con-
cludes that the Seoul Olympics enticed Korean citizens to support the state’s
grandiose development program by linking it with a “new empowered nation-
alism;” he observes that even after ex-presidents Chun and Roh were impris-
oned and discredited, the Olympics-inspired development program continued.
Elsewhere, I have echoed Shimizu’s argument in relation to Beijing,
demonstrating that the building of sports stadiums in general, and the 1990
Asian Games and 2008 Olympic complexes in particular, were part of a process
that transformed the old imperial city into a space symbolizing the power of a
modern nation-state (Brownell 2008: 73-96).  It may be that the Beijing Games
will initiate a period of regular bids for Olympic Games.  I was in Shanghai in
November 2008, where preparations for the 2010 World Expo were ramping
up after the conclusion of the Beijing Olympics, and the mood in the municipal
government was positive toward a future Olympic bid.  However, when Chinese
scholars refer to an anti-Olympic movement, they are not referring to opposition
to massive urban development, but rather to opposition to the state-supported
sport system and the government’s neglect of popular and school sport.  In 1964
Japan placed third in the gold medal count and in 1988 South Korea placed
fourth, their highest placements of all time.  Chinese sportspeople believed that
their first place in their own Olympics might also be the peak of China’s state-
supported sport system, and that the pursuit of gold medals might be down-
graded after the Games and more attention given to school and recreational
sport.  The Director of the State Sport General Administration, Liu Peng, took
a preemptive stance immediately after the Olympic Games in an interview in
the People’s Daily on September 6, stating, “Our position on the state-supported
sport system is clear: One, we will maintain it; two, we will perfect it” (Xu
2008). But the debates about the future of the state-supported system are still
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going on, as discussed in Dong Jinxia’s chapter.
Motivated by rivalry with China and South Korea, the Japanese govern-
ment established a National Training Center in 2000 and a system of subsidies
for top athletes in 2003, leading to a fifth-place finish in the gold medal count
at the 2004 Athens Olympics, the first time that it had defeated Korea (ninth)
in the gold medal count since the 1988 Seoul Olympics – and also the first time
that China, Japan, and South Korea had all finished in the top ten (excepting
the socialist bloc-boycotted 1984 Olympics). When Germany found its sixth-
place finish behind Japan unacceptable, it initiated the revival of several of the
former East German sports schools (Johnson 2008).  In addition to Germany
and Japan, a number of other sport superpowers were shamed by their perform-
ance in Athens, and their governments increased funding for sport, including
Russia, Australia, and Great Britain; the British Olympic Association pressed
for greater funding on the premise that it, like China, should make a good show-
ing at its own Olympic Games in 2012.  In Beijing, Great Britain redeemed its
national honor with an unexpected fourth (up from ninth), Germany climbed
back into fifth place, Australia dropped to sixth (from fourth), South Korea sur-
prised in seventh, and Japan slipped to eighth – due in part to South Korea’s
gold medal in baseball, which added salt to Japan’s wound.  Among the sport
superpowers of the world, the U.S. is an anomaly in its lack of direct govern-
ment investment in sport, since most American Olympians are cultivated in the
collegiate sport system, a structure that is unique to the U.S.  The U.S. Olympic
Committee’s (USOC) investment in sport is only a miniscule part of the Amer-
ican sport infrastructure.  About half of the USOC’s 600 million-dollar operating
budget in the last Olympiad came from a long-term contract with the IOC that
grants about 13% of U.S. Olympic television rights fees and 20% of Olympic
Top Programme marketing revenue to the USOC, which is greater than the per-
centage allotted to the other 204 national Olympic committees combined.  In
2008 resentment began to boil over in the IOC and among the other national
Olympic committees, who felt that the U.S. government was avoiding its moral
obligation to fund national sport by essentially skimming profit off the
Olympics that should be shared more equitably with other countries.  The
USOC and IOC postponed the re-negotiation of the contract until economic
conditions were more favorable.  Government investment in Olympic sport
seems to be on the increase worldwide, stimulated in part by China’s rise as a
sport superpower.  This Chinese model is itself stimulated by East Asian
Olympic rivalries fueled by Japan and its memories of the 1964 Olympics as a
turning point in Japan’s status among nations.  
In sum, when we carefully reexamine the 1964 and 1988 Olympics, it is
surprising that we remember them today as turning points in the peaceful inte-
gration of Japan and South Korea into the global community.  Why would
“peace” be associated with these events so clearly connected with political up-
heaval and war?  In his chapter, Shimizu quotes a Japanese spectator who re-
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members, “But the Tokyo Olympics brought the world to Japan for the first
time. Everybody could see the world in Japan, and found Japan in the world.”
Actually this was not strictly true, since World War II had brought the world to
Japan in unprecedented numbers and cultural influence – but the Pacific wars
of the twentieth century are not generally remembered for strengthening East-
West cross-cultural understanding (although, ironically, they did).  In the pop-
ular memory at home and abroad, probably the outstanding organization of the
Olympic ceremonial pageantry and the sports events themselves worked their
magic to leave lasting memories segregated from the surrounding politics and
remembrances of war.  Symbols of national pride that had been born in war,
which emphasized collective sacrifice in the struggle for survival among hostile
nations, were resituated within the pursuit of individual excellence and health,
in peaceful interaction with a friendly outside world.  
Dong Jinxia’s chapter captures the complexity of China’s national and in-
ternational identities in the Beijing Olympic Games, which was not well-rep-
resented in the Western media accounts.  Since the 1980s, nationalism in
Chinese sports was actually largely stimulated by the performances of women,
which should complicate a perception of Chinese sports as a symbol of aspira-
tions to military might.  The patriotic “Olympic Glory Plan” to top the gold
medal count went along with big efforts to incorporate the outside world into
the fabric of the Games, such as the students from other countries who com-
prised half of the 900 Olympic News Service workers.  From the position of a
Chinese academic living and working in China, Dong’s assessment of the effect
of increased national confidence conflicts with the Western distrust of Chinese
nationalism: she concludes that increased confidence will result in increased
tolerance and openness to the outside world.  As with the Japanese and South
Korean Olympic Games, the Beijing Olympic Games involved a complex in-
terplay of nationalism and internationalism that could not be summarized in a
sound bite.  Perhaps as the heated emotions surrounding the Beijing Olympics
fade into the distance, these Games will look similar to their East Asian prede-
cessors in hindsight, and will be remembered as a turning point in the peaceful
integration of China into the global community.
Note: 
A shorter version of this essay was published as “The Beijing Olympics as
a Turning Point? China’s First Olympics in East Asian Perspective” in the e-
journal The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (Vol. 23-4-09, June 8, 2009). It
appeared in the series “Playing Politics with the East Asian Olympics, 1964-
2016,” which also included a version of the chapter in this volume by Christian
Tagsold and an Introduction and essay by William W. Kelly.  I am grateful to
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